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Measuring Health Care Quality and Value: Theory and Empirics 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Imperfect information is a pervasive feature of health care markets. 
Therefore, measuring the quality and value of health care services may inform 
efforts to improve health care delivery.  This dissertation explores several 
applications of performance measurement in health care: describing national 
practice patterns, evaluating the effects of payment reforms, and contributing to 
policies that reward providers for measured performance. 
Chapter one describes the use of low-value services in fee-for-service 
Medicare.  Drawing from evidence-based lists of services that provide minimal 
clinical benefit, I develop 26 claims-based measures of low-value services.  Applying 
these measures to Medicare claims, I demonstrate that 42% of beneficiaries 
received at least one of these services in a year, which constituted 2.7 % of overall 
annual spending.  When more specific and less sensitive versions of the measures 
were used, I detected low-value service use for 25% of beneficiaries, constituting 
0.6% of overall spending.  In adjusted analyses, spending on low-value services was 
substantial even in regions at the 5th percentile of the regional distribution of low-
value spending.  Adjusted regional use was positively correlated among five of six 
categories of low-value services. These findings are consistent with the view that 
wasteful practices are pervasive in the US health care system.  The results also 
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suggest that the performance of claims-based measures in supporting policies to 
reduce overuse may depend heavily on how the measures are defined.  
Chapter two examines the role of provider organizations in influencing the 
delivery of low-value services.  In Part I of this chapter, I assess whether provider 
organizations exhibit distinct profiles of low-value service use in fee-for-service 
Medicare.  In one sample of 3,137 large provider organizations and another sample 
of 250 provider organizations that entered the Medicare Pioneer Accountable Care 
Organization (ACO) Program or the Medicare Shared Savings Program, I 
demonstrate that provider organizations’ use of low-value services exhibits 
considerable variation, substantial persistence over time, and modest consistency 
across service types.  In Part II of this chapter, I evaluate the effects of the Pioneer 
ACO Program on the use of low-value services. In a difference-in-differences 
analysis, I compare the use of low-value services between beneficiaries attributed to 
Pioneer ACOs and beneficiaries attributed to other providers, before (2009-2011) 
vs. after (2012) Pioneer ACO contracts began. During its first year, the Pioneer ACO 
program was associated with modest reductions in low-value services, with greater 
reductions for organizations that had provided more low-value services. The 
findings in this chapter suggest that provider organizations can influence the use of 
low-value services by affiliated physicians, and that organization-level incentives 
can reduce low-value practices.  
Chapter three analyzes the economic properties of performance measures 
used in both health care and education policy. Because observable outcomes 
constitute a noisy signal of performance in these settings, shrinkage estimators are 
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often used to improve measurement accuracy. I demonstrate that these 
improvements in accuracy come at the cost of reducing a measure’s responsiveness 
to agent behavior, thereby diluting incentives for performance improvement.  In a 
model of consumers sorting between agents, I show that welfare depends on two 
components: (1) accuracy of performance signals, which promotes efficient 
consumer sorting, and (2) incentives for performance improvement, which promote 
efficient agent effort.  Using Monte Carlo simulation, I evaluate the accuracy and 
incentive properties of various techniques for estimating hospital performance in 
heart attack mortality.  Shrinkage estimators entail substantial incentive distortions, 
particularly for smaller hospitals, which experience an approximate 50-70% “tax” 
on improvement.  Several estimation techniques, including the methods currently 
used by Medicare, are dominated on the basis of both accuracy and incentive 
criteria.  I discuss various policy alternatives to shrinkage estimation, such as 
increasing the timespan of measuring performance. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Measuring Low-Value Care in Medicare* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* A version of this chapter was previously published: 
Schwartz AL, Landon BE, Elshaug AG, Chernew ME, McWilliams JM. Measuring low-
value care in Medicare. JAMA Internal Medicine. 2014;174(7):1067–76. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Several recent initiatives, including the “Choosing Wisely” campaign by the 
American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation,1 have focused on directly defining 
wasteful health care services that provide little or no health benefit to patients.  It is 
challenging, however, to translate evidence-based lists of low-value services generated 
by such initiatives into meaningful metrics that can be applied to available data sources 
such as insurance claims.2  The value of most services depends on the clinical situation 
in which they are provided, and administrative data often lack the clinical detail 
necessary to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate use.  Consequently, the 
number of low-value services that can be reliably identified in claims data may be 
limited, and the amount of low-value care detected by claims-based measures may be 
highly sensitive to how the measures are defined.   
Direct approaches to measuring overuse may nevertheless be useful for 
characterizing the potential extent of wasteful care and informing policies to address 
low-value practices.  Indirect approaches to measuring care efficiency, such as 
comparing total risk-adjusted spending per patient across geographic areas or provider 
organizations,3 may be challenging for policymakers and providers to act on because 
specific services contributing to wasteful spending are not identified.4  Furthermore, 
such relative measures may fail to characterize the full extent of low-value practices if 
they are widespread.  In contrast, direct measures could be used to identify specific 
instances of overuse and assess their frequency among even the most efficient 
providers.  In addition, even a limited set of direct measures could be useful for 
monitoring low-value care if it reflects underlying drivers of overuse more broadly.  For 
analogous reasons, many quality measures relating to underuse have been developed 
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and applied widely in quality-improvement initiatives despite similar measurement 
challenges.5,6  
Drawing from evidence-based lists and the medical literature, we created 
algorithms to measure selected low-value services that could be applied to insurance 
claims data with reasonable accuracy despite the limited clinical information in claims.  
Using 2009 Medicare claims, we examined the use of these services and their associated 
spending, varying the sensitivity and specificity with which the measures likely 
identified overuse.  We also examined whether use of different types of low-value care 
was correlated within regions; positive correlations might suggest that the measures 
reflect common drivers of overuse. 
 
1.2 METHODS  
Data Sources and Sample Population 
We analyzed 2008-2009 claims data for a random 5% sample of Medicare 
beneficiaries, as well as demographic information from enrollment files and chronic 
conditions from the Chronic Condition Data Warehouse (CCW).7  We applied measures 
of low-value services to 2009 claims, using 2008 claims and the CCW for relevant 
clinical history.  Our study population consisted of 1,360,908 beneficiaries who were 
continuously enrolled in Part A and B of traditional fee-for-service Medicare in 2008 
and while alive in 2009.  We further restricted the study population to individuals who, 
in 2009, were living in the United States or Washington, DC, and were at least 65 years 
old.  Our study was approved by the Harvard Medical School Committee on Human 
Studies and the Privacy Board of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 
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Measures of Low-Value Services 
We considered services that have been characterized as low-value by the 
American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation’s Choosing Wisely initiative,8 the US 
Preventive Services Task Force “D” recommendations,9 the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence “do not do” recommendations,10 the Canadian Agency for Drugs 
and Technologies in Health health technology assessments,11 or peer-reviewed medical 
literature.12  These services provide little to no clinical benefit on average, either in 
general or in specific clinical scenarios.  From these services, we selected a subset that is 
relevant to the Medicare population and could be detected using Medicare claims with 
reasonable specificity, meaning that major clinical factors distinguishing likely overuse 
from appropriate use could be identified or approximated with claims and enrollment 
data (Appendix 1).  We also required the evidence base characterizing each service as 
low-value to have been established before 2009.  Many low-value services were not 
selected (e.g., imaging for pulmonary embolism without moderate or high pre-test 
probability8) because of difficulty distinguishing inappropriate from appropriate use 
with claims data. 
For each selected service, we developed an operational definition of low-value 
occurrences using Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes, Berenson-Eggers Type 
of Service (BETOS) codes, International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) 
diagnostic codes, CCW indicators, timing of care, site of care, and demographic 
information (Appendix 1).  When supported by clinical evidence or guidelines, we 
broadened the scope of some recommendations featured in lists of low-value services.  
For example, we expanded the Choosing Wisely definition of low-value preoperative 
pulmonary testing before cardiac surgery to include pre-operative pulmonary testing 
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before low- or intermediate-risk surgical procedures more broadly.13  We also 
combined similar low-value services (e.g. various laboratory tests for hypercoaguable 
states) into single measures.  Table 1.1 presents the operational definitions for the 26 
measures of low-value care we developed and applied to claims.  
Inherent in most of our claims-based measures of low-value care was a trade-off 
between sensitivity (greater capture of inappropriate use) and specificity (less 
misclassification of appropriate use as inappropriate).  To assess the variability of our 
findings across a spectrum of these important measurement properties, we specified 
two versions of each measure, one with higher sensitivity (and lower specificity) and 
the other with higher specificity (and lower sensitivity) for detecting low-value care 
(Table 1.1).  Even without a gold standard for assessing service appropriateness, the 
relative sensitivity and specificity of our measures can be inferred from the clinical 
criteria we applied.  For example, limiting the colorectal cancer screening measure to 
beneficiaries older than 85 years instead of older than 75 years decreases its sensitivity 
(fewer low-value instances detected) but increases its specificity (smaller proportion of 
appropriate services misclassified as inappropriate). 
We calculated spending on low-value services using standardized prices to 
adjust for regional differences in Medicare payments.  We used the median spending 
per service nationally as the standardized price for each service, including payments 
from Medicare, beneficiary coinsurance amounts, and any payments from other 
primary payers.  We included related services typically bundled with the low-value 
service in these price estimates (e.g. contrast medium administration for an imaging 
study or anesthesia for a procedure).  These bundles were defined based on 
examination of the most frequent CPT codes appearing during the day a low-value 
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service was provided and thus would not include subsequent care prompted by the 
service (e.g., further imaging for incidental findings on preoperative chest radiographs).  
Additional information on service detection and pricing, including the specific codes 
(CPT, BETOS, etc.) employed, is available in Appendix 1.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
We counted the number of times each beneficiary experienced each low-value 
service and calculated the per-beneficiary spending for each service.  From these values, 
we calculated the percentage of beneficiaries receiving at least one low-value service 
and the aggregate spending for all beneficiaries for each service and in each of six 
service categories: low-value cancer screening; low-value diagnostic and preventive 
testing; low-value preoperative testing; low-value imaging; low-value cardiovascular 
testing and procedures; and other low-value surgical procedures.  Aggregate spending 
estimates were multiplied by 20 to approximate spending for the entire Medicare 
population from 5% samples.  We also calculated the proportion of total spending for 
services covered by Medicare Parts A and B (including coinsurance amounts and 
payments from other primary payers) devoted to services detected by low-value care 
measures.  
We used hospital referral regions (HRRs) to examine how use of different types 
of low-value services was related among the same groupings of providers.  Although we 
were not interested in geographic areas per se and although practice patterns vary 
within and between areas,4 HRRs nevertheless served as a useful unit of comparison to 
determine whether groups of providers that were more likely to provide one type of 
low-value service were more likely to provide another.  First, we estimated mean per-
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beneficiary utilization counts in each service category at the HRR level using linear 
regression models with HRR fixed effects.  To control for beneficiaries’ 
sociodemographic and clinical characteristics, we included as covariates age, age 
squared, sex, race, indicators of 21 CCW diagnoses present before 2009 (derived from 
claims dating back to 1999), indicators of having multiple comorbid conditions (2 to 
7+), the Rural-Urban Continuum Code  for beneficiaries’ county of residence, and 
several socioeconomic measures of the elderly population at the zip code tabulation 
area level (median income, percentage below the federal poverty level, and percentage 
with a high school diploma).  To account for additional dimensions of case mix not 
captured by the CCW, we included indicators of conditions that qualified patients for 
potential receipt of several low-value services (e.g., a diagnosis of headache in 2009 
qualifying beneficiaries for potentially inappropriate head imaging; see Appendix 1 for 
details).  For each pair of low-value service categories, we then estimated correlations 
between regional means in adjusted use, weighted by the number of traditional fee-for-
service Medicare beneficiaries in each HRR.  Correlations were not substantially altered 
by use of random effects to estimate regional means or by the addition of indicators of 
qualifying conditions. 
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Table 1.1 Measures of Low-Value Services  
  Operational Definition 
Measure 
Source and 
Supporting 
Literature 
More Sensitive, Less Specific 
(Base Definition) 
Less Sensitive, More Specific 
(Additional Restrictions) 
Cancer Screening 
Cancer screening for patients 
with CKD receiving dialysis 
CW14  
Screening for cancer of the breast, cervix, 
colon, or prostate for patients with CKD 
receiving dialysis services 
Only patients aged ≥75ya 
Cervical cancer screening for 
women aged ≥65 y 
CW,  
USPSTF15 
Screening Papanicolaou test for women aged 
≥65 y 
No personal history of cervical cancer or 
dysplasia noted in claim or in prior claimsb; no 
diagnoses of other female genital cancers, 
abnormal Papanicolaou findings, or human 
papillomavirus positivity in prior claims  
Colorectal cancer screening for 
older elderly patients 
USPSTF16 
Colorectal cancer screening (colonoscopy, 
sigmoidoscopy, barium enema, or fecal occult 
blood testing) for patients aged ≥75 y 
No history of colon cancer; only screening (i.e. 
not diagnostic) procedure codes; only patients 
over age 85 
PSA testing for men aged ≥75 y USPSTF17 PSA test for patients ≥75 y 
No history of prostate cancer; only screening 
(i.e. not diagnostic) procedure codes  
Diagnostic and Preventive Testing 
Bone mineral density testing at 
frequent intervals 
Literature18,19 
Bone mineral density test <2 y after prior 
bone mineral density test 
Only patients with a diagnosis of osteoporosis 
prior to the initial bone mineral density testc  
Homocysteine testing for 
cardiovascular disease 
Literature20 Homocysteine testing 
No diagnoses of folate or B12 deficiencies in 
claim and no folate or B12 testing in prior 
claims 
Hypercoagulability testing for 
patients with deep vein 
thrombosis 
CW21 
Laboratory tests for hypercoagulable states 
within 30 d after diagnosis of lower-extremity 
deep vein thrombosis or pulmonary embolism  
No evidence of recurrent thrombosis, defined 
by diagnosis of deep vein thrombosis or 
pulmonary embolism > 90 d before claim 
PTH measurement for patients 
with stage 1-3 CKD 
NICE22,23 PTH measurement in patients with CKD 
No dialysis services before PTH testing or 
within 30 d after testing; no hypercalcemia 
diagnosis in any 2009 claim 
 
 
  
9
 
Table 1.1 (Continued) Measures of Low-Value Services  
Preoperative Testing    
Preoperative chest 
radiography  
CADTH 
CW24,25 
Chest radiograph specified as a preoperative 
assessment or occurring within 30 d before a 
low- or intermediate-risk noncardiothoracic 
surgical procedured   
No radiographs related to inpatient or 
emergency caree; only radiographs that 
preceded a low- or intermediate-risk 
noncardiothoracic surgical procedure (i.e. 
excluding those specified as preoperative 
before other procedures)d  
Preoperative 
echocardiography 
CW26 
Echocardiogram specified as a preoperative 
assessment or occurring within 30 d before a 
low- or intermediate-risk noncardiothoracic 
surgical procedured  
No echocardiograms related to inpatient or 
emergency caree; only echocardiograms that 
preceded a low- or intermediate-risk non-
cardiothoracic surgical procedured   
Preoperative PFT CW13 
PFT specified as a preoperative assessment or 
occurring within 30 d before a low or 
intermediate risk surgical proceduref  
No PFTs related to inpatient or emergency 
caree; only PFT that preceded a low- or 
intermediate- risk surgical proceduref 
Preoperative stress testing CW27 
Stress electrocardiography, 
echocardiography, or nuclear medicine 
imaging specified as a preoperative 
assessment or occurring within 30 d before a 
low- or intermediate-risk noncardiothoracic 
surgical procedured 
No stress testing related to inpatient or 
emergency caree; only stress testing that 
preceded a low- or intermediate-risk 
noncardiothoracic surgical procedured 
Imaging    
CT of the sinuses for 
uncomplicated acute 
rhinosinusitis  
CW28 
Maxillofacial CT study with a diagnosis of 
sinusitis in the imaging claim 
No complications of sinusitis,g immune 
deficiencies, nasal polyps, or head/face trauma 
noted in claim; no patients with chronic 
sinusitis, defined by sinusitis diagnosis 
between 1 y and 30 d before imaging 
Head imaging in the evaluation 
of syncope  
CW 
NICE29 
CT or MR imaging of the head with a diagnosis 
of syncope in the imaging claim 
No diagnoses in claim warranting imagingh  
Head imaging for 
uncomplicated headache 
CW30 
CT or MR imaging of the head with a diagnosis 
of (non-thunderclap, non-post-traumatic) 
headache 
No diagnoses in claim warranting imagingi  
EEG for headaches CW31 EEG with headache diagnosis in the claim 
No epilepsy or convulsions noted in current or 
prior claims 
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Table 1.1 (Continued) Measures of Low-Value Services  
Back imaging for patients with 
nonspecific low back pain  
CW, 
NICE32 
Back imaging with a diagnosis of lower back 
pain 
No diagnoses in claim warranting imagingj; 
imaging occurred within 6 wk of the first 
diagnosis of back pain 
Screening for carotid artery 
disease in asymptomatic adults 
CW, 
USPSTF33 
Carotid imaging for patients without a history 
of stroke or TIA and without a diagnosis of 
stroke, TIA, or focal neurological symptoms in 
claim 
Test not associated with inpatient or 
emergency carek 
Screening for carotid artery 
disease for syncope 
CW29 Carotid imaging with syncope diagnosis 
No history of stroke or TIA; No stroke, TIA, or 
focal neurological symptoms noted in claim 
Cardiovascular Testing and Procedures 
Stress testing for stable 
coronary disease 
CW34  
Literature35 
Stress testing for patients with an established 
diagnosis of ischemic heart disease or angina 
(≥6 mo before the stress test) and thus not 
done for screening purposes 
Test not associated with inpatient or 
emergency care, which might be indicative of 
unstable angina k; only patients with a past 
diagnosis of myocardial infarction in order to 
exclude patients with a history of noncardiac 
chest pain inaccurately coded as angina (i.e., 
those with no underlying ischemic heart 
disease who might benefit from screening and 
optimization of medical management) 
Percutaneous coronary 
intervention with balloon 
angioplasty or stent placement 
for stable coronary disease 
Literature35,36 
Coronary stent placement or balloon 
angioplasty for patients with an established 
diagnosis of ischemic heart disease or angina 
(≥6 mo before the procedure);procedure not 
associated with an ED visit,k which might be 
indicative of acute coronary syndrome 
Only patients with a past diagnosis of 
myocardial infarction in order to exclude 
patients with a history of non-cardiac chest 
pain inaccurately coded as angina  
Renal artery angioplasty or 
stenting 
Literature37,38 Renal/visceral angioplasty or stent placement 
Diagnosis of renal atherosclerosis or 
renovascular hypertension noted in procedure 
claim 
Carotid endarterectomy in 
asymptomatic patients 
CW33,39 
Carotid endarterectomy for patients without a 
history of stroke or TIA and without stroke, 
TIA, or focal neurological symptoms noted in 
claim 
Operation not associated with an ED visitk; only 
female patientsl 
IVC filters for the prevention of 
pulmonary embolism  
Literature40,41 Any IVC filter placement   No additional restrictions 
 
  
1
1
 
Table 1.1 (Continued) Measures of Low-Value Services  
Other Surgery 
Vertebroplasty or kyphoplasty 
for osteoporotic vertebral 
fractures 
Literature42-45 
Vertebroplasty/kyphoplasty for vertebral 
fracture 
No bone cancers, myeloma, or hemangioma 
noted in procedure claim 
Arthroscopic surgery for knee 
osteoarthritis 
NICE46,47 
Arthroscopic debridement/chondroplasty of 
the knee  
Diagnosis of osteoarthritis or chondromalacia 
in the procedure claim; no meniscal tear noted 
in the procedure claim 
 
Abbreviations: CADTH, Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health health technology assessments; CKD, chronic kidney disease; CT, 
computed tomography; CW, Choosing Wisely; ED, emergency department; EEG, electroencephalography; IVC, inferior vena cava; MR, magnetic 
resonance; NICE, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence “do not do” list; PFT, pulmonary function testing; PSA, prostate-specific antigen; 
PTH, parathyroid hormone; TIA, transient ischemic attack; USPSTF, US Preventive Services Task Force C or D recommendations.  
 
a This age cutoff is included because the distribution of kidney transplant recipient ages within the sample suggests transplantation is uncommon in 
patients 75 years or older. 
 
b Throughout the table, “prior claims” refers to all claims from January 1, 2008, until 1 d before the service of interest. 
 
c This restriction limits the measure to testing of patients with osteoporosis. 
 
d Including breast procedures, colectomy, cholecystectomy, transurethral resection of the prostate, hysterectomy, orthopedic surgical procedures 
other than hip and knee replacement, corneal transplant, cataract removal, retinal detachment, hernia repair, lithotripsy, arthroscopy, and 
cholecystectomy. The 30-day window between preoperative testing and surgery was derived empirically based on distribution of intervals between 
test and procedure. 
 
e Inpatient-associated is defined here as occurring during within 30 d after an inpatient stay; ED-associated, during or 1 d after an ED visit. 
 
f Including procedures listed in footnote d as well as coronary artery bypass graft, aneurysm repair, thromboendarterectomy, percutaneous 
transluminal 
coronary angioplasty, and pacemaker insertion. 
 
g Complications of sinusitis include eyelid inflammation, acute inflammation of orbit, orbital cellulitis, and visual problems. 
 
h Exclusion diagnoses include epilepsy, giant cell arteritis, head trauma, convulsions, altered mental status, nervous system symptoms (eg, 
hemiplegia), disturbances of skin sensation, speech problems, stroke, transient ischemic attack, and history of stroke. 
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Table 1.1 (Continued) Measures of Low-Value Services 
i Exclusion diagnoses include those listed in the preceding footnote as well as cancer and history of cancer. 
 
j Exclusion diagnoses include cancer, trauma, intravenous drug abuse, neurological impairment, endocarditis, septicemia, tuberculosis, osteomyelitis, 
fever, weight loss, loss of appetite, night sweats, and anemia. 
 
k Inpatient-associated is defined here as occurring during an inpatient stay; ED-associated, during or within 14 d after an ED visit. 
 
l Restriction is based on sex-specific subgroup analyses of procedure efficacy in the referenced literature. 
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1.3 RESULTS 
Among 1,360,908 beneficiaries in the study sample, 1,094,374 instances of care 
provision (80 services per 100 beneficiaries) were detected by the more sensitive 
measures of low-value services, corresponding to 21.9 million instances for the entire 
traditional Medicare population in 2009.  Forty-two percent of beneficiaries received at 
least 1 service detected by the more sensitive measures.  Our more specific but less 
sensitive measures of low-value care detected 454,783services (33 per 100 
beneficiaries), corresponding to 9.1 million services for the entire Medicare population.  
Twenty-five percent of beneficiaries received at least 1 of these services.  
Spending for services detected by our more sensitive measures of low-value care 
totaled $8.5 billion for the entire Medicare population, or $310 per beneficiary, while 
spending for services detected by our more specific measures totaled $1.9 billion, or 
$71 per beneficiary.  These amounts comprised 2.7% and 0.6%, respectively, of total 
annual spending in 2009 on services covered by Part A and B of Medicare. 
Figure 1.1 presents utilization rates and their associated spending, decomposed 
by category of low-value care measures.  Imaging, cancer screening, and diagnostic and 
preventive testing measures detected most of the use, whereas measures of imaging 
and cardiovascular testing and procedures detected most of the spending (see Appendix 
1 for these results in tabular form).  Table 1.2 presents utilization rates and associated 
spending captured by each of the 26 measures of low-value care.  Individual measures 
with major contributions to spending included both high-price, low-utilization items 
such as percutaneous coronary intervention for stable coronary disease and low-price, 
high-utilization items such as screening for asymptomatic carotid artery disease.   
 14 
 
Table 1.3 presents correlations between adjusted levels of regional service use 
in different categories of low-value care, as detected by our more sensitive measures.  
Per-beneficiary utilization counts were positively correlated with one another for five of 
the six categories.  Correlation coefficients ranged from 0.14 to 0.54 across all pair-wise 
combinations of these five categories (P≤0.01), with a mean of 0.33.  Non-
cardiovascular surgical procedures were not positively correlated with use in other 
categories of measures.  The measures exhibited good internal consistency across all 
categories (Chronbach’s alpha, 0.68). 
Adjusted regional spending on services detected by more sensitive measures of 
low-value care ranged from $227 per-beneficiary in the 5th percentile to $416 per-
beneficiary in the 95th percentile of HRRs (median, $304; inter-quartile range, $272 to 
$343).  Thus, low-value spending detected in regions at the 5th percentile of the 
regional distribution exceeded the difference in detected low-value spending between 
regions at the 5th and 95th percentiles ($189/beneficiary). 
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Figure 1.1  Utilization Rates and Associated Spending for Services Detected  
by Low-Value Care Measures Among Medicare Beneficiaries in 2009 
Count refers to unique incidences of service provision; overall spending, total spending on all services covered by Medicare Parts A and B (see Table 1.1 
for services included in each category and for operational definitions of all measures). 
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Table 1.2 Service Counts and Associated Spending Detected by Measures of Low-Value Care 
 More Sensitive Versions of Measures  More Specific Version of Measures 
Measure 
(Abbreviated) 
Count  
per 
100 
benesa 
% of 
low-
value 
count 
% of 
benes 
affected 
Spending 
 ($M) 
% of low-
value 
spending 
% of 
overall 
spendingb 
Count  
per 
100 
benesa 
% of 
low-
value 
count 
% of 
benes 
affected 
Spending 
 ($M) 
% of low-
value 
spending 
% of 
overall 
spendingb 
Imaging for non-specific 
low back pain 
12.4 15% 9.4% 226 3% 0.07% 4.5 14% 4.1% 82 4% 0.03% 
PSA screening at age 
>75 y 
12.0 15% 8.3% 98 1% 0.03% 2.8 8% 2.7% 23 1% 0.01% 
PTH testing in early 
CKD 
7.9 10% 2.5% 137 2% 0.04% 3.1 9% 1.7% 53 3% 0.02% 
Stress testing for stable 
coronary disease 
7.8 10% 7.3% 2,065 24% 0.67% 0.8 2% 0.8% 212 11% 0.07% 
Colon cancer screening  
for older elderly 
patients 
7.7 10% 6.9% 573 7% 0.18% 0.9 3% 0.8% 7 0% 0.00% 
Cervical cancer 
screening at age > 65 y 
7.0 9% 6.9% 120 1% 0.04% 6.5 19% 6.4% 111 6% 0.04% 
Carotid artery disease 
screening  for 
asymptomatic patients 
6.6 8% 6.0% 323 4% 0.10% 5.6 17% 5.1% 274 14% 0.09% 
Preoperative 
radiography 
5.5 7% 5.1% 75 1% 0.02% 1.6 5% 1.6% 22 1% 0.01% 
Head imaging for 
headache 
3.4 4% 3.1% 211 2% 0.07% 2.4 7% 2.2% 146 8% 0.05% 
Homocysteine testing  
for cardiovascular 
disease 
2.0 3% 1.5% 15 0% 0.00% 0.8 2% 0.6% 6 0% 0.00% 
Head imaging for 
syncope 
1.4 2% 1.3% 85 1% 0.03% 1.0 3% 0.9% 60 3% 0.02% 
Bone mineral density 
testing at frequent 
intervals 
1.0 1% 1.0% 20 0% 0.01% 0.8 3% 0.8% 17 1% 0.01% 
Carotid artery disease 
screening for syncope 
1.0 1% 1.0% 49 1% 0.02% 0.7 2% 0.7% 33 2% 0.01% 
PCI/stenting for stable 
coronary disease 
0.8 1% 0.7% 2,810 33% 0.91% 0.1 0% 0.1% 212 11% 0.07% 
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Table 1.2 (Continued) Service Counts and Associated Spending Detected by Measures of Low-Value Care 
Preoperative 
echocardiography 
0.8 1% 0.8% 58 1% 0.02% 0.3 1% 0.3% 21 1% 0.01% 
Preoperative stress 
testing 
0.7 1% 0.7% 180 2% 0.06% 0.3 1% 0.3% 81 4% 0.03% 
CT scan for 
rhinosinusitis 
0.6 1% 0.6% 42 1% 0.01% 0.3 1% 0.3% 23 1% 0.01% 
Renal artery stenting 0.4 0% 0.3% 705 8% 0.23% 0.1 0% 0.1% 139 7% 0.04% 
Vertebroplasty 0.3 0% 0.3% 199 2% 0.06% 0.3 1% 0.3% 196 10% 0.06% 
Arthroscopic surgery  
for knee osteoarthritis 
0.2 0% 0.2% 143 2% 0.05% 0.1 0% 0.1% 63 3% 0.02% 
Cancer screening for 
patients with CKD 
receiving dialysis 
0.2 0% 0.2% 4 0% 0.00% 0.1 0% 0.1% 1 0% 0.00% 
IVC filter placement 0.2 0% 0.2% 43 1% 0.01% 0.2 1% 0.2% 43 2% 0.01% 
Preoperative PFT 0.2 0% 0.2% 2 0% 0.00% 0.1 0% 0.1% 1 0% 0.00% 
Carotid endarterectomy 
for asymptomatic 
patients 
0.1 0% 0.1% 263 3% 0.08% 0.1 0% 0.0% 110 6% 0.04% 
Hypercoagulability 
testing after DVT 
0.1 0% 0.1% 3 0% 0.00% 0.0 0% 0.0% 1 0% 0.00% 
EEG for headache 0.1 0% 0.1% 3 0% 0.00% 0.0 0% 0.0% 2 0% 0.00% 
Total  80.4 100% 42%c 8,451 100% 2.7% 33.4 100% 25%c 1,941 100% 0.6% 
Abbreviations: Bene, Beneficiaries; CKD, chronic kidney disease; CT, computed tomography; DVT, deep vein thrombosis; EEG, 
electroencephalography; IVC, inferior vena cava; PBA, proportion of beneficiaries affected; PCI, percutaneous coronary intervention; PFT, pulmonary 
function testing; PLVC, proportion of low-value count; PLVS, proportion of low-value spending; POS, proportion of overall spending; PSA, prostate-
specific antigen; PTH, parathyroid hormone.  
 
a Count refers to the number of unique incidences of service provision. 
b Overall spending refers to annual spending for services covered by Medicare Parts A and B. See Table 1 for service category assignments and for 
operational definitions of all measures. 
c Totals do not equal column sums because some patients received multiple services. 
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Table 1.3 Correlations in Regional Use Between Categories of Measures of Low-Value Care 
Category Cancer Screening 
Diagnostic and 
Preventive 
Testing 
Preoperative 
Testing Imaging 
Cardiovascular 
Testing and 
Procedures Other Surgery 
Cancer Screening 1 [Reference]      
Diagnostic and 
Preventive 
Testing 
0.35b 1 [Reference]     
Preoperative 
Testing 
0.32b 0.14c 1 [Reference]    
Imaging 0.50b 0.32b 0.31b 1 [Reference]   
Cardiovascular 
Testing and 
Procedures 
0.29b 0.29b 0.27b 0.54b 1 [Reference]  
Other Surgery −0.14c -0.07 -0.16b 0.01 0.06 1 [Reference] 
 
a Values represent Pearson correlation coefficients 
b P<.01 
c P<.05 
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1.4 DISCUSSION 
In this national study of selected low-value services, Medicare beneficiaries 
commonly received care that was likely to provide minimal or no benefit on average.  
Even when applying narrower versions of our limited number of measures of overuse, 
we identified low-value care affecting one-quarter of Medicare beneficiaries.  These 
findings are consistent with the notion that wasteful practices are pervasive in the US 
health care system. 
Within regions, different types of low-value use generally exhibited significantly 
positive correlations with one another, ranging from weak to moderate in strength, 
although one category of low-value use (non-cardiovascular surgical procedures) was 
not positively correlated with the others.  These findings suggest that many low-value 
services may be driven by common factors.  Therefore, claims-based measures, 
although limited in number and the amount of wasteful spending they detect, could be 
useful for monitoring low-value care more broadly, including some care that may be 
difficult to measure with claims.   
Although these findings suggest that direct approaches to measuring wasteful 
care may be tractable and informative, other findings underscore potential challenges in 
developing and applying direct measures of overuse.  In particular, the amount of low-
value care we detected varied substantially with the clinical specificity of our measures.  
Estimates of the proportion of Medicare beneficiaries receiving at least one measured 
low-value service decreased from 42% to 25% when we used more restrictive 
definitions that traded off sensitivity for specificity, and the contribution of low-value 
spending to total spending decreased from 2.7% to 0.6%.  For example, our more 
sensitive measure of low-value imaging for low back pain captured more inappropriate 
 20 
 
use of imaging studies at the expense of including some appropriate use.  Our more 
specific measure was less likely to include appropriate use but probably excluded many 
low-value studies, as suggested by the 3-fold reduction in the number of studies 
captured.   
Thus, the performance of administrative rules to reduce overuse through 
coverage policy, cost-sharing, or value-based payment (e.g., pay for performance) may 
depend heavily on measure definition.  Such strategies may be appropriate for select 
services whose value is invariably low or whose low-value applications can be 
identified with high reliability.  For other services, however, more sensitive measures 
could result in unintended restriction of appropriate tests and procedures by coverage 
and payment policies, whereas more specific measures could substantially limit the 
effect of these strategies.  Provider groups seeking to minimize wasteful spending― for 
example, in response to global budgets― may be able to distinguish appropriate from 
inappropriate practices at the point of care without having to use rigid rules derived 
from incomplete clinical data.  
We also found that, although spending on low-value services varied 
considerably across regions, spending on low-value services was substantial even in 
regions where it was lowest.  For example, low-value spending at the 5th percentile of 
the regional distribution of low-value spending was greater than the difference in low-
value spending between the 5th and 95th percentiles.  This finding suggests potential 
advantages of direct measurement over relative spending comparisons as a basis for 
detecting overuse because overuse may be substantial even among more efficient 
providers. 
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Our study has several limitations.  Most notably, we analyzed only 26 measures 
of low-value services.  In selecting these measures, we emphasized the specificity with 
which overuse could be detected with claims data and created more restrictive versions 
that limited contributions of potentially valuable service use to low-value spending 
totals and utilization counts.  Despite the limited number of services we examined, their 
frequency and correlations with one another suggest substantial and widespread 
wasteful care.  Use of a broader set of less specific and more sensitive measures would 
capture more low-value care.  Similarly, broader definitions of wasteful spending that 
include downstream costs of low-value service use (e.g., repeat imaging for incidental 
findings) would capture more spending than our measures did.  For example, one study 
estimated that testing costs may account for just 2% of the lifetime costs of prostate-
specific antigen screening.48 
Clinical data from linked medical records might support a more extensive 
assessment of the properties of claims-based measures.  However, we would not expect 
the incorporation of more detailed data to substantially alter the amount of low-value 
care captured by many of our measures (e.g. cancer screening in patients above certain 
ages, inappropriately frequent bone mineral density testing, homocysteine testing for 
cardiovascular disease, renal artery stenting, and vertebroplasty).  Furthermore, by 
varying the definitions of our measures, we were able to demonstrate potential 
limitations of claims-based measures without having to use medical record data; any 
inconsistencies between claims and medical records in the amount of low-value care 
detected would have similar implications for strategies to address wasteful practices.  
Moreover, we focused on the potential utility of claims-based measures because 
medical record review as a means to measure and monitor wasteful care is costly and 
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thus not feasible on a large scale.  Nevertheless, validation of claims-based measures 
against a gold standard of clinical appropriateness will be needed to more precisely 
define their strengths and weaknesses and assess their utility for different purposes, 
such as monitoring, profiling, payment policy, or coverage design. 
Although our analysis suggests that common drivers of low-value care exist, our 
study did not identify specific determinants of wasteful care.  Factors associated with 
low-value care may also be associated with high-value care.49,50   Coupling measures of 
overuse with measures of underuse may therefore be important when evaluating 
programs intended to achieve more cost-effective care.   
Finally, unmeasured variation in diagnostic coding practices or case mix may 
have contributed to positive correlations between regional use of different low-value 
services in our study.  These were not likely sources of significant bias, however, 
because we found a significant positive correlation between categories of low-value 
services that did not rely on diagnosis codes to define (i.e. age-inappropriate cancer 
screening and preoperative testing) and because our results were not sensitive to 
adjustment for additional conditions qualifying beneficiaries for potential receipt of 
several low-value services.  
Many quality measures have been developed to assess underuse but few to 
assess overuse.  Our study findings illustrate the potential utility and limitations of a 
direct approach to detect wasteful care.  Despite their imperfections, claims-based 
measures of low-value care could be useful for tracking overuse and evaluating 
programs to reduce it.  However, many direct claims-based measures of overuse may be 
insufficiently accurate to support targeted coverage or payment policies that have a 
meaningful effect on use without resulting in unintended consequences.  Broader 
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payment reforms such as global or bundled payment models could allow greater 
provider discretion in defining and identifying low-value services while incentivizing 
their elimination. 
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2.1 LOW-VALUE CARE IN PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS:  
VARIATION, PERSISTENCE, AND CONSISTENCY 
 
2.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Provider organizations are an increasing focus of initiatives that aim to reduce 
unnecessary health care utilization. For example, both private and public insurers have 
pursued accountable care organization (ACO) programs, which base payments to 
provider organizations on total patient spending relative to a global budget.1,2   How 
organization-level incentives will affect patient care depends on how these 
organizations influence physician behavior.3 From small group practices to large 
integrated delivery systems, provider organizations may shape the practice patterns of 
affiliated physicians in several ways: by setting the form of physician compensation,4 by 
investing in care inputs like clinical decision support5,6 or in delivery models like the 
patient-centered medical home,7 by fostering social networks of peer physicians,8 or by 
selectively recruiting physicians based on their training background.9–11 Alternatively, 
loose organizational ties, which may be created to improve provider market share, may 
not meaningfully affect patient care.  
We explore whether patterns of low-value service use are consistent with 
provider organizations influencing the value of care that patients receive. Specifically, 
we examined whether provider organizations exhibited a profile of overuse that is 
measurable based on administrative claims data, like the spending or quality profiles 
investigated for physicians within the same region or hospital.12–14 Because it is difficult 
to distinguish between high-value and low-value services in many clinical scenarios, our 
methods drew from recent efforts by specialty societies to identify services that provide 
 33 
 
minimal patient benefit.15 Using 2007-2011 Medicare fee-for-service claims data, we 
study 31 of these services. Specifically, we measure three properties of low-value 
service use in provider organizations: variation across organizations, persistence of 
service use within an organization over time, and the consistency of organizational 
behavior across different types of low-value services. 
 
2.1.2 METHODS 
Study Population of Patients and Organizations 
 Our primary data were 2007-2011 claims and enrollment information for a 20% 
random annual sample of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. In each year of the 
study period, beneficiaries were excluded from the sample if they were not 
continuously enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B (while alive) during that year and 
during the prior year. The prior year of enrollment was necessary because the detection 
of certain low-value services depends on diagnoses and procedures found in prior 
claims. Beneficiaries were also excluded from the study sample for any years in which 
they did not receive primary care services, which were necessary for attribution to a 
provider organization.  
 We constructed two different samples in order to characterize practice patterns 
for large provider organizations in general and for organizations joining ACO programs 
in particular.  For the first sample, which we refer to as the general sample, provider 
organizations were defined by a single taxpayer identification number (TIN).  TINs, 
which are included in Medicare claims for professional services, can be shared by 
multiple physicians and typically identify group practices or broader provider 
organizations.16 We restricted the general sample to larger organizations, specifically 
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those organizations to which we attributed 1,000 or more patient-years during the 
study period.  
For the second sample, the ACO sample, an organization was defined as the 
collection of TINs for providers that formed a Medicare ACO in 2012 or 2013.  The ACO 
sample included 32 organizations that participated in the Medicare Pioneer ACO 
Program in 2012 and 218 organizations from the Medicare Shared Savings Program 
(MSSP), 114 that entered in 2012 and 104 that entered in 2013. To identify each ACO, 
we matched publicly available lists of ACOs’ participating practices and  facilities to 
TINs using public databases.17,18  Lists of ACO participants also contained individual 
affiliated physicians, which we matched to the most common TIN included in each 
physician’s 2011-2012 Medicare claims.  Using TIN-based definitions of ACOs allowed 
for a consistent organizational definition over the five-year study period despite 
turnover of physicians within an ACO.  We did not measure low-value service use in 
2012, when ACO contracts began, so that our results would not reflect practice pattern 
changes associated with the contracts. 
Following previously described methods,19 each beneficiary was attributed to an 
organization based on MSSP rules for patient attribution. Beneficiaries were attributed 
to organizations that accounted for the most allowed charges for outpatient primary 
care services during the year. Attribution was performed separately for the general 
sample and for the ACO sample. For ACO attribution, beneficiaries were not attributed 
to an ACO if they accumulated more primary care charges at a non-ACO TIN than at an 
ACO.   
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Low-Value Services 
Composite measures of each organization’s use of low-value services were 
constructed based on 31 low-value services.20  As described in a previous study of 26 of 
these services,20 these services were chosen because they provide minimal average 
clinical benefit in specific clinical scenarios.  The services were selected from evidence-
based lists published in the American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation’s Choosing 
Wisely initiative,21 the US Preventive Services Task Force “D” recommendations,22 and 
the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health technology assessments,23 or 
from the peer-reviewed medical literature.24  Services were excluded from measure 
construction if their appropriate use could not be distinguished from likely 
inappropriate overuse with reasonable accuracy using Medicare claims and enrollment 
data.  Because there can be scope for discretion in how to define a low-value service,20 
we tended to employ more specific definitions of low-value services that reduce the 
likelihood of classifying a high-value service as low-value. 
Table 2.1.1 presents the operational definitions used to detect each type of low-
value service.  These definitions incorporate relevant patient demographic or clinical 
characteristics like age, sex, and current or past diagnoses.  Some measure definitions 
also rely on the timing of a service (e.g. imaging preceding a surgical operation) or the 
service setting (e.g. non-emergent).  Service occurrences meeting these definitions were 
detected on the basis of information in claims like Current Procedural Terminology 
(CPT) service procedure codes and International Classification of Diseases, Ninth 
Revision (ICD-9) patient diagnosis codes, as well as information in the annual 
enrollment file, like age and presence of chronic conditions.  We employed claims data 
from as early as January 1 of the year before a service occurred in order to evaluate 
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whether the service met the measure definition.  Details regarding service detection, 
including all codes used in detection algorithms, are presented in the supporting 
materials (Appendix 2).  
Because some low-value services do not apply to all beneficiaries, we defined 
denominator criteria for each service.  For example, to qualify for the denominator for 
preoperative testing services, beneficiaries must have undergone surgery (Table 2.1.1).  
These denominator criteria were used to adjust organizations’ measured rates of a low-
value service for the number of beneficiaries within that organization who could 
possibly receive the service.  We attempted to avoid denominator criteria that might be 
sensitive to variation in organizations’ diagnostic coding practices.  For example, the 
denominator for the detection of head imaging for an uncomplicated headache was not 
restricted to patients with diagnoses of uncomplicated headache, since that diagnosis 
may be coded with varying completeness across organizations.  
 
Covariates 
We adjusted organizations’ rates of low-value service delivery for several 
patient characteristics in the annual Medicare enrollment file: age, age-squared, 
race/ethnicity, sex, hospital referral region (HRR), disability as the initial reason for 
Medicare entitlement, diagnosis of end-stage renal disease, and diagnosis of chronic 
conditions recorded in the Chronic Condition Warehouse (CCW).  CCW conditions are 
drawn from diagnoses in Medicare claims from as early as 1999.  We created binary 
indicators for the presence of each condition prior to the study year, and indicators for 
the total count of conditions, top-coded at nine.  HRR was determined based on 
beneficiary ZIP code.25  We also obtained the following characteristics of the population 
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aged 65 and over in each beneficiary’s local area: median income, fraction of residents 
below the federal poverty level (FPL), fraction of residents with a high school degree, 
and fraction of residents with a college degree.  These characteristics, all measured at 
the level of the ZIP code tabulation area (ZCTA), were obtained from the 2007-2011 
American Community Survey Summary File.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
We estimated three characteristics of organizations’ patterns of low-value 
service use: (1) variation across organizations in the total number of low-value services, 
(2) the persistence of organizations’ levels of low-value services over time, and (3) the 
correlation between organizations’ use of different categories of low-value services.  
Constructing each estimate involved three general steps.  First, we adjusted 
organizations’ use of each of the 31 low-value services for case mix.  Second, these 
adjusted scores for each service were combined to create composite scores of each 
organization’s overall low-value service use.  Third, we produced the parameters of 
interest by fitting random effects models to the composite scores.  This approach 
follows established practices of analyzing composite measures of quality that are based 
on multiple quality components.26  Details regarding these methods, briefly described 
below, are presented in the supporting materials.  
Organizations’ use of each low-value service was adjusted for case mix using 
ordinary least squares models of the following form: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡   =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡  +  𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 
with 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡  denoting the count of low-value service k  during year t for beneficiary i, who 
was assigned to organization j.  Covariates is a vector of the beneficiary characteristics 
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listed above, including indicators for beneficiary HRR, and Year_indicators are 
indicators for each year.  Every organization’s case mix-adjusted score was calculated 
for each service based on the error terms 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑘 for attributed beneficiaries.  Note that 
estimating a separate model for each low-value service allowed for service-specific case 
mix adjustment.  Each model included data from only those beneficiaries who satisfied 
the denominator condition for the service.  When analyzing the ACO sample, we 
included observations from those beneficiaries who accumulated more primary care 
charges at a non-ACO TIN than an ACO, preventing their attribution to an ACO.  
Including these additional beneficiaries allowed us to adjust for regional factors even in 
regions served by only a single ACO.  In order to explore the amount of organizational 
variation that could be accounted for by regional factors, we repeated the above 
regressions without including HRR indicators as covariates. 
Organizations’ composite measures of low-value use were calculated as a 
weighted sum of risk-adjusted scores for multiple services.  The weighting method 
ensured that, for every service, an increase in the risk-adjusted count of that service 
would contributed to an equal increase in the organization’s composite measure.  When 
estimating variation in the overall use of low-value services, we constructed a single 
composite measure that encompassed an organization’s use of all low-value services.  
When estimating persistence in organizational behavior, we constructed one composite 
measure for 2010 and one for 2011 (supporting materials).  When estimating 
organizational consistency, we constructed composite measures for each of the six 
clinical categories of low-value services in order to estimate correlations between these 
measures (Table 2.1.1).  
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We used random effects modeling to estimate variation, persistence, and 
consistency parameters (see Appendix 2).  We chose random effects model because 
they produce parameter estimates that account for sampling error stemming from finite 
sample sizes.27  In our analysis of organizational variation, the parameter of interest 
was the across-organization standard deviation of the low-value service composite 
score.  To aid in interpretation, we also present a corresponding ratio of the adjusted 
use of low-value services in an organization at the 90th percentile to that of an 
organization at the 10th percentile.  This measure has been used previously to describe 
regional variation in health care spending.12  For the analysis of persistence in 
organizational behavior, which used a correlated random effects model, the parameter 
of interest was the correlation coefficient between composite scores in 2010 and 2011.  
For the analysis of consistency in organizational behavior, which also used a correlated 
random effects model, the parameters of interest were the pairwise correlations 
between organizations’ different service category composite scores.  As a sensitivity 
analysis, we repeated our analysis of consistency without adjusting for patient HRR.  We 
calculated 95% confidence intervals for estimates via bootstrapping.  
Analyses were performed in SAS version 9.3, Stata version 13.1, and R version 
3.1.1.  Institutional review board approval was obtained through the National Bureau of 
Economic Research and the Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences. 
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Table 2.1.1 Measures of Low-Value Services 
Clinical 
Category Measure Source Operational definition Denominator 
C
an
ce
r 
Sc
re
en
in
g
 
Cancer screening for patients 
with CKD receiving dialysis 
CW29 
Screening for cancer of the breast, cervix, colon, or prostate for 
patients over age 75 with chronic kidney disease receiving 
dialysis servicesa 
Patients with CKDk 
receiving dialysisl 
Cervical cancer screening for 
women  age 65 and over 
CW 
 
USPSTF30 
Screening Papanicolaou test for women over age 65  with no 
personal history of cancer or dysplasia noted in claim or in prior 
claims, and no diagnoses of other female genital cancers, 
abnormal Papanicolaou findings, or human papillomavirus 
positivity in prior claimsb 
Women over 65 
Colorectal cancer screening 
for adults over age 85  
USPSTF31 
Colorectal cancer screening (colonoscopy, sigmoidoscopy, 
barium enema, or fecal occult blood testing) for patients age 86 
or over with no history of colon cancer 
Patients over 75 
PSA testing for men age 75 
and over 
USPSTF32 
PSA testing for patients age 75 and over with no history of 
prostate cancer 
Men over 75 
D
ia
gn
o
st
ic
 a
n
d
 P
re
v
en
ti
v
e 
T
es
ti
n
g
 
Bone mineral density testing 
at frequent intervals 
Literature33,34 
Bone mineral density test within two years of a prior bone 
mineral density test for patients with an established 
osteoporosis diagnosis  
Patients with 
osteoporosisk 
Homocysteine testing in 
cardiovascular disease 
Literature35 
Homocysteine testing with no diagnoses of folate or B12 
deficiencies in the claim and no folate or B12 testing in prior 
claims 
All patients 
Hypercoagulability testing for 
patients with deep vein 
thrombosis 
CW36 
Lab tests for hypercoagulable states within 30 days following 
diagnosis of lower extremity deep vein thrombosis or 
pulmonary embolism; no prior evidence of recurrent 
thrombosis, defined by diagnosis of DVT or pulmonary 
embolism more than 90 days prior to the testing claim 
Patients with deep 
vein thrombosisl 
PTH measurement for 
patients with stage 1-3 CKD  
NICE37,38   
PTH measurement for patients with chronic kidney disease and 
no dialysis services before PTH testing or within 30 days 
following testing, as well as no hypercalcemia diagnosis during 
the year 
Patients with CKDk 
not receiving dialysisl 
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Table 2.1.1 (Continued) Measures of Low-Value Services 
 
D
ia
gn
o
st
ic
 a
n
d
 
P
re
v
en
ti
v
e 
T
es
ti
n
g
 
Total or free T3 level testing 
for patients with 
hypothyroidism 
CW39 
Total or free T3 measurement in a patient with a 
hypothyroidism diagnosis during the year 
Patients with 
hypothyroidisml  
1,25-dihydroxyvitamin D 
testing in the absence of 
hypercalcemia or decreased 
kidney function 
CW40 
Calcitriol testing for patients without hypercalcemia, secondary 
hyperparathyroidism of renal origin, or conditions related to 
non-PTH mediated hypercalcemia noted in claim (sarcoidosis, 
TB, selected neoplasms), and without a history of chronic 
kidney disease; no diagnosis of hypercalcemia in the past 30 
days 
All patients 
P
re
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
T
es
ti
n
g
 
Preoperative chest 
radiography  
CW 
CADTH41,42 
Chest x-ray  not associated with inpatient or emergency carec 
and occuring within 30 days prior to a low or intermediate risk 
non-cardiothoracic surgical procedured 
Patients undergoing 
selected surgeriesl 
Preoperative 
echocardiography 
CW43 
Echocardiogram not associated with inpatient or emergency 
care and occuring within 30 days prior to a low or intermediate 
risk non-cardiothoracic surgical procedured 
Patients undergoing 
selected surgeriesl 
Preoperative PFT CW44 
PFT not associated with inpatient or emergency care and 
occuring within 30 days prior to a low or intermediate risk 
surgical proceduree 
Patients undergoing 
selected surgeriesl 
Routine preoperative stress 
tests 
CW45 
Stress electrocardiogram, echocardiogram,  nuclear medicine 
imaging, cardiac MRI or CT angiography,  not associated with 
inpatient or emergency care and occuring within 30 days prior 
to a low or intermediate risk surgical procedured 
Patients undergoing 
selected surgeriesl 
Im
ag
in
g
 
CT of the sinuses for 
uncomplicated acute 
rhinosinusitis  
CW46 
Maxillofacial CT study with a diagnosis of sinusitis and no 
complications of sinusitis,f immune deficiencies, nasal polyps, or 
head/face trauma noted in claim and no sinusitis diagnosis 
between 30 and 365 days prior to imaging 
All patients 
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Table 2.1.1 (Continued) Measures of Low-Value Services 
Im
ag
in
g
 
 
Head imaging in the 
evaluation of syncope  
CW47 
CT or MR imaging of the head with a diagnosis of syncope and 
no diagnoses in claim warranting imagingg 
Patients with syncope 
diagnosisl 
Head imaging for 
uncomplicated headache 
CW48 
 Brain CT or MR imaging with non-post-traumatic, non-
thunderclap headache diagnosis, and no diagnoses in claim 
warranting imagingh 
All patients 
EEG for headaches CW49 
EEG with headache diagnosis in claim, and no epilepsy or 
convulsions noted in current or prior claims 
All patients 
Back imaging for patients 
with non-specific low back 
pain  
CW, NICE50 
Back imaging with a diagnosis of lower back pain occurring 
within 6 weeks of initial back pain diagnosis and with no 
indication of radiculopathy or other diagnoses in claim 
warranting imagingi 
All patients 
Screening for carotid artery 
disease in asymptomatic 
adults 
CW, 
USPSTF51  
Carotid imaging not associated with inpatient or emergency 
care for patients without a history of stroke or TIA, and without 
a diagnosis of stroke, TIA, or focal neurological symptoms in 
claim 
All patients 
Screening for carotid artery 
disease for syncope 
CW47 
Carotid imaging with syncope diagnosis for patients without a 
history of stroke or TIA, and without a diagnosis of stroke, TIA, 
or focal neurological symptoms in claim 
Patients with syncope 
diagnosisl 
Imaging for diagnosis of 
plantar fasciitis 
CW52 
Radiographic or MR imaging with diagnosis of plantar fasciitis 
occurring within two weeks of initial foot pain diagnosis 
Patients with fasciitis 
diagnosisl 
C
ar
d
io
v
as
cu
la
r 
te
st
in
g 
an
d
 p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s  Stress testing for stable 
coronary disease 
CW53,54 
Stress testing not associated with inpatient or emergency carej 
for patients with an established diagnosis of acute myocardial 
infarction (≥ 6 mo before testing) 
IHD patientsk 
Percutaneous coronary 
intervention with balloon 
angioplasty or stent 
placement  for stable 
coronary disease 
Literature54,55 
Coronary stent placement or balloon angioplasty, not associated 
with an ER visit,j for patients with an established diagnosis of 
acute myocardial infarction (≥ 6 mo before testing) 
IHD patientsk 
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Table 2.1.1 (Continued) Measures of Low-Value Services 
C
ar
d
io
v
as
cu
la
r 
te
st
in
g 
an
d
 p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s  
Renal artery angioplasty or 
stenting 
Literature56,57 
Renal/visceral angioplasty or stent placement with a diagnosis 
of renal atherosclerosis or renovascular hypertension noted in 
procedure claim 
Patients with 
hypertensionl  
Carotid endarterectomy for 
asymptomatic patients 
CW51,58 
Carotid endarterectomy, not associated with an ER visit,j for 
female patients without a history of stroke or TIA and without 
stroke, TIA, or focal neurological symptoms noted in claim 
All patients 
Inferior vena cava filters for 
the prevention of pulmonary 
embolism  
Literature59,60  Any IVC filter placement  All patients 
Pulmonary Artery 
Catheterization in the ICU 
Literature61 
Pulmonary artery catheterization for monitoring purposes 
during an inpatient stay that involved an ICU and a non-surgical 
DRG; claim contains no diagnoses indicating pulmonary 
hypertension, cardiac tamponade, or preoperative assessment 
Patients who were 
hospitalized with a 
non-surgical MS-DRGl 
O
th
er
 i
n
v
as
iv
e 
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s  Vertebroplasty or 
kyphoplasty for osteoporotic 
vertebral fractures 
Literature62–
64 
Vertebroplasty/kyphoplasty for vertebral fracture, with no 
bone cancers, myeloma, or hemangioma noted in procedure 
claim.  
Patients with 
osteoporosisk 
Arthroscopic surgery for knee 
osteoarthritis 
NICE65 
Arthroscopic debridement/chondroplasty of the knee with 
diagnosis of osteoarthritis or chondromalacia in the procedure 
claim and no meniscal tears noted in procedure claim 
All patients 
Spinal injection for low-back 
pain 
Literature66,67 
Outpatient epidural, facet, or trigger point injections for lower 
back pain, excluding etanercept; no radiculopathy diagnoses in 
the claim  
All patients 
Abbreviations:  CKD, chronic kidney disease; CT, computed tomography;  ED, emergency department; EEG, electroencephalography; ICU, intensive care 
unit; IVC, inferior vena cava; MR, magnetic resonance; PFT, pulmonary function testing; PSA, prostate-specific antigen; PTH, parathyroid hormone; TIA, 
transient ischemic attack;  
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Table 2.1.1 (Continued) Measures of Low-Value Services 
 
a The age cutoff is included because transplantation is uncommon in this patient population.  
 
b Prior claims refers throughout the table to claims for services before the day of the measured service and during or after the prior calendar year. 
 
c Inpatient-associated is defined here as occurring during within 30 days after an inpatient stay; ED-associated, during or 1 day after an ED visit. 
 
d  Includes breast procedures, colectomy, cholecystectomy, transurethral resection of the prostate, hysterectomy, orthopedic surgical procedures other 
than  hip and knee replacement, corneal transplant, cataract removal, retinal detachment, hernia repair, lithotripsy, arthroscopy, and cholecystectomy. 
 
e  Includes procedures listed immediately above as well as coronary artery bypass graft, aneurysm repair, thromboendarterectomy, percutaneous 
transluminal coronary angioplasty, and pacemaker insertion. 
 
f  Includes inflammation of eyelid or orbit, orbital cellulitis, and visual problems. 
 
g  Exclusion diagnoses include epilepsy, stroke/TIA, history of stroke, head trauma, convulsions, altered mental status, nervous system symptoms (e.g. 
hemiplegia), speech problems. 
 
h Exclusion diagnoses include those listed immediately above as well as giant cell arteritis, cancer and history of cancer. 
 
i  Exclusion diagnoses include cancer, trauma, intravenous drug abuse, neurological impairment, endocarditis, septicemia, tuberculosis, osteomyelitis, 
fever, weight loss, loss of appetite, night sweats, and anemia. 
 
j Inpatient-associated is defined here as occurring during an inpatient stay; ED-associated, during or within 14 d after an ED visit. 
 
k Defined by the presence of CCW first indication date prior to December 31st of the year. 
 
l Defined by presence of relevant diagnosis or service codes during the year.
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2.1.3 RESULTS 
 The general sample consisted of 4,039,733 beneficiaries attributed to 3,137 
organizations.  The ACO sample consisted of 1,432,644 beneficiaries attributed to 250 
ACOs.  Beneficiary characteristics were largely similar between the two samples (Table 
2.1.2).  Organizations in the ACO sample were considerably larger, with an average of 
5,731attributed beneficiaries compared to 1,288 in the general sample. On average, 
organizations in the general sample delivered an unadjusted rate of 45.6 low-value 
services per 100 beneficiaries and those in the ACO sample delivered 47.7 services per 
100 beneficiaries. Standard deviations of 13.8 and 11.4 services per 100 beneficiaries, 
respectively, suggest substantial variation in unadjusted low-value service delivery.  
Low-value imaging and low-value cancer screening were more frequent than the other 
service categories.  
 Table 2.1.3 presents adjusted estimates of variation in organizations’ delivery of 
low-value services.  The across-organization standard deviation in the use of low-value 
services was 9.3 services per 100 beneficiaries in the general sample (95% CI 8.8–9.9) 
and 7.6 services per 100 beneficiaries in the ACO sample (95% CI 6.8–8.3), without 
adjustment for geographic region.  This corresponds to 90th/10th percentile ratios of 
1.71 (95% CI 1.65–1.77) and 1.51 (95% CI 1.45–1.58), respectively.  Models that 
adjusted for geographic region produced smaller estimates of variation, with 90th/10th 
percentile ratios of 1.51 (95% CI 1.46–1.54) in the general sample and 1.27 (95% CI 
1.23–1.32) in the ACO sample.  Organizations’ adjusted low-value service use was highly 
persistent, with correlation coefficients between 2010 and 2011 service use of 0.95 
(95% CI 0.92–0.98) in the general sample and 0.87 (95% CI 0.80–0.95) in the ACO 
sample.  
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Within organizations, alternate categories of low-value services were positively 
correlated with one another in (Table 2.1.4).  Adjusted correlations between categories 
were positive and statistically significant for 13/15 pairs of services in the general 
sample and 10/15 pairs of services in the ACO sample.  All non-significant correlations 
involved a single category of low-value services, other invasive procedures.  The 
average correlation coefficient across all pairs was 0.19 in the general sample (95% CI 
0.17–0.21) and 0.24 in the ACO sample (95% CI 0.16–0.32).  The corresponding 
averages were 0.23 and 0.34 among the pairs that did not include other invasive 
procedures.  In both samples, the greatest correlation was between low-value 
cardiovascular testing and procedures and low-value imaging.  Low-value imaging had 
the highest correlation with other categories, with an average of 0.29 in the general 
sample and 0.39 in the ACO sample.  In a sensitivity analysis without adjustment for 
patient region (Appendix 2), this pattern of correlations was broadly similar.  However, 
the average correlation between service categories increased to 0.23 in the general 
sample (95% CI 0.21–0.25) and 0.35 in the ACO sample (95% CI 0.28–0.41). 
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Table 2.1.2. Unadjusted Beneficiary and Provider Organization Characteristics 
 
General Sample ACO Sample 
Beneficiaries, no. 4,039,733 1,432,644 
Observations, no. of beneficiary-years 10,149,111 3,580,702 
Mean age, y 72.6 ± 11.7 72.4 ± 11.9 
Female sex, % 58.4 58.2 
Race/ethnicity, % 
     White 89.4 87.3 
   Black 7.4 7.2 
   Hispanic 0.9 1.7 
   Other 2.2 3.8 
Medicaid recipient, % 16.7 20.8 
Disabled,a % 20.3 21.1 
End-stage renal disease, % 1.0 1.1 
CCW conditionsb 
    Total no., mean 5.1 ± 2.6 5.2 ± 2.7 
  ≥6 conditions 43.8 46.1 
  ≥9 conditions 16.0 17.8 
Low-value service measure denominators qualified for, mean 14.9 ± 2.5 14.9 ± 2.5 
ZCTA characteristics for age 65+, mean 
   median income 38,801 ± 13,533  39,706 ± 14,161 
  % below FPL 8.5 8.4 
  % with high school degree 77.2 77.3 
  % with college degree 20.3 21.1 
 
 
Provider organizations, no. 
3,137 250 
Beneficiaries per organization, mean no. 1,288 ± 1,447 5,731 ± 5,135 
Low-value services per 100 beneficiaries, mean 
    Cancer screening 14.0 ± 5.6 14.0 ± 3.8 
  Diagnostic and Preventive Testing 7.8 ± 0.6 9.2 ± 4.2 
  Preoperative Testing 2.5 ± 1.2 2.6 ± 1.0 
  Imaging 15.7 ± 5.2 16.3 ± 4.0 
  Cardiovascular testing and procedures 1.1 ± 0.6 1.2 ± 0.4 
  Other invasive procedures 4.4 ± 2.2 4.4 ± 1.6 
  Total 45.6 ± 13.8 47.7 ± 11.4 
ACO  = Accountable Care Organization, CCW = Chronic Conditions Warehouse, HCC = Hierarchical Condition 
Categories, ZCTA = ZIP Code Tabulation Area. Estimates are derived from 2007-2011 data. All means and 
percentages are unadjusted.  Means are presented ± standard deviations.  
 
a Refers to beneficiaries for whom disability was the original reason for Medicare eligibility. 
 
b Chronic conditions include 25 conditions  from the CCW: acute myocardial infarction, Alzheimer's disease, 
Alzheimer's disease and related disorders or senile dementia, anemia, asthma, atrial fibrillation, benign 
prostatic hyperplasia,  breast cancer,  chronic kidney disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
colorectal cancer, depression, diabetes, endometrial cancer, heart failure, hip/pelvic fracture, 
hyperlipidemia, hypertension, hypothyroidism, ischemic heart disease,  lung cancer, osteoporosis, prostate 
cancer, rheumatoid arthritis/osteoarthritis, stroke/transient ischemic attack.   
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Table 2.1.3. Variation and Persistence of Low-Value Service Delivery 
General Sample 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Variation in Low-Value Services Per 100 Beneficiaries 
 
Standard 
Deviation  95% CI 
90th/10th 
Percentile 
Ratio 95% CI 
Without Adjustment 
for Region 
9.3 8.8—9.9 1.71 1.65—1.77 
With Adjustment  
for Region 
7.1 6.6—7.6 1.50 1.46—1.54 
 
 
 
   
 
Persistence of Low-Value Services Per 100 Beneficiaries 
 
Correlation  
Between Years 95% CI 
 
0.95 0.92—0.98 
     
ACO Sample 
 
 
  
 
 
Variation in Low-Value Services Per 100 Beneficiaries 
 
Standard 
Deviation  95% CI 
90th/10th 
Percentile 
Ratio 95% CI 
Without Adjustment 
for Region 
7.6 6.8—8.3 1.51 1.45—1.58 
With Adjustment  
for Region 
4.4 3.8—5.1 1.27 1.23—1.32 
 
 
 
   
 
Persistence of Low-Value Services Per 100 Beneficiaries 
 
Correlation  
Between Years 95% CI 
  0.87 0.80—0.95 
 
 
TIN = Taxpayer Identification Number, ACO  = Accountable Care Organization 
 
Estimates are derived from models of organizations' total composite low-value service use. Standard 
deviation estimates refer to across-organization variation, estimated via a random intercept model that 
includes 2007-2011 data.  Correlation between years refers to the correlation coefficient for organizational 
performance between organizations' 2010 and 2011 performance. Models adjust for overdispersion of 
observed performance, beneficiary sociodemographic and clinical characteristics, local area economic 
characteristics, patient region, year, and the number of patients qualifying for component measure 
denominators.
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Table 2.1.4 Consistency Across Low-Value Service Domains Within Provider Organizations     
General Sample 
      
Measure composite 
Cancer 
Screening Diag. Preop. Imaging Cardio. Other. 
  Cancer screening 
- - - - - - 
  Diagnostic and Preventive Testing 0.19 
- - - - - 
 
(0.13—0.25) 
 Preoperative Testing 0.16 0.17 
- - - - 
 
(0.10—0.21) (0.10—0.24) 
 Imaging 0.33 0.20 0.29 
- - - 
 
(0.27—0.38) (0.15—0.26) (0.24—0.34) 
 Cardiovascular testing and procedures 0.12 0.18 0.26 0.44 
- - 
 
(0.05—0.18) (0.11—0.24) (0.19—0.32) (0.37—0.51) 
 Other invasive procedures 0.16 0.04 0.01 0.18 0.12 
- 
 
(0.11—0.22) (-0.02—0.10) (-0.06—0.08) (0.12—0.24) (0.04—0.19) 
ACO Sample 
      
Measure composite 
Cancer 
Screening Diag. Preop. Imaging Cardio. Other. 
  Cancer screening 
- - - - - - 
  Diagnostic and Preventive Testing 0.16 
- - - - - 
 
(-0.01—0.33) 
 Preoperative Testing 0.30 0.17 
- - - - 
 
(0.13—0.47) (0.04—0.30) 
 Imaging 0.42 0.40 0.42 
- - - 
 
(0.28—0.56) (0.23—0.57) (0.26—0.57) 
 Cardiovascular testing and procedures 0.24 0.28 0.51 0.53 
- - 
 
(0.06—0.42) (0.08—0.48) (0.36—0.67) (0.35—0.71) 
 Other invasive procedures 0.08 -0.03 -0.08 0.16 0.03 
- 
  (-0.07—0.24) (-0.23—0.17) (-0.27—0.11) (-0.03—0.36) (-0.22—0.28) 
ACO  = Accountable Care Organization 
 
Estimates are correlation coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals.  For each sample of organizations, all correlations are derived from a single 
model of organizations' low-value service composite measures.  The models adjust for overdispersion of observed performance, beneficiary 
sociodemographic and clinical characteristics, local area economic characteristics, patient region, year, and  the number of patients qualifying for 
component measure denominators.  
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2.1.4 DISCUSSION 
In this national study of low-value service use among provider organizations, we 
observed substantial variation in service use across organizations, highly persistent 
service use over time, and positive associations between various components of low-
value care.  Variation in organizations’ use of low-value services was large compared to 
previous estimates of practice pattern variation.  For example, the 90th/10th percentile 
ratio of regions’ Medicare adjusted spending has been estimated at 1.25,12  smaller than 
our estimates of variation among organizations.  We also observed that organizations 
varied substantially within the same region, which is consistent with prior studies of 
within-region variation in overall spending.28  We observed less variation in the ACO 
sample than the general sample, which may reflect greater uniformity among larger 
provider organizations in general or among organizations opting to participate in the 
ACO program specifically.  Despite the considerable variation across-organizations, low-
value services were used frequently even among the best performing organizations.  
Positive correlations between different clinical categories of low-value services 
suggest some consistency of low-value service delivery within an organization.  
However, because these associations were generally modest, a single category of low-
value service measures cannot provide a precise prediction of low-value service use in 
other clinical domains.  Profiling organizations on the basis of many low-value practices 
may produce more reliable estimates, as evidenced by high correlations between 
organizations’ composite scores over time.  Somewhat greater correlations for ACOs 
than for organizations in the general sample suggests that ACOs may have more 
effective mechanisms in place for influencing providers than other organizations.  
However, even for ACOs, we observed only weak associations between invasive 
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procedures, which tend to be provided by surgeons, and other services. This finding 
suggests that different physician specialties within an organization may have weakly 
associated or independent practice styles with respect to low-value services.   
There are several limitations to this study. First, it is a descriptive analysis, and 
the results may diverge from the outcomes that would be observed if patients and 
physicians were randomized to different provider organizations. Second, although we 
observed variation in organization’s use of low-value services, we could not isolate 
which characteristics of organizations drove this variation. Third, although our analyses 
adjust for many patient sociodemographic and clinical characteristics, it is possible that 
unobserved differences in patient characteristics may have contributed to 
organizations’ measured low-value service use.  Fourth, because some measures of low-
value services depend on diagnostic codes in claims, variation in measured service use 
might reflect differences in the completeness of organizations’ diagnostic coding. 
However, many services we examined were not detected on the basis of diagnoses in 
claims. Fifth, some of the organizations in our sample, especially smaller organizations, 
may not have delivered all of the types of services that we measured. This was one 
motivation for examining ACOs, which are more likely to be a part of integrated delivery 
systems that provide a comprehensive range of services. 
Our study indicates that organizations have exhibited distinct profiles in their 
use of low-value services, with substantial performance variations that are persistent 
over time. Our methods of characterizing organizations’ use of low-value service may 
have applications for public disclosure (e.g. organization report cards) or benefit design 
(e.g. tiering of organizations), or for future efforts to study the drivers of organizational 
variation. Our findings are consistent with, though not definitive evidence of, 
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organizations influencing the amounts of low-value services that their patients receive.  
If organizations do shape the practice patterns of their affiliated physicians, then 
policies like global payment contracts, which modify organization-level incentives, are 
more likely to affect patient care. 
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2.2 CHANGES IN LOW-VALUE SERVICES IN YEAR 1 OF THE MEDICARE PIONEER ACO PROGRAM 
 
2.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Reducing unnecessary health care utilization, a source of substantial spending,1 
has been a central goal of many government2–4 and private initiatives.5,6  However, 
distinguishing high-value from low-value use of the same service is often challenging.  
As a result, efforts to directly limit overuse of specific services through coverage 
restrictions or other payment incentives may produce unintended consequences or 
achieve minimal gains.7–9  Another approach to enhancing value is to place spending for 
all services under a global budget, with incentives to stay under the budget and to 
improve performance on quality measures, as in the Medicare Pioneer accountable care 
organization (ACO) program.  This approach has been associated with lower overall 
spending and improved or stable performance on standard quality measures.10–14 
However, it is unknown whether payment reforms like the Pioneer ACO 
program are associated with reductions in overuse.  A combination of lower overall 
spending and improved performance on quality measures can result from reductions in 
high-value services affecting unmeasured dimensions of quality rather than from 
reductions in low-value services.  Also, because risk-based contracts do not incentivize 
reductions in overuse directly, it is unclear whether providers under these contracts are 
targeting low-value services in their broader efforts to control overall spending.  If ACO-
like payment models succeed in reducing wasteful utilization, there should be 
observable reductions in the delivery of low-value services that can be measured 
directly.  Moreover, if providers are targeting low-value services specifically in response 
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to ACO contracts, their efforts should result in greater reductions in spending on low-
value services than in overall spending. 
We constructed 31 claims-based measures of low-value services—services that 
provide minimal clinical benefit on average.  Using these measures and 2009-2012 
Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) claims, we conducted a difference-in-differences analysis 
comparing use of low-value services between beneficiaries served by Pioneer ACOs and 
beneficiaries served by non-ACO providers before vs. after the start of Pioneer contracts 
in 2012.  
 
2.2.2 METHODS 
Background on the Pioneer ACO Program 
 In 2012, 32 provider organizations volunteered to participate in the Medicare 
Pioneer ACO program, in which each ACO receives a bonus payment, or is penalized, if 
overall spending for an attributed patient population falls sufficiently below or above a 
financial benchmark, respectively.  The financial benchmark is based on baseline 
spending for each ACO’s attributed population, inflated each year according to national 
spending growth.  Performance on 33 quality measures determines the proportion of 
savings or losses shared by the ACO, although ACOs were only required to report on 
these measures to be eligible for maximum savings in the first year of the program.  
None of the quality measures in Medicare ACO contracts assesses overuse of medical 
services. 
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Study Population 
 We analyzed 2009-2012 Medicare claims for a random 20% sample of 
beneficiaries; in a given year, this sample includes sample members from the prior year 
plus a 20% sample of new beneficiaries.  For each year of the study period, we included 
beneficiaries in the study sample if they were continuously enrolled in Parts A and B of 
traditional Medicare while alive during that year and the entire prior year.  We used the 
prior year of claims to collect diagnoses and procedures used for case-mix adjustment 
or for assessing the appropriateness of service use.  In each study year, beneficiaries 
were excluded if they did not receive primary care services necessary for attribution to 
provider organizations, or if they were attributed to any of the 114 organizations that 
entered the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) later in 2012.  MSSP ACOs faced 
weaker incentives than Pioneer ACOs to reduce spending, and for only part of 2012.  
Thus, if MSSP ACOs took early steps to limit low-value services, inclusion of their 
beneficiaries in the control group could have biased our estimates.  
 Each of the 32 organizations that entered the Pioneer ACO program was defined 
as the collection of National Provider Identifiers (NPIs) for physicians listed by the ACO 
as participating in the ACO contract.  Our definition of ACOs as sets of NPIs reflects the 
organizations’ ability to include only a subset of their affiliated physicians in their ACO 
contracts.  Following the MSSP attribution rules and previously described methods, 14 
for each year in the study period, each beneficiary was assigned to the ACO (ACO group) 
or non-ACO practice (control group) that accounted for the greatest fraction of that 
beneficiary’s annual allowed charges for primary care services (Appendix 2).  Non-ACO 
practices were defined by taxpayer identification numbers (TINs), which identify the 
billing practice, provider organization, or individual physician. 
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Measures of Low-Value Services 
We constructed 31 claims-based measures of low-value care, including 26 
analyzed in a prior study 8  The selection and construction of these measures is 
described in Section 2.1. 
The primary outcome of this study was use of low-value services, defined as the 
annual count of all measured services.  We chose this primary outcome because 
measures of overall use provide equal weight to each clinical decision, while measures 
of spending will tend to be driven by more expensive services.  To compare changes in 
low-value services to previously published estimates of overall spending changes 
associated with the Pioneer program, we examined price-standardized spending on 
measured services as a secondary outcome.  Methods of standardizing service prices for 
spending calculations are presented in the Appendix 2.  
To assess whether any changes in low-value service use associated with Pioneer 
ACO contracts were concentrated in a specific clinical area or evident in multiple areas, 
we categorized the 31 low-value services into the following clinical categories: cancer 
screening, diagnostic and preventive testing, preoperative testing, imaging, 
cardiovascular testing and procedures, and other invasive procedures.  We also 
categorized services as higher-priced (standardized price $180-$13,331) or lower-
priced ($5-$117) than to the median service price, because ACOs would be unlikely to 
reduce higher-priced services in the absence of new payment incentives, whereas ACOs 
might restrict provision of lower-priced wasteful services even under FFS incentives to 
improve quality without major reductions in revenue.  Thus, reductions in use of 
higher-priced low-value services would provide stronger evidence of changes related 
specifically to ACO contract incentives. 
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Finally, to explore the possibility that patient preferences moderated providers’ 
responses to ACO contracts, we categorized services as less vs. more sensitive to patient 
preferences (Table 2.2.1).  For example, we considered testing for hypercoagulability 
for patients with deep venous thrombosis as less sensitive to patient preferences 
because most patients would be unaware that such testing could be done.  Table 2.1.1 
presents each measure’s source and supporting literature, operational definition, and 
assigned categories of price and preference sensitivity, as well as the mean annual 
count of each service per beneficiary in the pre-contract period.
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Table 2.2.1 Summary of Low-Value Care Measures 
Clinical 
Category Measure 
Price 
category 
Preference 
sensitivity 
category 
Mean 
annual 
count  
per 100 
benes 
(2009-
2011) 
C
an
ce
r 
Sc
re
en
in
g
 Cancer screening for patients with CKD receiving 
dialysis 
Lower priced More sensitive 0.1 
Cervical cancer screening for women  age 65 and 
over 
Lower priced More sensitive 4.3 
Colorectal cancer screening for adults over age 
85  
Lower priced More sensitive 0.6 
PSA testing for men age 75 and over Lower priced More sensitive 7.7 
D
ia
gn
o
st
ic
 a
n
d
 P
re
v
en
ti
v
e 
T
es
ti
n
g
 
Bone mineral density testing at frequent 
intervals 
Lower priced Less sensitive 0.6 
Homocysteine testing in cardiovascular disease Lower priced Less sensitive 0.8 
Hypercoagulability testing for patients with DVT Lower priced Less sensitive 0.04 
PTH measurement for patients with stage 1-3 
CKD  
Lower priced Less sensitive 3.8 
Total or free T3 level testing for patients with 
hypothyroidism 
Lower priced Less sensitive 2.6 
1,25-dihydroxyvitamin D testing in the absence 
of hypercalcemia or decreased kidney function 
Lower priced Less sensitive 1.0 
P
re
-
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
T
es
ti
n
g
 Preoperative chest radiography  Lower priced Less sensitive 1.7 
Preoperative echocardiography Higher priced Less sensitive 0.3 
Preoperative PFT Lower priced Less sensitive 0.1 
Routine preoperative stress tests Higher priced Less sensitive 0.3 
Im
ag
in
g
 
CT of the sinuses for uncomplicated acute 
rhinosinusitis  
Higher priced More sensitive 0.3 
Head imaging in the evaluation of syncope  Higher priced More sensitive 1.0 
Head imaging for uncomplicated headache Higher priced More sensitive 2.9 
EEG for headaches Higher priced Less sensitive 0.05 
Back imaging for patients with non-specific low 
back pain  
Lower priced More sensitive 4.4 
Screening for carotid artery disease in 
asymptomatic adults 
Higher priced Less sensitive 5.8 
Screening for carotid artery disease for syncope Higher priced Less sensitive 0.6 
Imaging for diagnosis of plantar fasciitis Lower priced More sensitive 0.4 
C
ar
d
io
v
as
cu
la
r 
te
st
in
g 
an
d
 
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s  Stress testing for stable coronary disease Higher priced More sensitive 0.7 
Percutaneous coronary intervention with 
balloon angioplasty or stent placement  for 
stable coronary disease 
Higher priced More sensitive 0.1 
Renal artery angioplasty or stenting Higher priced Less sensitive 0.1 
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Table 2.2.1 (Continued) Summary of Low-Value Care Measures 
C
ar
d
io
v
as
cu
la
r 
te
st
in
g 
an
d
 
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s  
Carotid endarterectomy for asymptomatic 
patients 
Higher priced Less sensitive 0.05 
Inferior vena cava filters for the prevention of 
pulmonary embolism  
Higher priced Less sensitive 0.2 
Pulmonary Artery Catheterization in the ICU Lower priced Less sensitive 0.01 
O
th
er
 
in
v
as
iv
e 
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s  Vertebroplasty or kyphoplasty for osteoporotic 
vertebral fractures 
Higher priced Less sensitive 0.3 
Arthroscopic surgery for knee osteoarthritis Higher priced More sensitive 0.2 
Spinal injection for low-back pain Higher priced More sensitive 4.0 
Abbreviations:  CKD, chronic kidney disease; CT, computed tomography; DVT, deep vein thrombosis; ED, 
emergency department; EEG, electroencephalography; ICU, intensive care unit; IVC, inferior vena cava; MR, 
magnetic resonance; PFT, pulmonary function testing; PSA, prostate-specific antigen; PTH, parathyroid 
hormone; TB, tuberculosis; TIA, transient ischemic attack; USPSTF, US Preventive Services Task Force D 
recommendations. 
a The age cutoff is included because transplantation is uncommon in this patient population.  
b Prior claims refers throughout the table to claims for services before the day of the measured service and 
during or after the prior calendar year. 
c Inpatient-associated is defined here as occurring during within 30 d after an inpatient stay; ED-associated, 
during or 1 d after an ED visit. 
d Includes breast procedures, colectomy, cholecystectomy, transurethral resection of the prostate, 
hysterectomy, orthopedic surgical procedures other than  hip and knee replacement, corneal transplant, 
cataract removal, retinal detachment, hernia repair, lithotripsy, arthroscopy, and cholecystectomy. 
e Includes procedures listed immediately above as well as coronary artery bypass graft, aneurysm repair, 
thromboendarterectomy, percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty, and pacemaker insertion. 
f Includes inflammation of eyelid or orbit, orbital cellulitis, and visual problems. 
g Exclusion diagnoses include epilepsy, stroke/TIA, history of stroke, head trauma, convulsions, altered 
mental status, nervous system symptoms (e.g. hemiplegia), speech problems. 
h Exclusion diagnoses include those listed immediately above as well as giant cell arteritis, cancer and history 
of cancer. 
i Exclusion diagnoses include cancer, trauma, intravenous drug abuse, neurological impairment, endocarditis, 
septicemia, tuberculosis, osteomyelitis, fever, weight loss, loss of appetite, night sweats, and anemia. 
j Inpatient-associated is defined here as occurring during an inpatient stay; ED-associated, during or within 
14 d after an ED visit. 
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Covariates 
 For each beneficiary, the following demographic and clinical covariates were 
assessed from Medicare claims and enrollment files: age (<65, 65-69, 70-74…, >84), sex, 
race/ethnicity, disability as the original reason for Medicare entitlement, presence of 
end-stage renal disease, presence of 27 chronic conditions in the Chronic Condition 
Warehouse (CCW) by the start of each study year (including indicators for each 
condition and indicators for having ≥2, 3, 4, etc. conditions up to ≥9), and the patient’s 
hierarchical condition category (HCC) risk score.  Because most low-value service 
measures do not apply to all beneficiaries (e.g. low-value PSA tests were defined as PSA 
tests for men age 75 and over), we also created indicators for whether beneficiaries 
qualified for potential receipt of each low-value service (see Appendix 2 for definitions 
of these qualifying indicators).  
 
ACO Baseline Levels of Low-Value Services  
Because organizations with more wasteful practices may have a greater 
opportunity to limit wasteful care, we measured ACO baseline levels of low-value 
service use and tested whether those levels were associated with changes in the use of 
low-value services after ACO contacts began. We decomposed an ACO’s baseline levels 
of low-value care into two components.  First, we assessed whether the ACO had a 
greater or lesser risk-adjusted count of low-value services per beneficiary than the 
control group within an ACO’s service area (Appendix 2).  Second, we assessed whether 
the risk-adjusted count of low-value services among the control group in each ACO’s 
service area was greater or less than that of the median ACO’s service area.  This 
decomposition allowed us to examine whether an organization’s prior performance 
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relative to its service area or service area performance relative to the national average 
predicted changes under ACO contracts.  This distinction bears on whether ACO 
contracts might be associated with convergence in provider practices within regions or 
across regions.  Baseline levels of low-value care were assessed in 2008 in order to 
avoid results driven by regression to the mean between the pre-contract period (2009-
2011) and 2012; we found no evidence of regression to the mean over the 2009-2011 
pre-contract period (Appendix 2). 
 
Statistical Analysis 
 We conducted a difference-in-differences analysis to quantify changes in the 
annual per-beneficiary count of low-value services in the ACO group that differed from 
concurrent changes in the control group from the pre-contract period (2009-2011) to 
the post-contract period (2012), while adjusting for geography and any coincident 
changes in the groups’ measured patient characteristics. Specifically, we fit the 
following linear regression model: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑘ℎ)  =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐴𝐶𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑘  +  𝛽2𝐻𝑅𝑅_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠ℎ × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡  
+  𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝑂_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑘𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  
with 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑘ℎ) denoting the expected value of outcome Y (i.e., count of low-value 
services) for beneficiary i during year t assigned to ACO or non-ACO TIN k  living in HRR 
h.  “ACO_indicators” is a vector of indicators for each organization in the ACO group, 
with a single indicator for the control group omitted, “HRR_indicators×Year” is a vector 
of indicators for each HRR in each year of the sample with a single HRR-year 
combination omitted, “ACO_contract” is an indicator of being attributed to a Pioneer 
ACO in 2012, and “Covariates” include patient sociodemographic and clinical covariates 
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listed above.  The β1 term adjusts for organizations’ average level of low-value services 
in the pre-contract period, and for changes in the distribution of ACO-assigned 
beneficiaries across ACOs between the pre-contract and post-contract periods.  The β2 
term allows for comparison of beneficiaries in the ACO group to control group 
beneficiaries in the same geographic area, thereby adjusting for region-specific trends 
in the control group’s use of low-value services. 
 The quantity of interest, β3, is the mean differential change in low-value services 
for ACO-attributed beneficiaries relative to local changes in low-value services for the 
control group.  To compare ACOs with higher vs. lower baseline levels of low-value 
service use, we added to the model interactions between the β3 term and each of the 
two measures of ACOs’ baseline low-value service use.  
A key assumption of this difference-in-differences analysis is that differences in 
adjusted counts of low-value services between the ACO group and the control group in 
the pre-contract period would have remained constant in the post-contract period in 
the absence of the Pioneer program.15  We tested this assumption by comparing trends 
in low-value service use between the ACO group and control group over the 2009-2011 
pre-contract period (Appendix 2). 
We conducted several sensitivity analyses to test for potential sources of bias.  
First, we adjusted for any differences in trends in low-value service use between the 
ACO and control groups in the pre-contract period (Appendix 2). Second, we excluded 
the indicators of service qualification as covariates, in case ACO contracts were 
associated with changes in the likelihood of patients satisfying qualifying conditions.  
Third, we tested for differential changes in sociodemographic and clinical 
characteristics from the pre- to post-contract periods between the ACO and control 
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groups.  If the composition of the ACO and control groups did not change differentially 
in these observed dimensions, it is less likely that there were differential changes in 
other, unobserved, dimensions.  All analyses employed robust variance estimators 
clustered at the level of ACOs (for the ACO group) or HRRs (for the control group).16,17  
 
2.2.3 RESULTS 
 The study sample included 18,146,641 person-years (6,110,212 unique 
beneficiaries), 693,218 in the ACO group and 17,453,423 in the control group. 
Beneficiary characteristics during the 2009-2011 pre-contract period were similar in 
the ACO and control groups, adjusted for geographic area, and differential changes in 
the ACO group were minimal (Table 2.2.2).  
 During the pre-contract period, the adjusted annual count of low-value services 
in the ACO group was 1.8 services per 100 beneficiaries lower (P=0.02) than the control 
group (Table 2.2.3), but trends in the pre-contract period were similar (0.1 services per 
100 beneficiaries per year greater for the ACO group; P=0.74).  Following the start of 
Pioneer contracts, there was a differential reduction in the use of low-value services for 
the ACO group (-0.8 services per 100 beneficiaries; P<0.001), or a reduction of 1.9% 
relative to the expected 2012 mean for the ACO group of 41.0 services per 100 
beneficiaries.  Total spending on low-value services in the pre-contract period was 
similar for the ACO group and control group ($256 per 100 beneficiaries higher in the 
control group; P=0.13) and trends were also similar ($20 per 100 beneficiaries per year 
greater for the control group; P=0.88).  In 2012, the ACO group underwent a differential 
reduction in spending of 4.5% (P=0.004). 
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 All clinical categories of low-value services except for preoperative services 
contributed to the overall differential reduction in the ACO group (Table 2.2.3).  The 
differential reductions were statistically significant for three clinical categories (cancer 
screening, imaging, and cardiovascular testing and procedures).  The greatest absolute 
reductions in service use occurred for the most frequently delivered services, cancer 
screening and imaging, which experienced differential reductions of 0.3 services per 
100 beneficiaries (P=0.01 and P=0.05, respectively).  Cardiovascular testing and 
procedures underwent the greatest reduction in relative terms, with a differential 
reduction of 6.3% for the ACO group (P=0.05).  Differential reductions in low-value 
service use were similar in magnitude for higher-priced services (1.4%, 95% CI -0.4%—
3.3%) and lower-priced services (2.1%, 95% CI 0.7%—3.5%), as well as for services 
that were more sensitive to patient preferences (1.7%, 95% CI 0.3%—3.2%) and less 
sensitive to patient preferences (2.2%, 95% CI 0.7%—3.7%).   
ACOs with higher baseline levels of low-value service use than their service area 
experienced a differential reduction of 1.2 services per 100 beneficiaries (Figure 2.2.1), 
while ACOs with lower baseline rates experienced a statistically insignificant 
differential reduction of 0.2 services per 100 beneficiaries (P=0.003 for test of 
difference in differential reductions between ACO subgroups).  Differential reductions 
in low-value service use were similar for ACOs serving areas with higher or lower 
baseline levels of low-value service use (P=0.41) 
 Estimates were not substantially affected by adjusting for small differences in 
trends in low-value service use during the pre-contract period, or by omitting service 
qualification indicators from the regression model (Appendix 2).
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Table 2.2.2 Beneficiary Characteristics Before and After Start of Pioneer ACO Contracts  
 
2009-2011 2012 
  
 Characteristic 
Control Group 
N=13,041,918 
ACO Group 
N=511,426 
Control Group 
N=4,411,505 
ACO Group 
N=181,792 
Differential 
Change for 
ACO Group P-Value 
Age, mean 72.2 ± 0.0  71.9 ± 0.2 72.0 ± 0.0 71.8 ± 0.1 0.1 0.16 
Female sex, % 57.4 58.1 57.1 57.8 -0.1 0.54 
Race/ethnicity, % 
         White 83.2 82.2 82.6 81.7 0.1 0.53 
   Black 8.6 9.1 8.9 9.2 -0.1 0.13 
   Hispanic 4.8 5.8 5.0 5.8 -0.2 0.10 
   Other 3.3 2.9 3.5 3.3 0.2 0.03 
Medicaid recipient, % 16.3 16.3 16.1 16.0 -0.1 0.76 
Disabled,a % 22.0 22.2 22.9 22.8 -0.3 0.06 
End-stage renal disease, % 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 0.0 0.46 
Nursing home resident, % 3.2 2.6 3.1 2.5 -0.1 0.38 
CCW conditionsb 
        Total no., mean 5.6 ± 0.0  5.6 ± 0.1 5.8 ± 0.0  5.7 ± 0.1  0.0 0.32 
  ≥6 conditions 47.8 46.9 50.1 48.9 -0.3 0.28 
  ≥9 conditions 19.3 18.6 21.4 20.5 -0.3 0.25 
Low-value service measures qualified 
for,c total no., mean 14.9 ± 0.0  14.9 ± 0.0  15.0 ± 0.0  14.9 ± 0.0  0.0 0.47 
HCC risk score,d mean 1.3 ± 0.0  1.3 ± 0.0  1.3 ± 0.0  1.3 ± 0.0  0.0 0.99 
ZCTA-level characteristics, mean 
        % below FPL 9.1 8.9 9.1 8.8 0.0 0.83 
  % with high school degree 75.6 76.3 75.7 76.5 0.1 0.17 
  % with college degree 19.8 20.6 19.9 20.8 0.1 0.16 
ACO  = Accountable Care Organization, CCW = Chronic Conditions Warehouse, HCC = Hierarchical Condition Categories, ZCTA = ZIP Code Tabulation 
Area 
Means and percentages were adjusted for geography to reflect comparisons within hospital referral regions.  Means are presented ± standard errors.  
a Refers to beneficiaries for whom disability was the original reason for Medicare eligibility. 
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Table 2.2.2 (Continued) Beneficiary Characteristics Before and After Start of Pioneer ACO Contracts  
b Chronic conditions include 25 conditions  from the CCW: acute myocardial infarction, Alzheimer's disease, Alzheimer's disease and related disorders 
or senile dementia, anemia, asthma, atrial fibrillation, benign prostatic hyperplasia,  breast cancer,  chronic kidney disease, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, colorectal cancer, depression, diabetes, endometrial cancer, heart failure, hip/pelvic fracture, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, 
hypothyroidism, ischemic heart disease,  lung cancer, osteoporosis, prostate cancer, rheumatoid arthritis/osteoarthritis, stroke/transient ischemic 
attack.   
c Refers to the number of low-value service measures that could potentially apply to a beneficiary each year. For example, preoperative testing 
measures only apply to patients who underwent specific surgical procedures. Qualification criteria for all measures are presented in the eAppendix. 
d HCC risk scores are calculated based on Medicare enrollment and claims files from the prior calendar year. Higher scores predict higher subsequent 
spending.  Higher scores predict higher subsequent spending.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
7
5
 
Table 2.2.3 Differential Changes in Use of Low-Value Services in ACO vs. Control Group  
Annual Count or Spending per 
100 Beneficiaries 
Mean 
for 
ACO 
Groupa 
Baseline 
Difference 
between 
ACO and 
Control 
Group P-Value 
Differential 
Change (per 
100 benes) 95% CI 
Differential 
Change as 
Percent of 
ACO Meanb 95% CI P-Value 
Total low-value services, no. 41.0 -1.8 0.02 -0.8 (-1.2, -0.4) -1.9 (-2.9, -0.9) <0.001 
Total low-value service 
spending, $ 
10301 -256 0.13 -459 
(-773, -146) 
-4.5 (-7.5, -1.4) 0.004 
 
        
Low-value services by clinical 
category, no.c          
   Cancer screening 11 -0.3 0.27 -0.3 (-0.4, -0.1) -2.4 (-4.1, -0.7) 0.01 
   Testing 8.7 -0.7 0.01 -0.2 (-0.5, 0.2) -1.7 (-5.8, 2.3) 0.39 
   Preoperative Services 2.1 -0.1 0.01 0.0 (-0.1, 0.1) 1.0 (-3.9, 5.8) 0.69 
   Imaging 14 -0.6 0.05 -0.3 (-0.5, 0) -1.8 (-3.6, 0) 0.05 
   Cardiovascular Tests and 
Procedures 
1.0 0.0 0.43 -0.1 
(-0.1, 0) 
-6.3 (-12.6, 0) 0.05 
   Other Invasive Procedures 4.4 -0.1 0.22 -0.1 (-0.2, 0.1) -1.3 (-4.3, 1.7) 0.38 
 
        
Low-value services by price, 
no.c          
   Higher priced 15 -0.7 0.03 -0.2 (-0.5, 0.1) -1.4 (-3.3, 0.4) 0.13 
   Lower priced 25 -1.1 0.03 -0.5 (-0.9, -0.2) -2.1 (-3.5, -0.7) 0.00 
 
        
Low-value services by 
sensitivity to patient 
preferences, noc  
        
   More sensitive 28 -1.4 0.01 -0.5 (-0.9, -0.1) -1.7 (-3.2, -0.3) 0.02 
   Less sensitive 13 -0.3 0.17 -0.3 (-0.5, -0.1) -2.2 (-3.7, -0.7) 0.004 
a Calculated by as the sum of the 2012 control group mean and the adjusted pre-contract difference between the ACO and control group, which 
approximates the expected 2012 ACO group mean if there we no differential change.   
b Calculated as the differential change divided by the mean for ACO group.  
c Note that the sum of differential changes within each set of service categories equals the total differential change.  
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FIGURE 2.2.1 Differential Changes in Use of Low-Value Services in ACO vs. Control Group, by Baseline Use 
 
Adjusted differential changes in the total annual count of low-value services for beneficiaries attributed to Pioneer ACOs vs. the control group from the 
pre-contract period (2009-2011) to the post-contract period (2012) are presented for the following ACO subgroups: (1) ACOs serving areas with a 2008 
adjusted count of low-value services per beneficiary in the control group that was greater than vs less than that of the service area of the median ACO, 
and (2) ACOs with an adjusted count of low-value services per beneficiary in 2008 that was greater vs. less than that of the control group within the 
ACO’s service area.  The number of ACOs within each subgroup is indicated parenthetically. Estimates are displayed with 95% confidence intervals 
and P-values for the difference between subgroups. 
-2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5
Differential change in count of low-value services per 100 beneficiaries 
P-value for test of 
difference between 
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2.2.4 DISCUSSION 
 The first year of the Medicare Pioneer ACO program was associated with a 
modest reduction in use of low-value services that could be measured directly with 
claims data.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis that global payment 
initiatives can discourage overuse even while preserving broad provider discretion in 
determining what services are low-value.  Notably, spending on low-value services 
underwent a differential reduction of 4.5%, substantially larger than the 1.2% overall 
spending reduction in the first year of the Pioneer program previously estimated with 
the same methods.14  This finding suggests that Pioneer ACOs targeted low-value 
services in their efforts to reduce spending, despite a lack of financial incentives or 
quality reporting requirements specifically concerning overused services.  
 Utilization changes appear to have occurred broadly across services, and were 
not driven by a single measured service or type of service.  Even though it may be more 
difficult for ACOs to incentivize member physicians to reduce higher-priced services, 
since those services generate more revenue under fee-for-service reimbursement,18 we 
observed relative reductions that were similar between higher-priced and lower-priced 
services.  Differential reductions in low-value service use were also similar for services 
that were more or less sensitive to patient preferences.  This finding suggests that 
reductions in low-value service use in ACOs were driven by changes in physician 
practice patterns, which accords with research demonstrating that patient preferences 
are not major obstacles to reducing low-value service use.19-21 
 Reductions in low-value service use were concentrated among ACOs with higher 
baseline levels of use of these services relative to their service areas, whereas baseline 
performance of ACO service areas did not predict reductions in low-value service use.  
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These findings highlight the importance of practice variation within regional markets 
rather than across markets in predicting organizations’ prospects for improving 
efficiency. In service areas where overuse is especially common, providers may face 
difficulties in reducing low-value service use markedly below local norms.  Bundled 
payment initiatives may produce greater reductions in overuse if the programs 
encourage participation of provider organization with more wasteful practices at 
baseline.  
Several limitations of this study warrant discussion.  First, organizations 
selecting into the volunteer Pioneer program may have been uniquely well positioned 
to identify and reduce wasteful practices. Consequently, similar results may not be 
achieved if the Pioneer program or similar programs are expanded to include a different 
set of provider organizations.  Second, although our difference-in-differences study 
design controls for fixed difference between the ACO group and control group, and even 
though we detected no difference in temporal trends of low-value service use between 
these groups, it is nevertheless possible that an independent contemporaneous factor 
affecting ACOs produced a differential change in 2012.  It is also possible that 
organizations entering the Pioneer program may have differentially reduced low-value 
service use even in the absence of the program. However, we found no evidence that 
these organizations were experiencing faster reductions in low-value service use prior 
to the ACO contracts.  In addition, reductions in use of higher-priced low-value services 
would entail a substantial loss in fee-for-service revenue in the absence of ACO 
contracts, and we found that reductions were unrelated to service price.  
Finally, our results do not constitute conclusive evidence of value improvement 
among Pioneer ACOs.  It is possible that important high-value services also experienced 
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reductions in 2012.  Nevertheless, our findings, taken together with studies 
demonstrating spending reductions greater than Medicare bonus payments14 and 
improved or stable performance on measures of patient experiences and quality,10 are 
consistent with the conclusion that the overall value of health care provided by Pioneer 
ACOs improved after their participation in an alternative payment model. 
 
  
 
 
80 
 
 
2.2.5 REFERENCES 
1. Berwick DM, Hackbarth AD. Eliminating waste in US health care. JAMA. 
2012;307(14):1513–6. 
2. Burwell SM. Setting Value-based payment goals - HHS efforts to improve U.S. health 
care. The New England Journal of Medicine. 2015;(372):897–899. 
3. Coulam RF, Gaumer GL. Medicare’s prospective payment system: a critical appraisal. 
Health Care Financing Review Annual Supplement. 1991:45–77. 
4. McGuire TG, Newhouse JP, Sinaiko AD. An economic history of Medicare part C. The 
Milbank Quarterly. 2011;89(2):289–332. 
5. Song Z, Chokshi DA. The role of private payers in payment reform. JAMA. 
2015;313(1):25–6. 
6. Choudhry NK, Rosenthal MB, Milstein A. Assessing the evidence for value-based 
insurance design. Health Affairs. 2010;29(11):1988–94. 
7. Elshaug AG, McWilliams JM, Landon BE. The value of low-value lists. JAMA. 
2013;309(8):775–6. 
8. Schwartz AL, Landon BE, Elshaug AG, Chernew ME, McWilliams JM. Measuring low-
value care in Medicare. JAMA Internal Medicine. 2014;174(7):1067–76. 
9. Colla CH. Swimming against the current--what might work to reduce low-value care? 
New England Journal of Medicine. 2014;371(14):1280–3. 
10. McWilliams JM, Landon BE, Chernew ME, Zaslavsky AM. Changes in patients’ 
experiences in Medicare Accountable Care Organizations. New England Journal of 
Medicine. 2014;371(18):1715–24. 
 
 
81 
 
 
11. Song Z, Rose S, Safran DG, Landon BE, Day MP, Chernew ME. Changes in health care 
spending and quality 4 years into global payment. New England Journal of Medicine. 
2014;371(18):1704–14. 
12. Song Z, Safran DG, Landon BE, et al. Health care spending and quality in year 1 of 
the Alternative Quality Contract. New England Journal of Medicine. 
2011;365(10):909–18. 
13. McWilliams JM, Landon BE, Chernew ME. Changes in health care spending and 
quality for Medicare beneficiaries associated with a commercial ACO contract. JAMA. 
2013;310(8):829–36. 
14. McWilliams JM, Chernew ME, Landon BE, Schwartz AL. Performance differences in 
year 1 of Pioneer accountable care organizations. New England Journal of Medicine. 
2015;in press. 
15. Dimick JB, Ryan AM. Methods for evaluating changes in health care policy: the 
difference-in-differences approach. JAMA. 2014;312(22):2401–2. 
16. Bertrand M, Duflo E, Mullainathan S. How much should we trust differences-in-
differences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2004;119(1):249–275. 
17. Williams RL. A note on robust variance estimation for cluster-correlated data. 
Biometrics. 2000;56(2):645–6. 
18. Landon BE. Keeping score under a global payment system. New England Journal of 
Medicine. 2012;366(5):393–5. 
19. Cutler DM, Skinner JS, Stern AD, Wennberg DE. Physician beliefs and patient 
preferences: a new look at regional variation in health care spending. National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series. 2013;19320. 
 
 
82 
 
 
20. Gogineni K, Shuman KL, Chinn D, Gabler NB, Emanuel EJ. Patient Demands and 
Requests for Cancer Tests and Treatments. JAMA Oncology. 2015;Published . 
21. Chandra A, Cutler D, Song Z. Who ordered that? The economics of treatment 
choices in medical care. Handbook of Health Economics. 2012;2:397–432. 
 
  
 
 
83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Accuracy vs Incentives: 
A Tradeoff for Performance Measurement  
in Health Care and Education 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Perceptions of suboptimal quality in health care and education have spurred 
interest in promoting performance accountability for hospitals, doctors, schools and 
teachers. Regulators and institutional purchasers have increasingly employed 
standardized performance measures for this purpose. In health care, providers are 
scored on outcomes like mortality, cost, and patient satisfaction, or on processes like 
rates of appropriately prescribing a medication. In education, there is substantial 
interest in value-added modeling, which assesses a teacher or school’s performance 
based on changes in student test scores. Several federal and state policies in the United 
States have accelerated these trends, mandating public disclosure of certain 
performance measures and tying substantial financial incentives to others.  
The reliability of performance measures in these settings has been a persistent 
concern (Hofer et al. 1999, Kane and Staiger 2002). High variance of measured 
outcomes and relatively small sample sizes of patients or students can result in 
substantial measurement error. Outstanding performers in one period often experience 
reversion to the mean soon after, suggesting that initial performance was partially due 
to chance. To address this limitation, it is common to modify estimates of observed 
performance by shrinking them toward a common prior value, typically the average 
observed performance of all agents. A substantial literature dating to Stein (1956) 
illustrates that shrinkage estimation reduces measurement error, and shrinkage 
estimation is employed in a variety of specific modeling strategies referred to as mixed, 
hierarchical, multilevel or random effects modeling, or empirical Bayes estimation. 
Research on the policy applications of these techniques has focused on their statistical 
properties like precision or bias (Koedel, Mihaly, and Rockoff 2015; Normand and 
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Shahian 2007). However, because these measures are intended to affect the market 
behavior of consumers and suppliers, these measures should be ultimately judged on 
the basis of economic rather than statistical criteria.  
This paper explores the implications of applying Bayesian shrinkage techniques 
to performance measurement in public policy. The study is motivated by a simple 
observation: shrinkage estimation reduces a measure’s responsiveness to measured 
behavior. When shrinkage techniques are not employed, and performance is estimated 
as the mean of an agent’s observed performance (i.e. the average mortality of a 
surgeon’s patients), then an increase in that agent’s true performance will coincide with 
an equal expected increase in measured performance. Adjusting these estimates using 
shrinkage techniques will tend to increase the measured performance of below-average 
agents, and decrease the measured performance of above-average agents. In both cases, 
however, the shrinkage estimate will be less responsive to the agent’s observed 
performance and to the agent’s true unobserved performance. For incentive schemes in 
which agents are rewarded according to their measured performance, reducing the 
responsiveness of a measure will reduce the marginal incentive for performance 
improvement. Thus, the incentive properties of performance estimation techniques, 
which are economic properties, are a first-order concern for designing optimal 
incentive schemes in public policy.  
This observation motivates several policy-relevant questions. Do measure 
accuracy and measure responsiveness both contribute to the success of accountability-
based public policies? If so, in what cases does one property contribute more to welfare 
than the other? In the context of current and potential policies, is the loss in measure 
responsiveness from shrinkage estimation substantial compared to the accuracy gains? 
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Is the tradeoff avoidable? This paper aims to provide theoretical and empirical traction 
on these unexplored issues.  
The paper’s first contribution is an assessment of the welfare implications of 
accuracy and responsiveness in performance estimation. In a stylized model of two 
agents with market power competing on quality, accuracy and responsiveness of 
performance signals each contribute to welfare. Greater accuracy improves consumers’ 
match to agents, thereby reducing welfare losses resulting from misinformed consumer 
choices. Responsive performance estimation drives a demand response to quality, 
reducing welfare loss arising from suboptimal quality investment by agents. The 
relative welfare contribution of each measurement property depends on the policy 
setting. This model motivates my examination of shrinkage estimation by 
demonstrating that accuracy of performance measurement and incentives for 
performance improvement can be substitutes in promoting welfare.  
 My second contribution is a characterization of the tradeoff between accuracy 
improvement and reduced measure responsiveness entailed by shrinkage estimation. 
Shrinkage estimators reduce measure responsiveness by one minus the shrinkage 
factor, which depends on sample size, variance in true performance across agents, and 
variance in observed performance within agents (i.e. noise). Thus, incentives are 
distorted by the extent to which an agent’s performance score is determined by other 
agents’ observed performance, resulting in a free-riding problem. Greater incentive 
distortions are to be expected whenever observed performance is an especially noisy 
signal of true performance. In particular, agents with few available performance 
observations, like teachers with small classrooms or hospitals with few patients, face 
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weaker incentives to improve performance. I also demonstrate the connection between 
the accuracy-incentives tradeoff and alternate definitions of a measure’s biasedness. 
 Third, I show that the magnitude of the accuracy-incentives tradeoff is 
substantial in the context of a hospital performance measurement. Using a Monte Carlo 
simulation, I examine accuracy and responsiveness in the context of measuring heart 
attack mortality, which is publicly reported in a national disclosure program. I calculate 
that the current preferred method for shrinking one-year performance estimates 
reduces measure responsiveness by 34 percent on average, and by 64 percent for 
smaller hospitals. These smaller hospitals must decrease mortality by 2.8 times more 
than a large hospital in order to experience an equal measured mortality improvement.  
Finally, I compare the accuracy and responsiveness of several alternate 
approaches to estimating hospital performance. Although shrinkage estimators tend to 
reduces measurement error substantially, similar reductions in error can be achieved 
without shrinkage by increasing the number of years used to estimate performance. 
Scoring each estimation technique based on accuracy and responsiveness, I identify a 
frontier of techniques that dominate others. Notably, the current risk-standardized 
mortality rate measurement employed by Medicare is dominated.  
This study is related most closely to the economics literature on performance 
measurement in health care and education. In education, studies have highlighted the 
obstacles introduced by imprecise performance measures (Kane and Staiger 2002; 
Staiger and Rockoff 2010). A review of value-added modeling documents many studies 
of measurement properties like bias and stability (Koedel, Mihaly, and Rockoff 2015). 
Health economics is largely devoted to understanding extensive information 
imperfections in health care (Arrow 1963) which may motivate quality reporting or 
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pay-for-performance schemes (Kolstad 2013; Richardson 2013). Many of these studies 
of health care and education fall within a broader economic literature on quality 
disclosure and certification (Dranove and Jin 2010). There is also an expansive 
statistical, medical, and policy literature on various properties of health care quality 
measurement, including measure reliability (e.g. Adams et al., 2010; Dimick et al., 2004; 
Nyweide et al., 2009).  
A broader economics literature concerns the consequences of imprecise quality 
signals in markets. In organizational economics, this topic has been a particular area of 
focus, especially with regard to the optimal power of incentive contracts (Gibbons and 
Roberts 2013). Precision of performance signals also plays a role in the economics of 
discrimination. For example, the canonical Phelps (1972) study of statistical 
discrimination concludes by illustrating how high-performing minorities may face 
discrimination in the labor market if they produce a high variance performance signal. 
Just as this penalty for high-variance performance may reduce human capital 
investment (Farmer and Terrell 1996), I argue that shrinkage estimation in education 
and health care may discourage quality investment. The key distinction between my 
research and the broader literature on quality signals is my focus on the public policy 
setting. For example, I do not impose labor market equilibrium conditions equating 
compensation to workers’ expected productivity. Instead, I assume that a government 
paying for health care or education services differs from other employers in that the 
government can provide compensation that departs from a posterior belief about 
workers’ productivity. This ensures that whether to use shrinkage estimation for 
performance measures is the government’s choice rather than a necessity.  
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents a stylized 
model demonstrating the contributions of measure accuracy and performance 
incentives to welfare. Section 3.3 describes the accuracy-incentives tradeoff in the 
context of shrinkage estimation. Section 3.4 details the Monte Carlo simulation and its 
results. Section 3.5 discusses several implications of the analysis for health and 
education policy and provides a brief conclusion.  
 
3.2 MEASUREMENT ACCURACY, MEASUREMENT RESPONSIVENESS, AND WELFARE:  
A STYLIZED MODEL  
I consider a stylized model in which agents with market power choose levels of 
quality and quality signals guide consumers’ choice of agents. This model could describe 
patients choosing among medical provider or students choosing schools. In equilibrium, 
I find that total welfare is a function of the magnitude of signal error and the 
responsiveness of the signal to agents’ quality choices. The intuition for this result 
follows from the two ways in which quality information contributes to welfare. First, 
accurate quality signals promote efficient sorting for consumers, who might choose an 
inferior agent based on an erroneous quality signal. Second, quality signals that are 
responsive to agent behavior elicit a demand response, increasing agents’ incentives for 
investing in quality and raising quality above suboptimal levels. I also highlight two 
special cases which illustrate the context-dependence of whether signal accuracy or 
performance incentives are more important contributors to welfare. In the first, welfare 
gains can only be achieved through improved signal accuracy because quality levels are 
exogenous. In the second, welfare gains can only be achieved through increased 
financial incentives for quality because demand is unresponsive to quality.  
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Consumers are arrayed uniformly on a line between two agents (agent A and 
agent B), with 𝑧 ∈ (0,1)  denoting a consumer’s distance from agent A. Both the distance 
between agents and the number of consumers are normalized to one. The model 
proceeds in three stages. First, each agent j simultaneously chooses a level of quality 
𝑢𝑗 ∈ [0, ∞) and bears the costs of that quality investment. Second, consumers perceive a 
quality signal from each agent. Third, consumers sort between agents, who receive a 
regulated fee for each consumer they serve. 
Consumer utility depends on quality of the consumer’s chosen agent, 𝑢𝑎 or 𝑢𝑏, 
and transport costs 𝑐 > 0 per unit of travel. Specifically,  
𝑈(𝑧) = {
𝛼 + 𝑢𝐴 − 𝑐𝑧 
𝛼 + 𝑢𝐵 − 𝑐(1 − 𝑧)
 
if  𝑗 = 𝐴
if 𝑗 = 𝐵
 
I assume 𝛼 > 𝑐/2, which ensures that the minimal utility achieved from being served by 
an agent exceeds the maximum transport costs entailed by choosing the closest agent. 
Thus, each consumer will choose one of the agents. Consumers perceive agent quality as  
?̂?𝑗, a signal of quality that contains some error 𝜀𝑗. By definition:  
?̂?𝑗 = 𝑢𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗 
Quality signals are perceived identically by all consumers, and no particular distribution 
of the error is assumed. I do assume that 𝐸[𝜀𝑗|𝑢−𝑗, 𝜀−𝑗 ] = 𝐸[𝜀𝑗], where –j indicates the 
agent who is not agent j. Thus, error in one agent’s quality signal is unaffected by the 
other agent’s true quality or the error in their quality. Note that an agent’s quality signal 
and the consumer’s perception of that agent’s quality are equal. This is reasonable in 
the public policy settings I discuss, where information imperfections are common, and 
consumers may not have access to multiple sources of reliable performance 
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information. The difference in the quality signals from each agent yields a relative 
quality signal, which is represented by the following notation:  
?̂?𝑗
∆ = 𝑢𝑗 − 𝑢−𝑗 +  𝜀𝑗 − 𝜀−𝑗 = 𝑢𝑗
Δ + 𝜀𝑗
Δ 
These quality signals yield a demand for each agent, 𝑍𝑗(?̂?𝑗
∆).  
Agents are self-interested, and their utility is the difference between revenue 
and effort costs, which I assume to be quadratic. Agents receive a regulated price r for 
each consumer they serve. Thus, physician utility is 
𝑉𝑗 = 𝑍𝑗𝑟 −
1
2
𝑢𝑗
2 
Specifying effort costs as quadratic function of quality conveniently ensures an interior 
solution for agent choice of quality. Revenue and costs are the same for both agents, 
implying symmetric behavior in equilibrium. Note also that agents are risk-neutral.1 
 
Equilibrium  
 Consumers maximize utility on the basis of the perceived quality of both agents, 
choosing agent A if and only if  ?̂?𝐴
∆ > 𝑐𝑧 − 𝑐(1 − 𝑧), yielding the following demand: 
𝑍𝑗 =
1
2
+
?̂?𝑖
∆
2𝑐
 
To ensure an interior sorting solution, I assume that max(|?̂?𝑗
∆|) < 𝑐 . In a symmetric 
equilibrium with equal agent quality, this corresponds to the assumption that 
max(|𝜀𝑗
𝛥|) < 𝑐.  
                                                          
1 At this point, it bears emphasizing the stylized nature of this model.  In order to consider issues of 
performance signal accuracy and responsiveness in isolation, the model does not incorporate 
additional concerns regarding agent altruism (Kolstad 2013, McGuire 2000), multitasking 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom 1990), the insurance value of performance contracts to agents (Gibbons 
and Roberts 2013), or agent participation decisions (Rothstein 2015).  
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Providers maximize their utility, with the following first order condition 
describing their choice of quality:  
𝑢𝑗 =  
𝑑𝐸[𝑍𝑗]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
𝑟 
Substituting for the derivative of demand and noting that 
 𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗
∆]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
=  
𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗]  
𝑑𝑢𝑗
 (which follows 
from the prior assumption that  𝐸[𝜀𝑗|𝑢−𝑗, 𝜀−𝑗 ] = 𝐸[𝜀𝑗], yields equilibrium quality 
supply: 
𝑢𝑗 =  
𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
𝑟
2𝑐
  
Given that the right hand side terms of this expression are equal for both agents, agent 
quality choices are indeed identical, which means that equilibrium demand is  
𝑍𝑗 =
1
2
+
𝜀𝑗
Δ
2𝑐
 
 
Welfare 
Before characterizing welfare in equilibrium, it is instructive to consider the 
welfare resulting from various potential sorting and quality decisions. If agent quality 
choice is symmetric and consumers choose agents such that all consumers located at  
𝑧 < 𝑍𝐴 choose agent A and all located at 𝑧 > 𝑍𝐴 choose agent B, then realized total 
welfare following sorting can be expressed as  
∫ (𝛼 + 𝑢 − 𝑐𝑧) 𝑑𝑧
𝑍𝐴
0
+ ∫ (𝛼 + 𝑢 − 𝑐(1 − 𝑧))𝑑𝑧
1
𝑍𝐴
− 𝑢2 
Solving and rearranging yields  
𝛼 +
1 − 𝑐
4
− (𝑢 −
1
2
)
2
− 𝑐 (𝑍𝐴 −
1
2
)
2
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The leftmost two terms, consisting of constants, reflect the maximum total realized 
utility for agents and consumers. This first-best utility can only be achieved when 
quality equals 0.5 and demand equals 0.5 for each agent. For intuition behind this 
result, note that optimal quality entails equalizing the marginal cost of quality for both 
agents, 2𝑢, with the marginal benefit for consumers, 𝑢. Because agents choose equal 
quality in equilibrium, it follows that optimal sorting occurs at the midpoint between 
agents, which minimizes travel distance.  
The expected total welfare across a range of possible error draws is simply the 
expectation of this expression.  Evaluating the expectation and substituting demand and 
quality in equilibrium and yields the following expression for expected welfare loss in 
equilibrium relative to the first-best scenario: 
(
 𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
𝑟
2𝑐
−
1
2
)
2
+
1
4𝑐
𝐸 [( ?̂?𝑗
∆ − 𝑢𝑗
∆ )
2
] 
 Note that 𝐸 [( ?̂?𝑗
∆ − 𝑢𝑗
∆ )
2
] is the mean squared error of  ?̂?𝑗
∆, the relative quality signal, as 
an estimate of 𝑢𝑗
∆ , the true difference in agent quality. The two terms in this expression 
represent two components of welfare loss in equilibrium. The left term is the square of 
the difference between equilibrium quality and optimal quality. If perceived signals of 
agent quality are fully responsive to agent quality investments (
 𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
= 1), then quality 
investment will be suboptimal when 𝑟 < 𝑐. Welfare losses from suboptimal quality will 
be exacerbated when quality signals are less than fully responsive (
 𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
< 1). The 
right term represents the welfare loss attributable to excess travel costs due to error in 
the relative quality signal. When quality signals have greater error, a greater number of 
consumers near the margin of agent selection will make inefficient agent choices. I say 
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an accuracy-incentives tradeoff exists when one component of this welfare expression 
increases while the other component decreases. 
 
Policy Responses and Special Cases 
 These equilibrium conditions suggest that quality disclosure policies and 
performance payment policies may be welfare-improving. A regulator can promote 
optimal sorting by reducing the mean squared error of quality signals that consumers 
perceive. For example, if the government were able to measure and publicly disclose a 
quality signal with zero error, then optimal sorting would result. Because mean squared 
error is the sum of variance and squared bias, note that an unbiased signal with large 
variance may produce greater welfare loss than a biased signal with lesser variance. A 
regulator can induce optimal agent effort in two ways. The regulated fee can be set so 
that  𝑟 = 𝑐 (
 𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
)
−1
. However, this approach would entail extremely high fees in the 
event of low demand elasticity (i.e. high transport costs). Alternatively, the regulator 
can introduce a bonus payment for quality such that agents now receive payments of 
𝑍𝑗𝑟 + 𝑏?̂?𝑗. Agents would now choose quality levels on the basis of the following first 
order condition 
𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
𝑟
2𝑐
+
𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗] 
𝑑𝑢𝑗
𝑏 = 𝑢𝑗  
Optimal effort can be achieved by choosing a bonus payment b and regulated fee r such 
that the left hand side equals 0.5, the optimal choice.  
 Although both the provision of accurate performance information and 
appropriate quality incentives can be welfare-improving, the relative welfare 
contribution of these policies will depend on the setting. I now illustrate two special 
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cases in which only one of these policy mechanisms contributes to welfare. First, 
consider a setting in which agent quality is fixed and depends only on innate talent, 
rather than effort.  In this case, 𝑢𝑖   is no longer a choice variable for agents. In this 
setting, demand equals 𝑢𝑗
𝛥 +
𝜀𝑗
𝛥
2𝑐
 and welfare losses relative to the first best equal 
1
4𝑐
𝐸 [( ?̂?𝑗
∆ − 𝑢𝑗
∆ )
2
].  First-best welfare can be achieved by providing quality signals with 
zero error. However, policies that provide incentives for quality have no effect on 
welfare, since quality is exogenous. Second, consider a setting in which demand is 
inelastic with respect to quality.  In the setting of this stylized model, this assumption 
can be modeled as transport costs 𝑐 approaching infinity.  In this setting, 𝑇𝑖 equals one 
half and consumers are split equally between agents regardless of quality differences.   
In the absence of a quality bonus payment scheme, equilibrium quality is zero, and 
relative to the first best, welfare loss equals (
𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗] 
𝑑𝑢𝑗
𝑏 −
1
2
).  First-best welfare can be 
achieved by providing an appropriate bonus for measured quality. However, improving 
measure accuracy has no effect on welfare.  
 To summarize, in this stylized principal-agent model, welfare loss can be 
decomposed into two sources: consumer uncertainty about quality and insufficient (or 
excessive) incentives for quality improvement. This welfare decomposition and the 
subsequent discussion of optimal policy responses illustrate how these two sources of 
welfare loss are addressed separately by policies like disclosure of precise performance 
information or provision of performance bonuses. Whether improving accuracy of 
performance signals or improving incentives for performance improvement contributes 
more to welfare improvement depends on demand responsiveness and the marginal 
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costs of quality improvement.  However, there will be an accuracy-incentive tradeoff 
when one component of welfare loss increases and the other decreases. 
 
3.3. SHRINKAGE ESTIMATION AND THE ACCURACY-INCENTIVES TRADEOFF 
Shrinkage estimation describes a broad class of estimation techniques that 
adjust raw observed estimates toward a common prior value.  These estimates are said 
to “borrow strength” or “borrow information” across units of observation, because the 
parameter of one unit is estimated using data from an independent unit.  In the context 
of performance estimation, this means that estimates of an agent’s performance will 
depend on other agents’ performance. Early motivation for such approaches was 
provided by Stein (1956), who proved the paradoxical result that, when estimating the 
means of several independent normal random variables, simple averages were inferior 
with respect to mean squared error to an alternative estimation approaches.  The 
massive breadth of the ensuing literature precludes a comprehensive review here.  In 
this section, I briefly review general properties of shrinkage estimators and 
demonstrate how choosing between estimators with and without shrinkage can entail 
an accuracy-incentive tradeoff.  
Consider estimating the performance of many educators or health care 
providers. Assume a data-generating process for the health or educational outcomes of 
individuals i who receive services from one of agents j: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛𝑗 
where 𝑥 is a vector of individual covariates, 𝑢𝑗 is the agent performance and 𝜀𝑖𝑗  is error. 
Agent performance is assumed to be independently normally distributed with mean 𝜇𝑢. 
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A standard shrinkage estimator for 𝑢𝑗, ?̃?𝑗 can be expressed as follows: (Gelman and Hill 
2007; Koedel, Mihaly and Rockoff 2015, Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2009): 
?̃?𝑗 = 𝑠𝑗?̅?𝑗 + (1 − 𝑠𝑗) 𝜇?̂? 
where ?̅?𝑗 is agent’s average residuals ?̅?𝑗− ?̂??̅?𝑗, and 𝑠𝑗 ∈ [0,1] is the shrinkage factor, 
which equals 
?̂?𝑢
2
 ?̂?𝑢
2+
?̂?𝜀
2
𝑛𝑗
 , where   𝜎𝑢
2 and  𝜎𝜀
2 are variances of 𝑢𝑗 and 𝜀𝑖𝑗  (i.e. the across-agent 
and within-agent variance).2  If the model is correctly specified, then the shrinkage 
estimator minimizes the estimates’ mean of the squared errors, and is particularly 
useful in correcting for attenuation bias when performance estimates are used as 
regressors (e.g. Chandra et al. 2013,  Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2014).  
 Several variants of such shrinkage estimation have been employed for health 
care and education measurement. Because larger hospitals often exhibit performance 
superior to smaller hospitals due to scale economies or learning-by-doing (Gaynor, 
Seider, and Vogt 2005), alternative methods shrink observed hospital outcomes toward 
a volume-standardized performance mean rather than an overall mean (Dimick et al. 
2009, Silber et al. 2010). Shrinkage estimates of teacher value-added can decompose 
the source of within-teacher variance into idiosyncratic annual classroom effects (i.e. 
exogenous classroom shocks) and student effects (Kane and Staiger, 2008). Others 
account for drift in teacher quality over time (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2014). 
Despite these differences, the methods all attempt to reduce mean squared error of 
                                                          
2 Note that the estimate  ?̃?𝑗  cannot be operationalized as written since the equation requires 
estimates of the variance components and mean.  This is a general property of shrinkage estimators, 
and there are many alternate ways of incorporating estimates of these parameters into the 
calculation of ?̂?𝑗 .  Fully Bayesian approaches employ a posterior distribution of these additional 
parameters (estimated based on prior distributions) while empirical Bayes approaches plug in point 
estimates.  For details and examples, see Gelman and Hill (2009), Gelman et al. (2014), Morris 
(1983), Guarino et al. (2014), Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014), Dimick, Staiger, and Birkmeyer 
(2010). 
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performance estimates by shrinking an average residual toward a common value, with 
the magnitude of shrinkage depending on a decomposition of variance.  
 To illustrate several properties of shrinkage estimation graphically, I briefly 
compare observed and shrunken performance estimates (?̅?𝑗 and ?̃?𝑗) obtained from 
synthetic classroom data for 100,000 teachers. In these data, teachers serve classrooms 
of 27 students, true teacher performance 𝑢𝑗  is independently distributed𝑁(0,0.15), and 
a student outcome is independently distributed 𝑁(𝑢𝑗, 0.95). This produces a shrinkage 
factor of 0.4 for each teacher performance estimate. These parameters were chosen 
based on the distribution of teacher ability and the measure reliability found in 
Rothstein (2015). In this example, since no student covariates must be adjusted for, the 
mean of student outcomes within a class constitutes a teacher’s observed performance, 
?̅?𝑗. Shrunken posterior performance estimates, ?̃?𝑗, are obtained via multilevel modeling 
with a random teacher effect. Panel A of Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of observed 
and shrunken performance estimates. Because of within-classroom variance in student 
performance, observed performance is over-dispersed relative to true teacher ability. 
Shrunken performance estimates exhibit less variance than both observed and true 
teacher performance. As noted by Chandra et al. (2013), the latter property follows 
because true performance is the sum of the shrunken performance prediction and an 
orthogonal prediction error. 
 Shrinkage estimators may be considered unbiased or biased depending on the 
criteria for bias. Consistent with this observation are Panels B and C of Figure 3.1, which 
present binned scatterplots of true performance vs measured performance and vice 
versa. First, consider for some performance measure ?̂?𝑗, the property 𝐸[𝑢𝑗|?̂?𝑗 ] = ?̂?𝑗, 
which I refer to as prediction unbiasedness, following Chetty Friedman and Rockoff 
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(2014). If a measure is prediction unbiased, then an agent’s measured performance will 
equal his or her expected true performance. As shown in Panel B, these shrunken 
performance measures very closely approximate the conditional mean of true teacher 
performance in the synthetic data. For this reason, linear shrinkage estimators are 
sometimes referred to as best linear unbiased predictors (BLUPs) (Skrondal and Rabe-
Hesketh 2009).3 Alternatively, observed performance clearly demonstrates prediction 
biasedness, overestimating the performance of teachers with relatively greater 
observed performance and underestimating the performance of teachers with inferior 
performance. Second, consider measurement unbiasedness, defined here as 
𝐸[?̂?𝑗|𝑢𝑗  ] = ?̂?𝑗. If a measure exhibits measurement unbiasedness, then an agent’s 
expected measured performance will equal their true performance. As shown in Panel 
C, shrinkage estimators do poorly according to this criteria, underestimating the 
performance of high performers and overestimating the performance of low 
performers. Alternatively, true performance very closely approximates the conditional 
average of observed (unshrunken) teacher performance.  
 Measurement bias relates to a key incentive property of shrinkage estimators: 
responsiveness to agent behavior. I define measure responsiveness as 
𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
, the change 
in expected measured performance for a change in actual performance. Assuming that 
𝐸[ 𝜀𝑖𝑗| 𝑢𝑗] = 0 and that an individual agent’s performance contributes negligibly to the 
average performance, 
𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
=
𝑑𝐸[?̃?𝑗]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
≈ 𝑠𝑗. Thus, the size of the shrinkage factor faced by 
an agent equals the measure’s responsiveness to that agent’s behavior. (Note that in 
                                                          
3 There has been recent interest in questioning whether assumptions required for unbiasedness hold 
when consumers’ choice of agents is not exogenous. See, for example Kalbfleisch and Wolfe (2013) 
and Guarino et al. (2014). 
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Panel C of Figure 3.1, the scatter plot slope for shrunken estimates indeed equals the 
shrinkage factor 0.4.) The loss of measure responsiveness entailed by shrinkage 
estimation equals one minus the shrinkage factor. As the shrinkage factor approaches 
one, the measure becomes fully responsive to agent behavior, since 
𝑑𝐸[?̅?𝑗]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
= 1. In this 
case, the group mean no longer contributes to the shrinkage estimate, which converges 
to its fixed effect estimate. Because measure responsiveness is increasing in 𝑛𝑗 and ?̂?𝑢
2 
and decreasing in ?̂?𝜀 
2, shrinkage estimates of performance will be less responsive for 
agents serving a smaller number of consumers (e.g. smaller hospitals), for measured 
outcomes with a large amount of residual error, and for settings in which agent 
performance is very similar.  
 Consider these shrinkage estimation properties in light of the model presented 
in Section 3.2. Recall that equilibrium welfare loss equals (
 𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
𝑟
2𝑐
−
1
2
)
2
+
1
4𝑐
𝑀𝑆𝐸[ ?̂?𝑗
∆]. 
Welfare loss is increasing in the mean square error of the relative performance signal 
and, when 𝑟 < 𝑐, decreasing in the responsiveness quality signals to true quality. 
Because shrinkage estimation decreases mean squared error but reduces 
 𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
 from 1 
to 𝑠𝑗, adopting shrinkage estimation entails an accuracy-incentives tradeoff. For the 
intuition behind this result, recall that agents’ investments in quality increase with the 
responsiveness of quality signals to behavior. For example, the quality bonus scheme 
described in Section 3.2 consists of a linear schedule of reward payments for measured 
performance. As measure responsiveness decreases, so does the effective marginal 
quality bonus for improved performance. Consumers’ demand response to quality, 
another driver of agent quality investments in Section 3.2, will be similarly diluted if 
publicly disclosed quality ratings are shrunken and consumers perceive these ratings to 
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be measurement unbiased. Thus, although shrinkage estimators may improve 
consumer sorting by improving measure accuracy, they reduce measure responsiveness 
and may lead to insufficient quality investment.
 
 
102 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Bias in Observed and Shrunken Performance 
 
A) Distribution of True and Measured Performance 
 
              B) Prediction Bias of                 C) Measurement Bias of 
              Observed and Shrunken Performance        Observed and Shrunken Performance 
   
 
Notes: These figures compare true performance (unobservable) to observed performance and 
shrunken estimates of observed performance. The data are simulated to match the variance 
properties of teacher value-added measures. True performance is distributed normally with mean 
zero and 𝜎𝑢 of 0.15. With classrooms of 27 students and 𝜎𝑒  of 0.95, reliability is 0.4 and the shrinkage 
weight is 0.6. Observed performance is the average outcome within in a teacher’s classroom. 
Shrunken performance is predicted via random effects estimation. Panel A is a kernel density plot of 
true performance, observed performance, and shrunken performance estimates for 100,000 
teachers. Panels B and C present binned scatterplots, which were constructed by dividing teachers 
into deciles based on their horizontal axis values and plotting means within each decile.  
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3.4. HOSPITAL QUALITY MEASUREMENT AND THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ACCURACY-INCENTIVES 
TRADEOFF 
 I use simulation to assess the magnitude of the accuracy-incentives tradeoff in 
the case of hospital performance measurement. Currently, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) employs shrinkage estimation to evaluate hospital mortality 
rates and rates of readmissions for patients with select diagnoses. These measures, 
constructed from Medicare claims data, are part of broader efforts to tie Medicare 
payments to measures of health care value (Burwell 2015) and to report hospital 
quality ratings (Werner and Bradlow 2006). 30-day readmission rates have been 
publicly reported since 2009 and began contributing to hospital payment penalties 
through the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program in fiscal year 2013. 30-day 
mortality ratings have been publicly reported since 2007 and began contributing to 
hospital payment adjustments as part of the Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing 
Program in the 2014 fiscal year. 4  CMS methods for calculating mortality and 
readmissions measures are broadly similar, involving hierarchical logistic models that 
include patient characteristics as covariates (Ash et al., 2012; Krumholz et al., 2006). 
 
Simulation Methods 
 I use Monte Carlo simulation to study measurement of hospital 30-day mortality 
for patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI), also known as heart attack. AMI 
                                                          
4 Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program penalties take the form of reductions in Medicare 
payments for all hospital admissions. The reduction is based on a hospital’s risk-adjusted 
readmissions rates for patients admitted with a select set of diagnoses. A hospital’s penalty is equal 
to the proportion of Medicare payments for these admissions that can attributed to readmissions in 
excess of a hospital’s expected number of readmissions, with a maximum penalty is a 3% in fiscal 
year 2015. Payments for the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program payments are more complex. 
In fiscal year 2015, 1.5% of base hospital payments were withheld from participating hospitals, and 
this money was used for incentive payments. Payments were calculated on the basis of 26 
performance measures, which are combined into composite scores for achievement as well as 
improvement.  
 
 
104 
 
 
was one of the first diagnoses used for CMS mortality measures, and is a serious 
complication of cardiovascular disease, the leading cause of death in the United States. 
The simulation is compares the performance of alternative measurement techniques 
according to two properties: root mean squared error (accuracy) and measure 
responsiveness (incentives). The simulation allows me to construct true hospital 
performance, which is typically unobserved, and to calculate an error equal to the 
difference between this value and measured performance. In addition, by taking 
repeated draws of data, simulation results incorporate findings from a broad set of 
possible hospital outcomes. Many studies use simulation to examine the properties of 
performance measures in health and education (Normand et al., 2007; Thomas and 
Hofer, 1999; Koedel Mihaly and Rockoff 2015; Rothstein 2015). My analysis closely 
follows that of Ryan et al. (2012), which compared the accuracy of several alternate AMI 
mortality measures. I replicate and extend those simulation methods by assessing 
measure responsiveness in addition to measurement error. The simulation methods, 
briefly described here, are detailed more fully in Ryan et al. (2012). 
 The data generating process has been calibrated to approximate the distribution 
of risk-adjusted mortality in Medicare inpatient claims data. In addition, the simulation 
includes a rejection sampling condition that discards any simulation iteration in which 
the simulated data differ substantially from Medicare inpatient data in more than one of 
several moment conditions.5 These conditions, and their values in Medicare inpatient 
data are: mean mortality (0.209), within-hospital standard deviation in mortality 
(0.091), between-hospital standard deviation in mortality (0.078), mean annual change 
in mortality (-0.007), within-hospital standard deviation of  annual mortality change 
                                                          
5 Specifically, this meant that the iteration was discarded if more than one of the simulated data 
parameters fell outside of a bootstrapped 95% confidence interval of the Medicare data parameter. 
 
 
105 
 
 
(0.137), between-hospital standard deviation of annual mortality changes (0.031), and 
mean hospital AMI volume (104.8). 
The data generation process involves the following steps. For each of 3000 
hospitals, an initial volume of AMI patients and an annual growth rate in volume are 
drawn from a truncated gamma distribution and a normal distribution, respectively 
(see Ryan et al. [2012] for all parameter values). Each hospital is assigned an initial raw 
mortality rate and an annual growth rate in mortality improvement, drawn from 
normal distributions. Annual raw mortality rates are then adjusted to reflect improved 
mortality in higher volume hospitals. Specifically, raw mortality rates are adjusted 
based on annual hospital volume and the empirical relationship between volume and 
risk-adjusted mortality in Medicare inpatient claims, which was modeled using a 
generalized linear model (Bernoulli family, logit link) and a of 5th degree polynomial 
function of hospital volume. The resulting annual mortality rate serves as a hospital’s 
true mortality score and corresponds to each patient’s probability of dying within 30 
days of admission. Deaths are assigned according to a random draw for each patient. 
Note that the probability of mortality is not a function of patient characteristics. This 
corresponds to an assumption that risk-adjustment eliminates residual confounding in 
all mortality measurement techniques I consider.  
For each measurement technique that I consider, I calculate hospital mortality 
scores based on one, two, or three years of observed mortality. In each simulation 
iteration, the accuracy of each measure is assessed by comparing measured mortality 
scores ?̂?𝑗 to true mortality in the following year 𝑢𝑗. The temporal lag reflects the role of 
public reporting policies in providing past hospital performance data to inform current 
patient decisions. Measure accuracy is scored as root mean square error (RMSE), 
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√(?̂?𝑗 − 𝑢𝑗)
2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
. Each measure’s responsiveness, 
 𝑑𝐸[?̂?𝑗]
𝑑𝑢𝑗
 is scored as the average shrinkage 
weight 𝑠𝑗. Accuracy and responsiveness are assessed across all hospitals and separately 
for hospitals categorized as small, medium and large, where patient volume for small 
hospitals is below the 25th percentile (approximately 30 AMI admissions) and volume 
for large hospitals is above the 75th percentile (approximately 143 AMI admissions). 
I consider five alternate measures of hospital mortality, four of which are 
included in Ryan et al. (2012). The first measure is observed over expected mortality 
(OE). OE, which is not a shrinkage estimator, has been used to estimate cardiac surgery 
performance (Kolstad 2013). It is calculated as follows: 
𝑂?̂?𝑗 =
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=1
∑ ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=1
 ∙ ?̅? 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗  is an indicator for death, ?̅? is the overall average mortality rate, and 𝑋 is a 
vector of patient characteristics. The denominator is the expected number of patient 
deaths based on prediction via linear regression. In the absence of patient covariates, 
this expression simplifies to the observed mortality rate ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=1
/𝑛𝑗 . I also implement a 
moving average (MA) of this estimator, a simple average of OE estimates over two or 
three years. Since OE and MA do not incorporate shrinkage, their measure 
responsiveness equals one.  
 The second measure is risk-standardized mortality rate (RSMR), the current 
CMS measure for 30-day mortality and 30-day readmissions. CMS now uses three years 
of claims data for its RSMR calculations, though it initially used one year. The formula 
for RSMR is: 
?̂?𝑗
𝑅𝑆𝑀𝑅 =
∑ 𝑓( ?̂?0+?̂?𝑗+?̂?1𝑋𝑖𝑗)
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑓( ?̂?0+?̂?1𝑋𝑖𝑗)
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=1
 ∙ ?̅?  
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where 𝑓() is the inverse of the logistic link function. For this simulation, ?̂?0, 𝜃𝑗, and ?̂?1 
are estimated via a multilevel logistic model with a hospital random effect. The third 
measure I test is a novel measure that I call the average best linear unbiased estimator 
(ABLUP). ABLUP, also a shrinkage estimate, is calculated using the same logistic model 
estimates as RSMR: 
?̂?𝑗
𝐴𝐵𝐿𝑈𝑃 =
∑ 𝑓( ?̂?0 + 𝜃𝑗 + ?̂?1𝑋𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 
 where N is the total number of patients across all hospitals. Thus, ABLUP can be 
interpreted as the hospital’s average of predicted mortality across all possible patients 
in the sample. Although ABLUP and RSMR are derived from the same logistic model, 
they do not produce identical estimates, which is apparent when assuming all patients 
are uniform in their characteristics. In this case, ?̂?𝑗
𝑅𝑆𝑀𝑅 = ?̂?𝑗
𝐴𝐵𝐿𝑈𝑃 ?̅?
𝑓(?̂?0)
. The shrinkage 
factors of RSMR and ABLUP served as estimates of measure responsiveness. These were 
estimated as 
?̂?𝑢
2
 ?̂?𝑢
2+
?̅?(1−?̅?)
𝑛𝑗
  and 
?̂?𝑢
2
 ?̂?𝑢
2+
?̅?(1−?̅?)
𝑛𝑗
∙
?̅?
𝑓(?̂?0)
 , respectively, where ?̅? is the average of 
hospitals’ observed mortality rates.6  
 The fourth and fifth measures are the Dimick-Staiger measure (DS) (Dimick et al. 
2009) and the hierarchical Poisson measure (HP) (Ryan et al. 2012). Unlike the 
previously described shrinkage estimators, the DS and HP estimators do not shrink all 
hospitals’ observed mortality rates toward a common mortality average. Instead, 
mortality rates are shrunk toward values that are specific to a hospital’s patient volume. 
Both estimators are calculated according to the following formula: 
?̂?𝑗
𝐷𝑆,𝐻𝑃 = ?̅?𝑗𝑠𝑗
𝐷𝑆,𝐻𝑃 + ?̂?𝑗
𝐷𝑆,𝐻𝑃(1 − 𝑠𝑗
𝐷𝑆,𝐻𝑃) 
                                                          
6 See documentation for the Stata command meqrlogit for details on the calculation of ?̂?𝑢
2 (StataCorp, 
2013). 
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where ?̅?𝑗is a hospital’s observed mortality, 𝑠𝑗
𝐷𝑆,𝐻𝑃, is the DS or HP shrinkage factor and 
?̂?𝑗
𝐷𝑆,𝐻𝑃 is the hospital’s predicted mortality based on its volume. There are several 
differences between the DS and HP measures regarding how shrinkage weights and 
volume-predicted mortality are calculated. Unlike for DS, HP estimates of volume-
specific mortality are derived from a nonlinear model (a negative binomial model for 
number of deaths), HP is calculated from hospital-level data rather than patient-level 
data, and HP uses a maximum likelihood approach to estimate shrinkage weights.7  As 
in the case of RSMR and ABLUP, the shrinkage factors employed in DS and HP served as 
estimates of their responsiveness. 
 
Simulation Results 
Figure 3.2 illustrates each 30-day mortality measure’s overall performance in 
terms of accuracy and responsiveness. Note that the horizontal axis is reverse-coded, 
with greater accuracy measures displayed farther to the right. To consider the 
magnitude of measurement error in relation to average hospital performance, recall 
that the average hospital 30-day mortality is 0.209. First, consider the one-year 
mortality measures, which tend to perform least accurately and with the least 
responsiveness. OE, the one-year measure without shrinkage, has a substantial amount 
of error, with a RSME of roughly 0.1. Shrinkage measures perform much more 
accurately, with RMSE less than 0.06. However, the loss of measure responsiveness 
entailed by shrinkage estimation is also substantial. The average shrinkage factor facing 
hospitals ranges from 0.62 to 0.71 for one-year shrinkage measures. This level of 
                                                          
7 For the details of how volume-predicted mortality and shrinkage factors are calculated for DS and 
HP, see Dimick et al. (2009), Ryan et al. (2012). For details on adjusting the DS estimator for patient 
covariates, see Staiger et al. (2009). 
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measure responsiveness can be viewed as a tax of roughly 30-40 percent on measure 
improvement. Note that a hospital facing a 0.71 shrinkage factor must improve 
mortality by 1/.71 = 1.4 percentage points to increase measured mortality by one 
percentage point.  
Table 3.1 contains the main simulation results, which present the measures’ 
overall accuracy and responsiveness by hospital size. Columns (1) and (5), which 
contain the findings in Figure 3.2, confirm that the shrinkage estimators have greater 
accuracy and lower measure responsiveness than the estimators without shrinkage, OE 
and MA. 8  Columns (2) and (5) present RSME and measure responsiveness for hospitals 
in the bottom quartile of AMI volume. These smaller hospitals experience the greatest 
improvements in RMSE and greatest reductions in responsiveness when shrinkage 
estimators are employed. For example, with one year of mortality data, RMSE for the 
non-shrinkage measure is 0.17, and the shrinkage measure RMSR reduces this error to 
0.09. However, RSMR also decreases measure responsiveness from one to 0.36. These 
differences in the accuracy and responsiveness between shrinkage and non-shrinkage 
estimates tend to narrow as more years of data are included in measures. However, 
even with multiple years of data, responsiveness of shrinkage estimates to the 
performance of small hospitals remains very low, at 0.50 for the three-year RSMR. As 
shown in columns (4) and (8) of Table 3.1, shrinkage does not appear to reduce error in 
estimating large hospitals’ performance. For larger hospitals, error is slightly greater for 
measures without shrinkage, and the responsiveness of shrinkage measures ranges 
from 0.83 to 0.96. 
                                                          
8 Although several point estimates presented in Table 3.1 are very similar, given the large number of 
simulation iterations, the differences in measure accuracy and responsiveness between alternate 
measures tend to be highly statistically significant in paired t-tests. 
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Figure 3.3 aids in demonstrating the substantial variation in the responsiveness 
of shrinkage measures by hospital size. The figure presents, from a representative 
simulation iteration, the responsiveness of one-year shrinkage measures for each decile 
of hospital AMI volume. Responsiveness increases at a decreasing rate with respect to 
hospital volume, and there is considerable variation in responsiveness of shrinkage 
estimators across hospital size. Responsiveness to hospital performance is 
approximately 0.2 for hospitals below the 10th percentile of AMI volume, and 
approximately 0.9 for hospitals above the 90th percentile. Since measures only 
approach full responsiveness asymptotically as sample size increases, measures are not 
fully responsive to hospital performance for even the largest hospitals in the sample. 
There is also heterogeneity across shrinkage estimators in terms of their 
responsiveness. Within each hospital decile, the difference between the most and least 
responsive measure is 0.11 on average. 
Choosing among performance measures does not always entail an accuracy-
incentives tradeoff. For all estimators, incorporation of additional years of data tends to 
improve both measure accuracy and responsiveness. The exception to this pattern is 
the three-year DS measure, which is less accurate than the two-year DS measure. The 
non-shrinkage measure experiences an especially pronounced gain in accuracy when 
the measurement timeframe expands. As column (1) of Table 3.1 shows, RSME for this 
measure falls from 0.097 to 0.061 when three years of data are used instead of one year. 
The corresponding change in error for the RSMR shrinkage measure was considerably 
smaller, from 0.060 to 0.052. Increasing the number of observations also improves the 
responsiveness of shrinkage estimates. However, even with three-years of data, 
shrinkage estimates are still approximately 20-25% less responsive than the non-
 
 
111 
 
 
shrinkage estimates, which are fully responsive regardless of the number of 
observations. 
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Figure 3.2 30-Day Mortality Measure Accuracy and Responsiveness 
 
Notes: This figure plots average responsiveness and root mean square error (RMSE) of each 
hospital 30-day AMI mortality measure, estimated via Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 iterations. 
Measures incorporate one, two, or three years of prior hospital data (i.e. two years for MA 2). Error 
is the difference between a measure value and true (unobserved) hospital performance in the 
following year. A one percentage point difference between a measured and true mortality rate 
corresponds to MSE of 0.01. Responsiveness is defined as the measure shrinkage factor, which 
approximates the change in expected measure performance for a change in true performance. 
Observed over expected (OE) and moving average (MA) are mortality measures without shrinkage. 
Shrinkage estimators are risk standardized mortality rate (RSMR), average best linear unbiased 
estimate (ABLUP), Dimick-Staiger (DS) and hierarchical Poisson (HP).   
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Table 3.1 30-Day Mortality Measure Accuracy and Responsiveness, by Hospital Size 
  
Root Mean Square Error 
 
Responsiveness 
   
By Hospital Size 
  
By Hospital Size 
  
All 
Hospitals Small Medium Large 
 
All 
Hospitals Small Medium  Large 
  Estimator (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
O
n
e 
Y
ea
r  
OE* .0967 .1746 .0513 .0260 
 
1 1 1 1 
RSMR .0599 .0942 .0473 .0277† 
 
.663 .362 .723 .857 
ABLUP* .0558 .0863 .0450 .0279 
 
.713 .389 .777 .922 
DS* .0496 .0708 .0444 .0274 
 
.642 .303 .696 .884 
HP .0575 .0905 .0447 .0288 
 
.623 .339 .663 .834 
           
T
w
o
 Y
ea
rs
 MA
* .0703 .1245 .0400 .0249 
 
1 1 1 1 
RSMR .0538 .0843 .0419 .0277† 
 
.714† .458 .774 .861 
ABLUP* .0482 .0739 .0385 .0272 
 
.790 .507 .855 .952 
DS** .0460 .0674 .0393 .0268 
 
.728 .411 .793 .927 
HP .0525 .0831 .0397 .0280 
 
.714† .447 .764 .893 
           
T
h
re
e 
Y
ea
rs
 MA** .0610 .1038 .0384 .0289 
 
1 1 1 1 
RSMR .0519 .0791 .0415 .0308† 
 
.732 .502 .789 .859 
ABLUP** .0463 .0677 .0383 .0308† 
 
.821 .563 .884 .962 
DS .0464 .0666 .0396 .0305 
 
.762 .462 .827 .941 
HP .0521 .0804 .0401 .0315   .749 .494 .800 .911 
           Notes: Cells contain either the root mean squared error (RMSE) or average responsiveness of each 
hospital 30-day AMI mortality measure, estimated via Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 iterations. 
Measures incorporate one, two, or three years of prior hospital data. Error is the difference between a 
measure value and true (unobserved) hospital performance in the following year. Responsiveness is 
defined as the measure shrinkage factor, which approximates the change in expected measure 
performance for a change in true performance. A one percentage point difference between a measured 
and true mortality rate corresponds to MSE of 0.01. Observed over expected (OE) and moving average 
(MA) are mortality measures without shrinkage. Shrinkage estimators are risk standardized mortality 
rate (RSMR), average best linear unbiased estimate (ABLUP), Dimick-Staiger (DS) and hierarchical 
Poisson (HP). Small and large hospitals have annual AMI volume in bottom or top quartile, respectively. 
Medium hospitals have AMI volume in the middle quartiles. Estimators marked by * are non-dominated 
on the basis of overall RMSE and responsiveness by other estimators with the same number of years of 
data. Estimators marked by ** are non-dominated among all estimators regardless of the number of 
years of data. Within each column, paired t-tests indicate statistically significant (p<0.05) differences 
between all pairwise cell comparisons except for those indicated by †.
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Figure 3.3 30-Day Mortality Measure Responsiveness, by Hospital Size 
 
Notes: This figure presents average measure responsiveness within deciles of hospital size. 
Responsiveness is defined as the measure shrinkage factor. Shrinkage estimators are risk 
standardized mortality rate (RSMR), average best linear unbiased estimate (ABLUP), Dimick-
Staiger (DS) and hierarchical Poisson (HP). Each measure included in this figure uses a single year 
of mortality data. Data for this figure are drawn from a single representative simulation iteration. 
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Although additional years of data improved measure accuracy in the simulation, 
this finding may not generalize to settings in which there is substantial drift in agent 
behavior over time. If there is extensive drift, early outcomes are less informative of 
current performance. To demonstrate the sensitivity of measure accuracy to the extent 
of performance drift, I conduct two secondary simulations. In the first, a no-drift case, 
each hospital’s true mortality rate is fixed over time. In the second, strong-drift case, 
each hospital has an annual growth rate in mortality improvement (percent change per 
year) that is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation 
of 15%. All other data-generation parameters are the same as in the previously 
described simulation. In each case, I calculate the RSME of three measures of hospital 
mortality: one-year observed mortality, three-year mortality average (unweighted), and 
a three-year weighted average of mortality. Rather than selecting arbitrary weights for 
the weighted average, I calculate weights for years t-1, t-2, and t-3 using constrained 
linear regression. In each simulation iteration, I regress hospital observed mortality in 
year t-1 on observed mortality in years t-2, t-3, and t-4, with the constraint that the sum 
of these coefficients equals one. The resulting coefficients serve as the weights for 
mortality in years t-1, t-2 and t-3, respectively.  
Table 3.2 presents the results from these simulations. As shown in column (1), 
when there is no drift in hospital performance, a moving average has lower RMSE than a 
one-year estimate. As expected, the constrained regression produced equal weights for 
all measurement years in this case. As shown in column (2), in the case of substantial 
performance drift, a three year unweighted average is less accurate than a one-year 
estimate (0.116 vs 0.109 RMSE). The weighted average, with average weights of 0.67, 
0.31 and 0.02 for mortality data from years t-1, t-2, and t-3, outperforms both alternate 
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measures. Thus, even in the case of changing hospital performance, incorporating early 
data into measures can increase accuracy if those data are weighted appropriately.  
 Finally, note that several estimators evaluated in the primary simulation 
dominate others on the basis of both accuracy and responsiveness. For example, the DS 
estimator is both more accurate and more responsive than the HP estimator. Similarly, 
the novel measure ABLUP tends to dominate the current CMS approach, RSMR. The 
performance frontier of all measures is comprised of the two-year DS, three-year 
ABLUP, and three-year MA. The RMSE of these measures ranges from 0.061 to 0.046, 
and the responsiveness ranges from 0.73 to 1. Notably, volume-adjusted shrinkage 
estimators DS and HP, which shrink observed mortality toward a target that is specific 
to hospital volume, do not dominate ABLUP and RSMR, which are not volume adjusted. 
To understand this result, recall that shrinkage measures have greater shrinkage when 
there is lesser cross-hospital variation in performance. Volume-adjusted shrinkage 
estimators attribute some hospital performance variation to hospital volume, thereby 
reducing residual cross-hospital variation increasing shrinkage, and reducing measure 
responsiveness.  
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Table 3.2 Comparison of Measure Accuracy for Moving Averages 
 
Root Mean Square Error 
 
No Temporal  
Trend in 
Performance 
 
Temporal Trend in 
Performance  
Estimator (1)   (2) 
One-Year Observed Mortality .101 
 
.109 
Three-Year Unweighted Average .059 
 
.116 
Three-Year Weighted Average .059   .100 
    
 
Moving Average Weights 
Year Before Index Year  
No Temporal  
Trend in 
Performance   
Temporal Trend in 
Performance  
t-1 0.33† 
 
.67 
t-2 0.33† 
 
.31 
t-3 0.33†   .02 
    Notes: This table compares the accuracy of moving averages for performance 
measurement in two scenarios of hospital performance trajectories. In the column 1 
simulation, hospital performance is constant over time. In the column 2 simulation, 
each hospital improves at a annual rate drawn from a normal distribution with mean 
zero and standard deviation of 15 percentage points. The Monte Carlo simulations are 
iterated 1000 times. Error is the difference between a measure value and true 
(unobserved) hospital performance in the following year, year t . The weights for each 
year of data in 3-year moving averages are determined by constrained linear regression 
of observed mortality in year t-1 on observed mortality in years t-2, t-3 and t-4, with 
coefficients summing to one. According to paired t-tests, within each simulation, all 
values of RMSE and all weights exhibit statistically significant pairwise differences 
except for those indicated by †. 
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3.5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
These theoretic and empirical findings can inform the design of public policies 
involving performance measurement. The results highlight a substantial tradeoff 
involved in the choice of performance estimation technique. Although accuracy and 
responsiveness to agent behavior are both economically desirable features of 
performance measures, one feature generally comes at the cost of the other. Indeed, in 
policy settings like health care and education, where ordinary performance estimates 
are unreliable, shrinkage estimates are least responsive to agent performance. In the 
case of hospital performance measurement, the magnitude of this loss in 
responsiveness is economically significant, and may substantially dilute performance 
incentives. In addition, the magnitude of distortion varies substantially across hospitals, 
affecting small hospitals to a much greater degree.   
As demonstrated in Section 3.2, the appropriate choice of estimation technique 
depends on a policy’s goals. In education, policies that identify inferior teachers for 
replacement or inferior schools for closure may be welfare-improving even if the policy 
does not produce a behavioral response. Because the goal of these policies is selecting 
superior agents rather than incentivizing agent performance, shrinkage estimation 
seems appropriate. However, for performance payment schemes in which payment is a 
function of a teacher’s absolute performance, shrinkage estimation will tend to dilute 
incentives unless bonus payments are increased to compensate for reduced measure 
responsiveness. If performance pay is based on teachers’ performance relative to one 
another, then shrinkage estimation may not distort incentives if teachers face similar 
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shrinkage factors.9 However, if there is substantial variation in class sizes, then it will be 
difficult for teachers in smaller classrooms to receive relative performance bonuses. 
Shrinkage estimation may be less appropriate for health care policies, which 
tend to emphasize incentives. Retaining superior agents (i.e. shutting down inferior 
hospitals or medical practices) is not a focus of current or proposed initiatives. In the 
case of performance-based payment to hospitals and physicians, the goal is clearly to 
incentivize better performance. Shrinkage measurement seems generally inappropriate 
for performance payment policies like Medicare’s hospital readmissions penalties 
because shrinkage dilutes provider incentives and it is unclear how improved 
measurement accuracy would contribute to improved welfare. Even if performance 
payment were based on relative performance, the substantial variation in the size of 
patient samples across medical providers means that shrinkage estimation could dilute 
the incentives for providers serving fewer people. The case of public disclosure of 
quality information is more ambiguous. While publicly disclosing a less responsive 
performance measure may reduce demand elasticity to provider quality, a more 
accurate signal could improve patients’ choice of hospital. Whether or not to shrink 
these performance estimates depends on the comparison between the welfare gains 
from more efficient patient sorting to the welfare gains from increased provider quality 
spurred by from demand elasticity to quality.  
                                                          
9 If all teachers have identical numbers of students, then the use of shrinkage estimation does not 
change the rank order of teacher performance. Moreover, the responsiveness of a teacher’s 
performance rank to their true performance is also unchanged by shrinkage estimation.  When 
employing shrinkage estimation, the decrease in the responsiveness of absolute measured 
performance would be exactly offset by a reduction in the difference between the measured 
performance of different teachers.  Thus, the amount of performance improvement required to 
increase a teacher’s rank would be unchanged.  
 
 
120 
 
 
 The simulation results also highlight that some measurement techniques may 
outperform others with respect to both accuracy and incentives. Policymakers should 
select measures from this frontier, though it is possible that the relative performance of 
each technique will vary according to the policy setting. The results also demonstrate 
that incorporating more observations into performance measures is a substitute to 
shrinkage estimation in improving measure accuracy. For measures without shrinkage, 
the gains in accuracy from including more data were considerable. Additional accuracy 
gains from applying shrinkage may not be worth the loss in measure responsiveness. 
Even if agent performance changes over time, early data can improve measure accuracy 
when included in a weighted average of performance.  
The analysis in this paper assumes risk-neutrality of agents, which may not hold 
in all policy settings. A classic finding in the principal-agent literature is that, in 
determining optimal compensation, agent risk aversion introduces a tradeoff between 
incentive power and insurance for agents (Gibbons and Roberts, 2013). Although high-
powered incentives can still incentivize efficient agent performance, they expose agents 
to risk. Thus, high-powered incentives may be inappropriate when agents are risk 
averse. While estimating agent performance with shrinkage does provide some 
insurance to agents, it is likely to be a blunt tool for this purpose. The shrinkage factors 
used in performance measurement are not calculated to optimally balance incentives 
and agent insurance. Thus, even if the optimal incentive power of health care or 
education policies is not very high (i.e. due to agent risk aversion or multitasking 
concerns), shrinkage estimation seems unlikely to produce those optimally powered 
incentives.  
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Finally, a policymaker’s choice of measurement technique may be affected by 
fairness concerns. An agent may view noisier performance measures as less fair since 
ratings can vary widely over time even as agent behavior is constant. Similarly, a 
policymaker may be hesitant to employ a less accurate measurement technique that 
increases the possibility of type I or type II errors in rewarding or penalizing agents. 
Alternatively, shrinkage measures may be viewed as less fair. For a given agent, errors 
from measures without shrinkage will tend to even out over time, while errors from 
shrinkage estimates are persistent. Shrinkage estimates will persistently underestimate 
the performance of high-performing agents, and overestimate the performance of low-
performing agents. These errors are magnified for agents with fewer observations.  
Thus, agents may view shrinkage estimation as unfair because their efforts to improve 
quality performance are not reflected fully in their measured performance.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Measures of Low-Value Services 
Services were screened for measure appropriateness from the sources listed in 
the paper’s methods section according to the following criteria: (1) the service must 
apply to the general Medicare population; (2) appropriate use of the service (if present) 
must be plausibly distinguishable from wasteful use using procedural and diagnostic 
codes from the date of service, site of care, beneficiary demographic information, and 
chronic condition indicators; (3) the evidence base establishing the low-value of the 
service must have existed prior to 2009. The feasibility denoted by the second criterion 
was determined by the physicians on our research team. For some services (e.g., 
imaging for pulmonary embolism without moderate or high pre-test probability), there 
was an obvious lack of clinical information in claims necessary to define the low-value 
scenario (e.g., pre-test probability of pulmonary embolism depends in part on heart rate 
and physical exam findings not recorded in claims). For other services, we inspected a 
small random sample of claims detected by preliminary measure algorithms to 
determine if cases of potentially appropriate use could be systematically excluded. The 
adequacy of information on symptoms in particular determined the inclusion or 
exclusion of many candidate services. For example, to identify cardiac stress tests for 
low-risk, asymptomatic patients would require excluding cases with a wide range of 
symptoms, including non-specific symptoms (e.g., nausea and diaphoresis), as well as 
cases with risk factors present that may not be captured in claims (e.g., smoking status, 
family history, dyslipidemia). In contrast, symptoms of carotid artery disease are more 
circumscribed as they relate directly to transient ischemic attacks and strokes; thus, we 
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could more confidently exclude appropriate use in developing a measure of screening 
for asymptomatic carotid artery disease. Similarly, the cardiac stress testing measure 
we did include in our analysis (for adults with stable coronary disease) depended only 
on site of service and prior diagnoses, not symptoms, in order to assess 
appropriateness. We applied the second criterion more leniently when defining more 
sensitive versions of each measure (e.g. relaxing from USPSTF D recommendation 
criteria to C criteria). 
A primary finding of our study was that the amount of low-value spending 
detected by our measures varied widely between more sensitive and more specific 
versions of our measures. For a service to be included in our study, we required that a 
more specific version – one that convincingly excluded most if not all cases of 
appropriate use – could be developed. The difference in spending between sensitive and 
specific versions, however, was not factored into the measure inclusion decision. 
Indeed, for some services (e.g., vertebroplasty), the sensitive version was quite specific 
and vice-versa, with little difference in detected utilization between the two. After the 
final measures had been developed, the six measure categories (low-value cancer 
screening, etc.) were defined based on service type and measures were assigned to 
these categories. 
In order to ensure that measures detected their target services across clinical 
settings, measures were developed from both the 2009 Carrier and Outpatient Research 
Identifiable Files (RIFs). Services provided in hospital outpatient departments or by 
hospital-employed providers appear either in the Outpatient RIF alone or in both the 
Outpatient and Carrier RIF, whereas physician and ancillary services provided in 
inpatient settings or in non-hospital outpatient settings appear in the Carrier RIF. In 
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both files, claims chronicle services using Current Procedural Terminology codes and 
document accompanying diagnoses using ICD-9 codes. Additional demographic 
information necessary for measure development (i.e. age and sex) was obtained from 
the 2009 enrollment (denominator) file, and summary spending totals and conditions 
from the Chronic Condition Warehouse (CCW) were obtained from the Beneficiary 
Annual Summary File. Together, these variables served as the basis for measure 
development. Because CPT codes are revised annually, appropriate CPT codes were 
selected based on their definitions as of January 1, 2009. For the development of some 
measurement algorithms, we also employed the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service 
(BETOS) coding system for identifying CPT codes in broader clinical categories. 
In order to assess for the presence of chronic conditions as of the service date, 
we employed CCW variables specifying each relevant condition’s date of first 
occurrence. Additional past diagnoses were assessed using ICD-9 codes present in the 
2008 and 2009 Carrier and Outpatient RIFs. When measure restriction criteria required 
assessment of whether certain services preceded or followed a service of interest (e.g. 
whether a surgical procedure followed a chest x-ray), the relevant preceding or 
following service was detected using CPT or BETOS codes in the 2008 and 2009 Carrier 
and Outpatient RIFs. Column two of Table A1.1 lists all relevant CPT, ICD-9 and BETOS 
codes used for service detection. Emergency department visits were detected according 
to methods described in a prior study.1 Inpatient stays were identified based on the 
presence of claims in the 2008 and 2009 Medicare Provider and Analysis Review 
(MedPAR) files. 
For all measures, standardized prices were calculated as the median of total 
allowed charges for relevant services. Allowed charges included payments from 
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Medicare, beneficiaries, and any other payers. For the majority of measures, relevant 
services were defined to include both the main detected service and specific services 
frequently delivered as a part of the detected service (e.g. venipuncture with PSA 
screening). These additional services were included in spending calculations if they 
occurred on the day of the detected low-value service. We conservatively excluded 
codes for evaluation and management services (i.e. office visits) from relevant services 
because they could have occurred even in the absence of the detected service. 
Two alternate approaches to defining relevant services were employed for 
surgical procedures whose complex billing precluded a comprehensive specification of 
relevant CPT codes. For surgical procedures sometimes occurring in the outpatient 
setting (renal artery angioplasty or stenting, vertebroplasty/kyphoplasty, and 
arthroscopic knee surgery), we isolated encounters that appeared in both the Carrier 
and Outpatient files and totaled all allowed institutional and professional spending that 
occurred on the day of the detected service across the two files. We examined the most 
common CPT codes employed on the day of these operations and did not observe any 
services being delivered that were obviously unrelated to the service of interest. Pricing 
based on inpatient prospective payments (diagnosis-related groups or DRGs) was 
avoided when possible because such payments cover a wide array of services that may 
not be related to the service of interest. However, this approach was necessary for 
surgical procedures that occurred almost exclusively in the inpatient setting (i.e. carotid 
endarterectomy and PCI). For these services, prices were determined based on the sum 
of all spending for services that occurred on the day of the detected services as well as 
the spending permitted by the DRG for the inpatient stay, obtained from the MedPAR 
file. In order to limit the inclusion of spending on unrelated services, we restricted the 
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pricing sample to instances where the detected service was the only procedure listed in 
the MedPAR stay or where the assigned DRG for the admission corresponded to the 
detected service. All additional codes used in the pricing of relevant services are listed 
in column three of Table A1.1 
Multiple prices were calculated for measures encompassing multiple services 
with substantially varied prices. For example, colon cancer screening prices were 
calculated separately for fecal occult blood testing and other colon cancer screening 
modalities, and prices for stress testing were calculated separately for exercise 
treadmill tests with electrocardiographic monitoring and for tests involving advanced 
imaging modalities. 
In order to avoid counting a single service multiple times in frequency or 
spending calculations, we did not count any detected services that was recorded as 
having occurred within seven days of the same type of detected service for each 
beneficiary.
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Table A1.1: Codes Used for Measures of Low-Value Services 
 
Measure 
Codes for detection and restriction 
criteria 
Additional codes for 
pricing 
Group 
qualifying 
Cancer screening for 
patients with chronic 
kidney disease (CKD) 
receiving dialysis 
BETOS: P9A P9B (dialysis) 
 
CPT/HCPCS: 77057 G0202 (breast 
screening), G0104-G0106 G0120 -
G0122 G0328 82270 (colorectal 
screening), G0102 G0103 84152-84154 
(prostate screening), G0101 G0123 
G0124 G0141 G0144 G0145 G0147 
G0148 P3000 P3001 Q0091 (cervical 
screening) 
CPT: 36415 
(venepuncture), 
77051-77059 
(mammography add-
on codes), 00810 
(endoscopy 
sedation), 87620-
87622 (HPV tests) 
Patients with 
CKDa 
Cervical cancer 
screening for women 
over age 65 
CPT/HCPCS: G0101 G0123 G0124 
G0141 G0144 G0145 G0147 G0148 
P3000 P3001 Q0091 (cervical 
screening) 
 
ICD-9:180 184x 2190 2331 2332 2333x 
6221 (cervical and other relevant 
cancers, dysplasias) 7950x-7951x 
(abnormal Papanicolaou finding, 
human papillomavirus positivity) 
V1040 V1041 V1322 (history of 
cervical cancer, other relevant cancers, 
dysplasia) 
CPT: 87620-87622 
(HPV tests) 
Women over 
65 
Colorectal cancer 
screening for adults 
older than age 85 
years 
CCW: Colorectal cancer first indication 
date 
 
CPT/HCPCS: 45330-45345 45378-
45392 G0104-G0106 G0120-G0122 
G0328 82270 (sigmoidoscopy, 
colonoscopy, barium enema or blood 
occult test for colon cancer screening)   
CPT: 00810 
(sedation) 
Patients over 
75 
Prostate-specific 
antigen (PSA) testing 
for men over age 75 
CCW: Prostate cancer first indication 
date 
 
CPT/HCPCS: G0103 84152-84154 (PSA 
testing) 
CPT: 36415 
(venepuncture) 
Men over 75 
Bone mineral density 
testing at frequent 
intervals  
CCW: Osteoporosis first indication date 
 
CPT/HCPCS: 76977 77078-77080 
77083 78350 78351 (bone density 
testing) 
None 
Patients with 
osteoporosisa 
Homocysteine testing 
for cardiovascular 
disease 
CPT/HCPCS: 83090 (homocysteine 
chemistry) 82746 82747 82607 (folate 
or B12 testing) 
 
ICD-9: 2662 2704 2810-2812 2859 
(folate or B12 disorders) 
CPT: 36415 
(venepuncture) 
All patients 
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Table A1.1 (Continued): Codes Used for Measures of Low-Value Services 
Hypercoagulability 
testing for patients 
with deep vein 
thrombosis 
CPT/HCPCS: 83090 85300 85303 
85306 85613 86147 
(hypercoagulability chemistries) 
 
ICD-9: 4151 (pulmonary embolism) 
4510 45111 45119 4512 45181 4519 
4534 (phlebitis, thrombophlebitis and 
venous embolism of lower extremity 
vessels) V1251  (history of venous 
thrombosis and embolism, pulmonary 
embolism) 
CPT: 83890-83914 
(nucleic acid 
molecular diagnostics) 
Patients with 
deep vein 
thrombosisb 
Parathyroid hormone 
(PTH) measurement 
for patients  with 
stage 1-3 CKD  
BETOS: P9A P9B (dialysis) 
 
CCW: Chronic kidney disease first 
indication date 
 
CPT/HCPCS: 83970 (parathyroid 
hormone chemistry) 
CPT: 36415 
(venepuncture) 
CKD patientsa 
Preoperative chest 
radiography  
BETOS: P1x P3D P4A P4B P4C P5C 
P5D P8A P8G  (selected surgeries) 
 
CPT/HCPCS: 71010 71015 71020-
71023 71030 71034 71035 (chest x-
ray), 19120 19125 47562 47563 
49560 58558 (relevant surgical codes 
not included in BETOS categories) 
None 
Patients 
undergoing 
selected 
surgeriesb 
Preoperative 
echocardiography 
BETOS: P1x P3D P4A P4B P4C P5C 
P5D P8A P8G (selected  surgeries) 
 
CPT/HCPCS: 93303 93304 93306-
93308 93312 93315 93318 
(echocardiogram) 19120 19125 
47562 47563 49560 58558 (relevant 
surgical codes not included in BETOS 
categories) 
CPT: 93303-93352 
(echocardiography) 
Patients 
undergoing 
selected 
surgeriesb 
Preoperative 
pulmonary function 
testing (PFT) 
BETOS: P1x P2x P3D P4A P4B P4C 
P5C P5D P8A P8G (selected surgeries) 
 
CPT/HCPCS: 94010 (spirometry)  
CPT: 94010-94799 
(pulmonary non-
ventilatory services), 
93720-93722 
(plethysmography) 
Patients 
undergoing 
selected 
surgeriesb 
Preoperative stress 
testing 
BETOS: P1x P3D P4A P4B P4C P5C 
P5D P8A P8G (selected surgeries) 
 
CPT/HCPCS: 78451-78454 78460 
78461 78464 78465 78472 78473 
78481 78483 78491 78492 93015-
93018 93350 93351 (stress testing), 
19120 19125 47562 47563 49560 
58558 (relevant surgical codes not 
included in BETOS categories) 
CPT: 93000-93042 
(ECG), 93303-93352 
(all 
echocardiography), 
78414-78499 (all 
cardiovascular nuclear 
diagnostic), A9500-
A9700 (contrast), 
J0150 J0152 J0280 
J1245 J1250 J2785 
(pharmacologic stress 
test injection) 
Patients 
undergoing 
selected 
surgeriesb 
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Table A1.1 (Continued): Codes Used for Measures of Low-Value Services 
Computed 
tomography (CT) of 
the sinuses for 
uncomplicated acute 
rhinosinusitis  
CPT/HCPCS: 70486-70488 (CT of 
maxillofacial area) 
 
ICD-9: 461x 473x (sinusitis), 2770x 
042 07953 279xx (immune disorders), 
471x (nasal polyp) 373xx 37600 
(eyelid/orbit inflammation), 800xx-
804xx 850xx-854xx 870xx-873xx 
9590x 910xx 920xx-921xx (head or 
face trauma) 
None 
Patients with 
sinusitis 
diagnosisb  
Head imaging in the 
evaluation of syncope  
CPT/HCPCS: 70450 70460 70470 
70551-70553 (CT or MRI of head or 
brain) 
 
ICD-9: 7802 9921 (syncope), 345xx 
7803x (epilepsy or convulsions), 43xx 
(cerebrovascular diseases, including 
stroke/TIA and subarachnoid 
hemorrhage), 800xx-804xx 850xx-
854xx 870xx-873xx 9590x 910xx 
920xx-921xx (head or face trauma), 
78097 781xx 7820 7845x (altered 
mental status, nervous and 
musculoskeletal system symptoms, 
including gait abnormality, 
meningismus, disturbed skin 
sensation, speech deficits), V1254 
V10xx (personal history of stroke/TIA 
) 
None 
Patients with 
syncope 
diagnosisb 
Head imaging for 
uncomplicated 
headache 
CPT/HCPCS: 70450 70460 70470 
70551-70553 (CT or MRI of head or 
brain) 
 
ICD-9: 30781 339xx 364x 7840 
(headache or migraine), 33920-33922 
33943 (post-traumatic or thunderclap 
headache), 14xx–208xx 230xx-239xx 
(cancer), 3463x 3466x (migraine with 
hemiplegia or infarction), 4465 (giant 
cell arteritis), 345xx 7803x (epilepsy 
or convulsions), 43xx (cerebrovascular 
diseases, including stroke/TIA and 
subarachnoid hemorrhage), 800xx-
804xx 850xx-854xx 870xx-873xx 
9590x 910xx 920xx-921xx (head or 
face trauma), 78097 781xx 7845x 
(altered mental status, nervous and 
musculoskeletal system symptoms, 
including gait abnormality, 
meningismus, disturbed skin 
sensation, speech deficits), V1254 
V10xx (personal history of stroke/TIA 
or cancer) 
None 
Patients with 
headache 
diagnosisb  
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Table A1.1 (Continued): Codes Used for Measures of Low-Value Services 
Electroencephalogram 
for headaches 
CPT/HCPCS: 95812 95813 95816 
95819 95822 95827 95830 95957 
(electroencephalogram) 
 
ICD-9: 30781 339xx 346x 7840 
(headaches) 345xx 7803x 7810 
(epilepsy or convulsions) 
None 
Patients with 
headache 
diagnosisb 
Back imaging for 
patients with non-
specific low back painc  
CPT/HCPCS: 72010 72020 72052 
72100 72110 72114 72120 72200 
72202 72220 72131-72133 72141 
72142 72146-72149 72156 72157 
72158 (radiologic, CT, and MRI 
imaging of spine) 
 
ICD-9: 7213 72190 72210 72252 
7226 72293 72402 7242-7246 72470 
72471 72479 7385 7393 7394 8460-
8463 8468 8469 8472 (back pain, 
various causes), 14xx–208xx 230xx-
239xx (cancer), 800x-839xx 850xx-
854xx 86xxx 905xx-909xx 92611 
92612 929, 952xx 958xx-959xx 
(trauma), 3040x-3042x 3044x 3054x-
3057x (IV drug abuse), 34460 7292x 
(neurologic impairment), 4210 4211 
4219 (endocarditis), 038xx 
(septicemia), 01xxx (tuberculosis), 
730xx (osteomyelitis), 7806x 7830x 
7832x 78079 7808x 2859x (fever, 
weight loss, malaise, night sweats, 
anemia not due to blood loss) 
None 
Patients with 
back painb 
Screening for carotid 
artery disease in 
asymptomatic adults 
CPT/HCPCS: 36222-36224 70498 
70547-70549 93880 93882 3100F 
(carotid imaging) 
 
CCW: Stroke/TIA first indication date 
 
ICD-9: 430 431 43301 43311 43321 
43331 43381 43391 43400 43401 
43410 43411 43490 43491 4350 4351 
4353 4358 4359 436 99702 V1254 
(stroke/TIA), 3623 36284 (retinal 
vascular occlusion/ischemia), 7802 
781xx 7820 78451 78452 78459 9921 
(nervous and musculoskeletal 
symptoms)  
None All patients 
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Screening for carotid 
artery disease for 
syncope 
CPT/HCPCS: 36222-36224 70498 
70547-70549 93880 93882 3100F 
(carotid imaging) 
 
CCW: Stroke/TIA first indication date 
 
ICD-9: 7802 9921 (syncope), 430 431 
43301 43311 43321 43331 43381 
43391 43400 43401 43410 43411 
43490 43491 4350 4351 4353 4358 
4359 436 99702 V1254 (stroke/TIA), 
3623 36284 (retinal vascular 
occlusion/ischemia), 781xx 7820 78451 
78452 78459 (nervous and 
musculoskeletal symptoms) 
None 
Patients with 
syncope 
diagnosisb 
Stress testing for 
stable coronary 
disease 
CPT/HCPCS: 93015-93018 93350 
93351 78451-78454 78460 78461 
78464 78465 78472 78473 78481 
78483 78491 78492 (stress testing) 
 
CCW: Ischemic heart disease first 
indication date, AMI first indication date 
CPT: 93000-93042 
(ECG), 93303-93352 
(echocardiography), 
78414-78499 
(cardiovascular 
nuclear diagnostic 
services), A9500-
A9700 (contrast), 
J0150 J0152 J0280 
J1245 J1250 J2785 
(pharmacologic 
stress test injection) 
IHD patientsa 
Percutaneous 
coronary intervention 
with balloon 
angioplasty or stent 
placement  for stable 
coronary disease 
CPT/HCPCS: 92980 92982 (coronary 
stent placement or balloon 
angiography) 
 
CCW: Ischemic heart disease first 
indication date, AMI first indication date 
DRG: 246-251d 
(percutaneous 
cardiovascular 
procedure) 
IHD patientsa 
Renal artery 
angioplasty or 
stenting 
CPT/HCPCS: 35471 35450 37205 
37207 75966 75960 (renal artery 
angioplasty or stenting) 
 
ICD-9: 4401 40501 40511 40591 
(atherosclerosis of renal artery, 
renovascular hypertension) 
Nonee 
Patients with 
hypertensionb 
Carotid 
endarterectomy in 
asymptomatic 
patients 
CPT/HCPCS: 35301 (carotid 
endarterectomy) 
 
CCW: Stroke/TIA first indication date 
 
ICD-9: 430 431 43301 43311 43321 
43331 43381 43391 43400 43401 
43410 43411 43490 43491 4350 4351 
4353 4358 4359 436 99702 V1254 
(stroke/TIA), 3623 36284 (retinal 
vascular occlusion/ischemia), 781xx 
7820 78451 78452 78459 (nervous and 
musculoskeletal symptoms) 
ICD-9 procedure: 
3812 0040-0042¶ 
(carotid 
endarterectomy) 
All patients 
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Table A1.1 (Continued): Codes Used for Measures of Low-Value Services 
Inferior vena cava 
filters for the 
prevention of 
pulmonary embolism  
CPT/HCPCS: 75940 (radiological 
supervision of inferior vena cava filter 
placement) 
CPT: 36010 37620 
75825 76937 
(catheter insertion, 
IVC interruption, 
venography, 
ultrasound guidance) 
All patients 
Vertebroplasty or 
kyphoplasty for 
osteoporotic vertebral 
fractures 
CPT/HCPCS: 22520 22521 22523 
22524 (vertebroplasty, kyphoplasty) 
 
ICD-9: 73313 8052 8054 (vertebral 
fracture) , 1702 1985 20300-20302 
2132 22809 2380 2386 2392 (primary 
or secondary neoplasm of vertebral 
column, multiple myeloma, 
hemangioma) 
Nonee 
Patients with 
osteoporosisa 
Arthroscopic surgery 
for knee osteoarthritis 
CPT/HCPCS: 29877 29879 G0289 
(knee arthroscopy with 
chondroplasty) 
 
ICD-9: 7177 73392 71500 71509 
71510 71516 71526 71536 71596 
(chondromalacia, osteoarthritis), 
8360-8362 7170 71741 (meniscal 
tear) 
Nonee 
Patients with 
arthritisa  
a  Defined by presence of CCW first indication date prior to January 1, 2010 
 
b  Defined by presence of relevant diagnosis or procedure codes during 2009. 
 
c  We follow prior literature in defining this measure.2 
 
d  The pricing sample was restricted to detected hospital admissions with these DRG codes. All    
   professional charges for expenses incurred on the same day of service were included in pricing   
  estimates. 
 
e The pricing sample was restricted to detected episodes that appeared in both the Carrier and 
  Outpatient files. All professional charges for expenses incurred on the same day of service were  
  included in pricing estimates. 
 
f The pricing sample was restricted to detected hospital admissions with no procedures besides 
  those listed here. All professional charges for expenses incurred on the same day of service were 
  included in pricing estimates 
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Primary Analysis 
Utilization rates and associated spending for services detected by low-value care 
measures, presented graphically in Figure 1.1, are presented in tabular form in Table 
A1.2. Several variables included in our regression analyses merit additional explanation. 
In order to account for case mix, we included an extensive set of patient characteristics 
in regressions. These included indicators for 21 CCW diagnoses present before 2009 
(derived from claims dating back to 1999) and indicators of having multiple comorbid 
conditions (2 to 7+). In addition to these variables, we developed indicators for 
demographic characteristics and clinical conditions qualifying beneficiaries for 
potential receipt of low-value services, listed in column 4 of Table A1.1. Although these 
indicators “qualify” beneficiaries for the receipt of services, the indicators do not imply 
that the receipt of services is appropriate. Instead, the indicators highlight those 
patients whose characteristics make them eligible to receive a low-value service. For 
instance, because our measure of low-value PSA testing applies to men over age 75, men 
over age 75 are the qualifying group for this measure. In our analyses, inclusion of these 
indicators helps prevent apparent correlations from arising that are driven by the 
geographic distribution of patients who qualify for low-value services. For instance, if 
some regions had a higher incidence of both syncope and osteoarthritis of the knee than 
average and therefore higher population rates of imaging for syncope and arthroscopy 
knee surgery, without adjustment for the prevalence of syncope and osteoarthritis of 
the knee, the estimated correlation between these two types of services could be 
positive even if practice patterns in these regions were the same (or even more 
conservative) relative to other regions. Notably, our results were not sensitive to the 
inclusion of these indicators. 
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Supplementary Analysis 
 In order to assess whether greater total spending predicts greater measured 
overuse, we examined the association between regional spending on low-value services 
and total regional spending for Medicare beneficiaries as a supplementary analysis. To 
do so, we fitted a linear regression model predicting spending on low-value services for 
each beneficiary as a function of 2009 mean price-adjusted Medicare Part A and B 
spending per beneficiary at the HRR level and the same set of beneficiaries’ 
sociodemographic and clinical characteristics included in our primary analysis. To 
facilitate interpretation, we specified total regional spending per beneficiary in 
quartiles. Following regression analysis, the statistical significance of the association 
between spending on low-value services and quartile of overall spending was assessed 
via Wald test of the null hypothesis that adjusted spending on low-value services was 
equal across quartiles. Regional total Medicare spending was positively associated with 
measured low-value spending (P<0.001 for test of equality across quartiles). Adjusted 
per beneficiary spending on services detected by low-value measures ranged from $282 
in the lowest quartile of overall spending to $326 in the highest quartile of overall 
spending. This finding is consistent with the interpretation that variation in total 
spending is predictive of wasteful practices. However, low-value spending varied by less 
than 20% across quartiles of total regional spending. 
 We conducted a sensitivity analysis assessing the association between spending 
on low-value services and an alternate measure of total regional Medicare spending. 
The purpose of this analysis was to test whether the inclusion of low-value spending in 
measures of overall spending induced the positive association presented above. Unlike 
the analysis, which used a price-adjusted regional measure of overall Part A and Part B 
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Medicare spending obtained from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, this sensitivity 
analysis used a measure of overall spending that excluded spending on measured low-
value services. The alternate measure was constructed by calculating total Part A and B 
payments for each beneficiary in our study from the 2009 Beneficiary Annual Summary 
File (payments by Medicare, beneficiaries, and other payers), multiplying the totals by 
Dartmouth Atlas regional price adjusters (each calculated as the ratio of price-adjusted 
regional spending estimates over unadjusted regional spending estimates), subtracting 
each individual’s spending on measured low-value services (based on standardized 
prices), and computing the average of the resulting value by HRR. The alternate 
measure of regional total Medicare spending was also positively associated with 
measured low-value spending (P<0.001 for test of equality across quartiles) and the 
association was not appreciably attenuated by use of the alternate measure. Adjusted 
per beneficiary spending on services detected by low-value measures ranged from $282 
in the lowest quartile of overall spending to $322 in the highest quartile of overall 
spending.
 
 
 
 
 
1
4
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Table A1.2 Use and Associated Spending of Services Detected by Low-Value Service Measures, by Category 
 More Sensitive Measure  More Specific Measure 
Measure 
Category 
Count 
per 
100 
benea 
% of 
low-
value 
count 
% of 
benes 
affected 
Spending 
($M) 
% of low-
value 
spending 
% of 
overall 
spendingb  
Count 
per 
100 
benea 
% of 
low-
value 
count 
% of 
benes 
affected 
 
Spending 
($M) 
 % of 
low-
value 
spending 
% of 
overall 
spendingb 
Cancer 
Screening 
27.0 34% 20% 794 9% 0.26% 
 
10.3 31% 10% 142 7% 0.05% 
Diagnostic and 
preventive 
testing 
11.0 14% 5% 174 2% 0.06% 
 
4.8 14% 3% 77 4% 0.02% 
Preoperative 
testing 
7.1 9% 6% 315 4% 0.10% 
 
2.3 7% 2% 125 6% 0.04% 
Imaging 25.5 32% 18% 939 11% 0.30% 
 
14.5 43% 12% 620 32% 0.20% 
Cardiovascular 
testing and 
procedures 
9.3 12% 8% 5,886 70% 1.90% 
 
1.2 4% 1% 717 37% 0.23% 
Other surgery 0.5 1% 0% 343 4% 0.11%  
0.4 1% 0% 259 13% 0.08% 
              
Total  80 100% 42%c 8,451 100% 2.73%  33 100% 25%c 1,941 100% 0.63% 
a Count refers to the number of unique incidences of service provision. 
 
b Overall spending refers to annual spending for services covered by Part A and B of Medicare. See Table 1.1 for service category assignments and for 
operational definitions of all measures. 
 
c Total does not equal column sum because some patients received multiple different services. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Service Detection 
 This section briefly describes our method for detecting services meeting our 
operational definitions of low-value service. These methods are described fully in prior 
work.1 To detect each service, we first searched for potential low-value services using 
their Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) code in the Medicare Carrier and 
Outpatient Research Identifiable Files. Services performed in the inpatient setting 
appear in the Carrier file, which contains claims filed on behalf of physicians and other 
non-institutional providers. Services performed in the outpatient setting appear in the 
Carrier and/or the Outpatient file depending on whether they took place in a hospital or 
non-hospital outpatient setting.  
 We determined whether target services satisfied our operational definitions of 
low-value services on the basis of patient demographic and clinical data found in claims 
or other Medicare research files. For example, the Beneficiary Annual Summary File was 
the source of patient data on age, sex, and the presence of the chronic conditions 
available in the Chronic Conditions Warehouse (CCW) segment of the file. In assessing 
whether a service met the operational definition of a low-value service, we employed 
claims data from as early as January 1 of the year prior to the service being evaluated. 
For example, we searched for relevant patient diagnoses on the basis of International 
Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) codes in the claims for target services 
and in prior claims.  
Some operational definitions of low-value services included criteria based on the 
site of care or the timing of the service.  For example, low-value preoperative services 
were defined as occurring prior to surgical operations, which were detected on the 
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basis of a CPT code or Berenson Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) code. For some 
measures, we assessed whether the service occurred during or close to an inpatient stay 
using the admissions and discharge dates in the Medicare Provider and Analysis Review 
(MedPAR) files.  Similarly, for some measures, we assessed whether the service 
occurred close to emergency department visit on the basis of emergency department 
evaluation and management CPT codes in the Carrier and Outpatient files, emergency 
department revenue center codes in the Outpatient file, and any indication of an 
emergency department visit in a MedPAR records (i.e. emergency admissions type, 
emergency room admissions source, or emergency department charges).  
In order to avoid detecting the same service twice, we excluded the detection of 
any low-value service that occurred within seven days of the same type of low-value 
service. All codes used to detect services are presented in Table A2.1 
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Table A2.1: Codes for Measures of Low-Value Care   
Measure Codes for detection and restriction criteria Added pricing codes 
Cancer screening 
for patients with 
chronic kidney 
disease (CKD) 
receiving dialysis 
BETOS: P9A P9B (dialysis) 
CPT: 36415 
(venepuncture), 
77051-77059 
(mammography add-
on codes), 00810 
(endoscopy sedation), 
87620-87622 (HPV 
tests) 
 CPT: 77057 G0202 (breast screening), G0104-
G0106 G0120 -G0122 G0328 82270 (colorectal 
screening), G0102 G0103 84152-84154 (prostate 
screening), G0101 G0123 G0124 G0141 G0143 
G0144 G0145 G0147 G0148 P3000 P3001 Q0091 
(cervical screening) 
Cervical cancer 
screening for 
women over age 65 
CPT: G0123 G0124 G0141 G0143 G0144 G0145 
G0147 G0148 P3000 P3001 Q0091 (cervical 
screening) 
CPT: 87620-87622 
(HPV tests) 
  
ICD-9:180 184x 2190 2331 2332 2333x 6221 
(cervical and other relevant cancers, dysplasias) 
7950x-7951x (abnormal Papanicolaou finding, 
human papillomavirus positivity) V1040 V1041 
V1322 V1589  (history of cervical cancer, other 
relevant cancers, dysplasia) 
Colorectal cancer 
screening for adults 
older than age 85 
years 
CCW: Colorectal cancer first indication date 
CPT: 00810 
(sedation) 
  
ICD-9: V7651 (colon cancer screening) 
  
 
CPT: G0104-G0106 G0120-G0122 G0328 82270 
(screening codes for sigmoidoscopy, colonoscopy, 
barium enema or blood occult test) 
Prostate-specific 
antigen (PSA) 
testing for men over 
age 75 
CCW: Prostate cancer first indication date 
CPT: 36415 
(venepuncture) 
  
CPT: G0103 84152-84154 (PSA testing) 
Bone mineral 
density testing at 
frequent intervals  
CCW: Osteoporosis first indication date 
None 
  
CPT: 76070 76071 76075 76076 76078 76977 
77078-77081 77083 78350 78351 (bone density 
testing) 
Homocysteine 
testing for 
cardiovascular 
disease 
CPT: 83090 (homocysteine chemistry) 82746 
82747 82607 (folate or B12 testing) 
CPT: 36415 
(venepuncture) 
  
ICD-9: 2662 2704 2810-2812 2859 (folate or B12 
disorders) 
Hypercoagulability 
testing for patients 
with deep vein 
thrombosis 
CPT: 81240 81241 83090 85300 85303 85306 
85613 86147 (hypercoagulability chemistries) 
CPT: 83890-83914 
(nucleic acid 
molecular 
diagnostics) 
  
ICD-9: 4151 (pulmonary embolism) 4510 45111 
45119 4512 45181 4519 4534 4535 (phlebitis, 
thrombophlebitis and venous embolism of lower 
extremity vessels) V1251 V1255 (history of 
venous thrombosis and embolism, pulmonary 
embolism) 
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Table A2.1 (Continued): Codes for Measures of Low-Value Care  
Parathyroid 
hormone (PTH) 
measurement for 
patients  with 
stage 1-3 CKD  
BETOS: P9A P9B (dialysis) 
CPT: 36415 
(venepuncture) 
  
CCW: Chronic kidney disease first indication date 
  
CPT: 83970 (parathyroid hormone chemistry) 
Total or free T3 
level testing for 
patients with 
hypothyroidism 
CPT: 84480 84481 (total or free T3) 
None 
  
 
CCW: Hypothyroidism first indicaiton date 
1,25-
dihydroxyvitamin 
D testing in the 
absence of 
hypercalcemia or 
decreased kidney 
function 
CPT:82652 (1, 25 dihydroxyvitamin D3) 
None 
  CCW: Chronic kidney disease first indication date 
  
ICD-9: 27542 (hypercalcemia) 58881  (secondary 
hyperparathyroidism of renal origin) 135x 01x 173x 
174x 175x 1890 1891 188x  1830 200x-208x 
(sarcoidosis, TB, select neoplasms) 
Preoperative 
chest radiography  
BETOS: P1x P3D P4A P4B P4C P5C P5D P8A P8G  
(selected surgeries) 
None 
  
ICD-9 V7281 V7282 V7283 V7284 (preoperative 
examination 
  
 
CPT: 71010 71015 71020-71023 71030 71034 71035 
(chest x-ray), 19120 19125 47562 47563 49560 
58558 (relevant surgical codes not included in BETOS 
categories) 
Preoperative 
echocardiography 
BETOS: P1x P3D P4A P4B P4C P5C P5D P8A P8G 
(selected  surgeries) 
CPT: 93303-93352 
(echocardiography) 
  
CPT: 93303 93304 93306-93308 93312 93315 93318 
(echocardiogram) 19120 19125 47562 47563 49560 
58558 (relevant surgical codes not included in BETOS 
categories) 
Preoperative 
pulmonary 
function testing 
(PFT) 
BETOS: P1x P2x P3D P4A P4B P4C P5C P5D P8A P8G 
(selected surgeries) 
CPT: 94010-94799 
(pulmonary non-
ventilatory 
services), 93720-
93722 
(plethysmography) 
  
CPT: 94010 (spirometry)  
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Table A2.1 (Continued): Codes for Measures of Low-Value Care 
Preoperative 
stress testing 
BETOS: P1x P3D P4A P4B P4C P5C P5D P8A P8G 
(selected surgeries) 
 
CPT: 93000-93042 
(ECG), 93303-93352 
(echocardiography), 
78414-78499 
(cardiovascular 
nuclear diagnostic 
services), 75552-
75564 (cardiac 
MRI), 75571-75574 
(cardiac CT), 
A9500-A9700 
(contrast), J0150 
J0152 J0280 J1245 
J1250 J2785 
(pharmacologic 
stress test injection) 
  
CPT: 75552-75564 75574 78451-78454 78460 78461 
78464 78465 78472 78473 78481 78483 78491 78492 
93015-93018 93350 93351  0146T 0147T 0148T 
0149T (stress testing, cardiac MRI, CT angiography) 
19120 19125 47562 47563 49560 58558 (relevant 
surgical codes not included in BETOS categories) 
Computed 
tomography 
(CT) of the 
sinuses for 
uncomplicated 
acute 
rhinosinusitis  
CPT: 70486-70488 (CT of maxillofacial area) 
 
None 
 
ICD-9: 461x 473x (sinusitis), 2770x 042 07953 279xx 
(immune disorders), 471x (nasal polyp) 373xx 37600 
(eyelid/orbit inflammation), 800xx-804xx 850xx-854xx 
870xx-873xx 9590x 910xx 920xx-921xx (head or face 
trauma) 
Head imaging in 
the evaluation 
of syncope  
CPT: 70450 70460 70470 70551-70553 (CT or MRI of 
head or brain) 
 
None 
  
ICD-9: 7802 9921 (syncope), 345xx 7803x (epilepsy or 
convulsions), 43xx (cerebrovascular diseases, including 
stroke/TIA and subarachnoid hemorrhage), 800xx-
804xx 850xx-854xx 870xx-873xx 9590x 910xx 920xx-
921xx (head or face trauma), 78097 781xx 7820 7845x 
(altered mental status, nervous and musculoskeletal 
system symptoms, including gait abnormality, 
meningismus, disturbed skin sensation, speech deficits), 
V1254 V10xx (personal history of stroke/TIA ) 
Head imaging 
for 
uncomplicated 
headache 
CPT: 70450 70460 70470 70551-70553 (CT or MRI of 
head or brain) 
 
 
 
ICD-9: 30781 339xx 346x  7840 (headache or 
migraine), 33920-33922 33943 (post-traumatic or 
thunderclap headache), 14xx–208xx 230xx-239xx 
(cancer), 3463x 3466x (migraine with hemiplegia or 
infarction), 4465 (giant cell arteritis), 345xx 7803x 
(epilepsy or convulsions), 43xx (cerebrovascular 
diseases, including stroke/TIA and subarachnoid 
hemorrhage), 800xx-804xx 850xx-854xx 870xx-873xx 
9590x 910xx 920xx-921xx (head or face trauma), 78097 
781xx 7820 7845x 79953 (altered mental status, 
nervous and musculoskeletal system symptoms, 
including gait abnormality, meningismus, disturbed skin 
sensation, speech deficits), V1254 V10xx (personal 
history of stroke/TIA or cancer) 
None 
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Table A2.1 (Continued): Codes for Measures of Low-Value Care 
Electroencep
h-alogram for 
headaches 
CPT: 95812 95813 95816 95819 95822 95827 95830 
95957 (electroencephalogram)  
None  ICD-9: 30781 339x 346x 7840 (headaches) 345xx 7803x 
7810 (epilepsy or convulsions) 
Back imaging 
for patients 
with non-
specific low 
back pain  
CPT: 72010 72020 72052 72100 72110 72114 72120 
72200 72202 72220 72131-72133 72141 72142 72146-
72149 72156 72157 72158 (radiologic, CT, and MRI 
imaging of spine) 
 
None 
  
ICD-9: 7213 72190 72210 72252 7226 72293 72402 
7242-7246 72470 72471 72479 7385 7393 7394 846x 
8472 (back pain, various causes), 14xx–208xx 230xx-
239xx (cancer), 800x-839xx 850xx-854xx 86xxx 905xx-
909xx 92611 92612 929, 952xx 958xx-959xx (trauma), 
3040x-3042x 3044x 3054x-3057x (IV drug abuse), 34460 
7292x (neurologic impairment), 4210 4211 4219 
(endocarditis), 038xx (septicemia), 01xxx (tuberculosis), 
730xx (osteomyelitis), 7806x 7830x 7832x 78079 7808x 
2859x (fever, weight loss, malaise, night sweats, anemia 
not due to blood loss) 72142 72191 72270 72273 7244 
(myelopathy, neuritis and radiculopathy ) 
Screening for 
carotid artery 
disease in 
asymptomatic 
adults 
CPT: 70498 70547-70549 93880 93882 3100F (carotid 
imaging) 
 
None 
 CCW: Stroke/TIA first indication date 
 ICD-9: 430 431 43301 43311 43321 43331 43381 43391 
43400 43401 43410 43411 43490 43491 4350 4351 4353 
4358 4359 436 99702 V1254 (stroke/TIA), 3623 36284 
(retinal vascular occlusion/ischemia), 7802 781xx 7820 
78451 78452 78459 9921 (nervous and musculoskeletal 
symptoms)  
Screening for 
carotid artery 
disease for 
syncope 
CPT: 70498 70547-70549 93880 93882 3100F (carotid 
imaging) 
 
None 
  
CCW: Stroke/TIA first indication date 
  
ICD-9: 7802 9921 (syncope), 430 431 43301 43311 
43321 43331 43381 43391 43400 43401 43410 43411 
43490 43491 4350 4351 4353 4358 4359 436 99702 
V1254 (stroke/TIA), 3623 36284 (retinal vascular 
occlusion/ischemia), 781xx 7820 7845x  78459 (nervous 
and musculoskeletal symptoms) 
Imaging for 
diagnosis of 
plantar 
fasciitis/heel 
pain 
CPT:73620 73630  73650  (foot radiograph) 73718 73719 
73720 (foot MRI)  76880 76881 76882 (extremity 
ultrasound)  
None   
 
ICD-9:72871  7294  (plantar fasciitis), 71947 7295  (foot 
pain) 
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Table A2.1 (Continued): Codes for Measures of Low-Value Care 
Stress testing 
for stable 
coronary 
disease 
CPT: 75552-75564 75574 78451-78454 78460 78461 
78464 78465 78472 78473 78481 78483 78491 78492 
93015-93018 93350 93351   0146T 0147T 0148T 0149T 
(stress testing, cardiac MRI, CT angiography)  
 
CPT: 93000-93042 
(ECG), 93303-93352 
(echocardiography), 
78414-78499 
(cardiovascular 
nuclear diagnostic 
services), 75552-
75564 (cardiac 
MRI), 75571-75574 
(cardiac CT), 
A9500-A9700 
(contrast), J0150 
J0152 J0280 J1245 
J1250 J2785 
(pharmacologic 
stress test injection) 
  
CCW: Ischemic heart disease first indication date, AMI 
first indication date 
Percutaneous 
coronary 
intervention 
with balloon 
angioplasty or 
stent 
placement  
for stable 
coronary 
disease 
CPT: 92980 92982 (coronary stent placement or balloon 
angiography) 
 
DRG: 246-251a 
(percutaneous 
cardiovascular 
procedure) 
 
CCW: Ischemic heart disease first indication date, AMI 
first indication date 
Renal artery 
angioplasty or 
stenting 
CPT: 35471 35450 37205 37207 75960 75966 (renal 
artery angioplasty or stenting) 
 
Noneb 
  
ICD-9: 4401 40501 40511 40591 (atherosclerosis of renal 
artery, renovascular hypertension), 36221 40xxx 4372 
(hypertension) 
Carotid 
endarterecto
my in 
asymptomatic 
patients 
CPT: 35301 (carotid endarterectomy) 
 
ICD-9 Procedure: 
3812 0040-0042a 
(carotid 
endarterectomy) 
  
CCW: Stroke/TIA first indication date 
  
ICD-9: 430 431 43301 43311 43321 43331 43381 43391 
43400 43401 43410 43411 43490 43491 4350 4351 4353 
4358 4359 436 99702 V1254  (stroke/TIA), 3623 36284 
(retinal vascular occlusion/ischemia), 781xx 7820 7845x 
(nervous and musculoskeletal symptoms) 
Inferior vena 
cava filters 
for the 
prevention of 
pulmonary 
embolism  
CPT: 37191 37192 (IVC placement, repositioning) 75940 
(radiological supervision of inferior vena cava filter 
placement) 
CPT: 36010 37620 
75825 76937 
(catheter insertion, 
IVC interruption, 
venography, 
ultrasound 
guidance) 
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Table A2.1 (Continued): Codes for Measures of Low-Value Care 
Pulmonary 
Artery 
Catheterizatio
n in the ICU 
CPT: 93503 (Swan-Ganz placement) 
 
None 
  
 
ICD-9: 4233 (cardiac tamponade) 4160 4161 4162 4168 
4169 (pulmonary hypertension) 
  
 
MS-DRGs (2008-2012)d: 001-003 005-008 010 020-033 
037-042 113-117 129-139 163-168 215-245 252-264 
326-358 405-425 453-517 820-830 853-858 876 901-909 
927-929 939-941 955-959 969-970 981-989  
Vertebroplast
y or 
kyphoplasty 
for 
osteoporotic 
vertebral 
fractures 
CPT: 22520 22521 22523 22524 (vertebroplasty, 
kyphoplasty) 
 
Noneb 
 
ICD-9: 73313 8052 8054 (vertebral fracture) , 1702 1985 
20973 20300-20302 2132 22809 2380 2386 2392 
(primary or secondary neoplasm of vertebral column, 
multiple myeloma, hemangioma) 
Arthroscopic 
surgery for 
knee 
osteoarthritis 
CPT: 29877 29879 29880 29881 G0289 (knee 
arthroscopy with chondroplasty) 
 
Noneb 
  
ICD-9: 7177 73392 71500 71509 71510 71516 71526 
71536 71596 (chondromalacia, osteoarthritis), 8360-
8362 7170 71741 (meniscal tear) 
Spinal 
injection for 
low-back pain 
CPT: 62311 64483 (epidural injections) 20552 20553 
(trigger point injections) 64493 64475  (facet injections) 
J1438 (etanercept injection) 
 
Noneb 
  ICD-9: 72142 72210  72270 72273 7243 7244 (back pain 
with radiculopathy) 7213 72190 72210 7222 72252 7226 
72280 72283 72293 72400 72402 72403 7242 7245 7246 
72470 72471 72479 7384 7385 7393 7384 7385 7393 
7394 75612 8460-8463 8468 8469 8472 (other back 
pain) 
 
a. The pricing sample was restricted to detected hospital admissions with these DRG codes.  All 
professional charges for expenses incurred on the same day of service were included in pricing 
estimates along with the DRG allowed charges. 
  
b The pricing sample was restricted to detected episodes that appeared in both the Carrier and 
Outpatient files.  All institutional and professional charges for expenses incurred on the same day 
of service were included in pricing estimates. 
 
c The pricing sample was restricted to detected hospital admissions with no procedures besides 
those listed here.  All professional charges for expenses incurred on the same day of service were 
included in pricing estimates. 
 
d Non-medical DRGs were defined according to methods presented in a prior study.6 
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Statistical Analysis: Variation, Consistency and Persistence 
 In this section, we provide a more detailed description of our methods for 
producing estimates of variation, consistency, and persistence of organizations’ use 
of low-value services.  All analyses involved three general steps. First, we adjusted 
beneficiary’s use of each of the 31 low-value services for case mix. For each service, 
this case mix adjustment allowed us to isolate each beneficiary’s residual low-value 
service use that could not be explained by various sociodemographic, clinical, 
temporal and regional characteristics. Second, residuals from the case-mix 
adjustment model were used to calculate organizations’ composite scores of low-
value service use. The composite scores reflected the use of several different low-
value services, either across the whole study period (i.e. for our analyses of variation 
and consistency) or during a single year (i.e. for our analysis of persistence). Third, 
we fit random effects models to these composite scores in order to estimate the 
parameters of interest.  We begin by describing our analysis of organizations’ 
variation in low-value service use. Each subsequent section describes the extensions 
to these methods that were required for analyzing consistency and persistence of 
organizational behavior. 
 
Variation  
 This analysis produced an estimate of the across-organization standard 
deviation in the case mix-adjusted count of low-value services per 100 beneficiaries. 
We also present a corresponding estimate of the ratio of adjusted low-value service 
counts at organizations at the 90th vs 10th percentile.  
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We performed case mix adjustment via ordinary least squares regressions 
for each low-value service. In these models, the outcome variable was each the 
number of times a beneficiary received the low-value service during the year. The 
regressions included patient sociodemographic characteristics, indicators for 
patient HRR, and indicators for year. Only beneficiaries who satisfied the 
denominator criteria for the service were included in the model, since other 
beneficiaries could not have received the measured service. Because some of the 
306 HRRs might be served by only one of the 250 ACOs, we included an additional 
group of beneficiaries in these models to serve as a regional control group. These 
additional beneficiaries (n=20,520,493) were not assigned to ACOs, and 
accumulated the majority of their annual allowed charges for primary care at a non-
ACO TIN. Including them in the case mix adjustment models ensured that patient 
region and provider organization were not perfectly correlated. Regressions were of 
the following form: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 
In this equation, i denotes beneficiary, j denotes their assigned provider 
organization, t denotes year, and k denotes the service. 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 includes the 
patient sociodemographic and clinical characteristics listed in the manuscript, as 
well as HRR indicators. We performed these regressions both with and without HRR 
indicators in order to compare estimates of organizational variation that included 
adjustment for region to estimates that did not.  
The prediction errors from the case mix adjustment models, 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑘, served as 
the basis for calculating  organizations’ composite score for the total number low-
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value services per beneficiary. For each organization in our sample, a component 
measure of each low-value service, ?̂?𝑗𝑘, was calculated as the average residual for 
beneficiary-years attributed to that organization: 
?̂?𝑗𝑘 = ∑ 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡𝑖𝑡 / ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑖     
where 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the number of years during which a beneficiary was assigned to 
organization j and satisfied the denominator criteria for service k.  ?̂?𝑗𝑘 represents the 
difference between an organization’s average number of low-value services per 
denominator beneficiary and the number that would be predicted from the case mix 
adjustment model.  
The composite measure for overall low-value service use was calculated as a 
weighted sum of these component scores: 
𝑅?̂? = ∑ 𝑤𝑘 ?̂?𝑗𝑘𝑘   
where 𝑤𝑘 is the proportion of all person-year observations in the sample that 
satisfied the denominator conditions. This approach does not give greater weight in 
the composite measure to services that apply to a greater proportion of the 
population. Instead, the weighting standardizes each service’s contribution by the 
number of beneficiaries included in the case mix adjustment models. For intuition 
behind this result, note that the total number of low-value services per beneficiary 
would be the same if a service were used one time per person in an entire 
population or if a service were used twice per person in half of that population. 
Thus, 𝑅?̂? approximates an organization’s residual case mix-adjusted count of all low-
value services. 
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 We estimate the across-organization variation in 𝑅𝑗  using Fay–Herriot-type 
models.2–4 This class of models allows for the estimation of multilevel model 
parameters after collapsing data to the highest level of analysis, which in our case, is 
the organization. This approach had computational advantages for our study given 
that the data contain millions or tens of millions of beneficiary-year observations 
among hundreds or thousands of organizations.  Specifically, for our analysis of 
organizational variation, we fit the following model:  
𝑅?̂? = 𝑅𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗 
with  𝑅𝑗  ~ 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎
(𝑅)) and 𝑒𝑗  ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑗
(𝑒)) 
Our parameter of interest is 𝜎(𝑅), the across-organization standard deviation of 𝑅𝑗 . 
The purpose of random effects estimation in this context is to account for sampling 
error, which results in over-dispersion of observed 𝑅?̂? relative to its true 
distribution.  Because, in our Fay–Herriot model, the data are aggregated to the 
organization level, with a single observation per organization, accounting for 
sampling error requires separately estimating the sampling variance. 
Following methods described for analyzing composite quality measures from 
the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS),5 we 
calculated the sampling variance of 𝑅?̂? in two steps. First, we calculated the following 
error term: 
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 =
∑ 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 ?̂?𝑗𝑘
 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑖
 
When an individual did not qualify for the denominator of a service, 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 and 
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 were both zero. The denominator is an organization’s total number of 
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beneficiary-year observations for service k. By collapsing the prediction error to the 
beneficiary-organization-service level, our variance estimate accounts for possible 
temporal autocorrelation in beneficiary use of a low-value service. The composite 
measure variance is then calculated as  
𝜎2(𝑒)̂ = ∑ (∑ 𝑤𝑘𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑘 )
2
 𝑖 ∙
𝑛𝑗
𝑛𝑗−1
   
where 𝑛𝑗  is the number of beneficiaries assigned to the organization during the 
study period. This formula can be derived via Taylor series approximation of 𝑅?̂?. 
 We estimated the 95% confidence interval for the across-organization 
standard deviation by bootstrapping. Specifically, we obtained 1,000 parameter 
estimates by repeatedly drawing observations from the set of organizations with 
replacement and running the Fay–Herriot model. Noting that these parameter 
estimates had a roughly normal distribution, we used a normal approximation, 
calculating the 95% confidence intervals as the parameter point estimate plus or 
minus 1.96 times the standard deviation of bootstrapped parameter estimates.  
We also used a normal approximation to calculated the 90th/10th percentile 
ratio, another measure of organizational variation. This was calculated based on a 
normal distribution centered at the unadjusted mean number of low-value services 
among all organizations (Table 1), with a standard deviation estimated via the Fay–
Herriot model. Specifically, the 90th percentile was calculated as the grand mean 
plus 1.28 times the adjusted standard deviation, and the 10th percentile was 
calculated as the grand mean minus 1.28 times the adjusted standard deviation.   
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Consistency  
The parameters of interest in our consistency analysis were the pairwise 
correlations between each service categories’ composite scores. The methods for 
producing these estimates were extremely similar to those of the variation analysis. 
The same case-mix adjustment models that were used for the variation analysis 
were used for the consistency analysis. The distinguishing feature of the consistency 
analysis was that we calculated multiple composite scores, one for each of the six 
clinical categories of low-value services. In the variation analysis, the single 
composite measure was constructed from all 31 component services. In the 
consistency analysis, the six composite measures were each constructed from only 
the K component services that fall within the same clinical category, c. Thus, the 
formula for composite scores is:  
𝑅𝑐?̂? = ∑ 𝑤𝑘?̂?𝑗𝑘
𝐾𝑐
𝑘=1
 
Similarly, the estimated variance of each composite measure was a function of the 
prediction errors for the K services: 
𝑉𝑐𝑗 = 𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑅𝑐?̂?|𝑅𝑐𝑗) = ∑ (∑ 𝑤𝑘𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 
𝐾𝑐
𝑘=1
)
2
 𝑖
 ̇
𝑛𝑗
𝑛𝑗 − 1
  
 Because there are six composite measures per organization, the 
corresponding Fay–Herriot model is multivariate normal rather than univariate. 
Specifically, the model is:  
𝑅?̂?  = (
𝑅1?̂?
⋮
𝑅6?̂?
) ~ 𝑁(𝑅𝑗 , 𝑉𝑗),  where 
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𝑅𝑗 = (
𝑅1𝑗
⋮
𝑅6𝑗
) ~ 𝑁(𝜇, Σ) and  𝑉𝑗 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑉1𝑗 … 𝑉6𝑗) 
This model includes correlated organizational random effects, and the correlation 
between each pair of service domains is extracted from Σ.  These estimated 
correlations between random effects are presented in Table 4. Again, 95% 
confidence intervals were estimated via bootstrapping, with the normal 
approximation described above.  
 
Persistence 
 The parameter of interest for our persistence analysis was the correlation 
between organizations’ low-value service composite scores in 2010 and 2011.  Like 
the variation analysis, the persistence analysis employed composite measures that 
included all 31 low-value services.  Like the consistency analysis, the persistence 
analysis involved constructing multiple composite scores, one for 2010 and one for 
2011, which would be included in a multivariate correlated random effects model.  
One distinctive obstacle for estimating organizational persistence in behavior is the 
problem of autocorrelation in beneficiary outcomes over time.  This problem did not 
arise for the variation and consistency analyses, since those composite measures 
were based on averaging 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 across all years of the study period. Organizational 
behavior could artificially appear correlated over time if positive temporal 
autocorrelation in a patient’s service use were driving the result.  
We purge our samples of this potential autocorrelation by estimating 2010 
and 2011 composite measures for mutually exclusive sets of beneficiaries. Because 
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no beneficiaries are present in both of the modified 2010 and 2011 samples, 
autocorrelation in patient outcomes can no longer introduce bias into the 
correlation estimate. In order to maintain a representative sample of beneficiaries, 
we randomly assign each beneficiary who is present in our 2010 and/or 2011 
sample to be included in either the 2010 sample (50% chance) or 2011 sample 
(50% chance). Then, we drop all beneficiary observations that do not occur in the 
assigned year. For instance, if a bene appeared in 2010 and in 2011, and is assigned 
to 2010, only their 2010 observation will be included. If a bene appeared only in 
2011 and was assigned to 2010, then they will not appear in the final sample. Note 
that many more beneficiary observations would have been dropped if we used more 
than two years of data in our persistence analysis. 
Following these modifications to our sample, we repeated the case-mix 
adjustment regressions using the new 2010-2011 sample. Component measures ?̂?𝑗𝑘𝑡 
were then calculated at the organization-year level as the average of 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 within 
each organization for 2010 and 2011. Similarly, The composite measure 𝑅𝑗?̂?  is 
constructed from all 31 measure components as 𝑅𝑗?̂? = ∑ 𝑤𝑘?̂?𝑗𝑘𝑡𝑘 . Since all 
beneficiaries are only present in the data for a single year, the previously described 
prediction error term is now calculated as: 
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 =
𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 −  ?̂?𝑗𝑘𝑡
 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
 
The variance of the composite measure estimates are each calculated as  
 
 
159 
 
 
𝑉𝑗𝑡 = 𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑅𝑗?̂?|𝑅𝑗𝑡)
̂ = (∑ (∑ 𝑤𝑘𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 
𝑘
)
2
 𝑖
)    ̇
𝑛𝑗
𝑛𝑗 − 1
 
where 𝑛𝑗  equals the total number of beneficiaries in the modified sample who were 
assigned to each organization in both 2010 and 2011. To estimate the correlation in 
organizational behavior over time, we fit the following model: 
𝑅?̂?  = (
𝑅𝑗2010̂
𝑅𝑗2011̂
) ~ 𝑁(𝑅𝑗 , 𝑉𝑗),  where 
𝑅𝑗 = (
𝑅𝑗2010
𝑅𝑗2011
) ~ 𝑁(𝜇, Σ) and  𝑉𝑗 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑉𝑗2010, 𝑉𝑗2011) 
Again, correlations between the random effects are extracted from Σ. These 
correlations are presented in Table 3. 
 
Pioneer ACO Evaluation 
Prices 
Constructing standardized prices for each service allowed us to categorize 
services by price (high-price vs low-price) and to include a dollar-denominated 
measure of low-value service use as a study outcome.  For each measure, a standardized 
price was calculated as the median of total allowed charges (from Medicare, 
beneficiaries and other payers) for relevant services in a care episode.  Prices were 
calculated based on services detected in the first year of our study period.   
For 25 of 31 measures, relevant services consisted of the detected service and 
other specific services delivered on the same day. For example, venipuncture is 
included as a relevant service for PSA screening.  For the remaining six measures, which 
detected procedural/surgical services, it was not possible to comprehensively specify 
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the many CPT codes that could be relevant to the service episode.  As described in prior 
methods,1 we employed alternate pricing methods for these measures based on total 
daily charges and/or inpatient prospective payments.  For services sometimes 
performed in the outpatient setting (vertebroplasty, renal artery angioplasty, 
arthroscopic knee surgery, and spinal injections), price was estimated based on the sum 
of Carrier and Outpatient charges during the day of the procedure.  For surgical 
procedures occurring near-exclusively in the inpatient setting (carotid endarterectomy 
and PCI), price was estimated based on the sum of allowed Carrier charges during the 
procedure date and the spending allowed by the MS-DRG in the MedPAR file.  CPT and 
MS-DRG codes for relevant services are included in column 3 of Table A2.1. 
In order to ensure that prices were consistent across measures, prices for 
identical services included in multiple different measures (e.g. head imaging for 
syncope and head imaging for headache) were based on a pooled set of care episodes 
detected by both measures. For measures that include multiple services with 
substantial variation in price, we calculated a standardized price for each service.  For 
example, separate prices were calculated for stress testing involving only exercise 
treadmill testing and for tests including advanced imaging.  
The 16 measures with the highest standardized prices were designated as high-
price and the remaining 15 were designated as low-price.  Each beneficiary’s annual 
spending on detected services was calculated by multiplying his or her annual count of 
each service by its standardized price.   
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Qualifying Indicators 
 Many beneficiaries do not fit the demographic or clinical characteristics needed 
to qualify for potential receipt of services we measured.  Failure to account for 
differential changes in the qualifying characteristics of beneficiaries in the ACO vs non-
ACO groups could introduce bias into our difference-in-difference estimations.  As a 
result, we include binary indicators of measure qualification as covariates in our 
models.  These qualification criteria are included in Table 2.1.1.  We avoided 
qualification criteria based on symptoms (i.e. back pain or headache) since whether a 
beneficiary meets such criteria could be influenced by changing provider practice 
patterns.  Based on these criteria, fifteen binary indicators for measure qualification 
were constructed (some applying to multiple measures) for each beneficiary in each 
year of our study sample.  
We conducted a sensitivity test in which qualifying indicators were omitted from 
regressions estimating differential changes in the count of low-value services and 
associated spending.  Results were extremely close to those presented in Table 2.2.3.  In 
these analyses, the start of Pioneer contracts was associated with a differential 
reduction of 0.8 low value services per 100 beneficiaries in the ACO group (P<0.001) 
and a differential reduction in spending on these services of $455 per 100 beneficiaries 
(P=0.005). These corresponded to reductions of 2.0% and 4.4%, respectively.  
 
Baseline Outcomes and Mean Reversion 
Two measures were constructed to assess organizations’ baseline rate of low-
value service delivery in 2008.  The first, a measure of service area rates, isolated 
practice patterns that can be attributed to geography.  The measure is based on the risk-
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adjusted count of low-value services in each ACO’s geographic service area among 
beneficiaries in the non-ACO group.  This parameter is calculated by performing linear 
regression of the total counts of low-value services on a set of HRR indicators as well as 
the demographic and clinical controls appearing in our main analyses, for the 2008 non-
ACO sample.  Then, for each ACO, we calculate an average of the HRR coefficients that is 
weighted by number of the ACO’s beneficiaries in each HRR. ACOs are then categorized 
as serving areas with high or low levels of low-value services according to whether the 
weighted average falls above or below that of the median ACO. The second measure 
assesses the ACO’s baseline performance relative to its geographic service area. This 
measure is calculated using the full ACO and non-ACO sample by regressing low-value 
service counts on beneficiary covariates, HRR indicators and ACO indicators. ACOs are 
classified as deviating above or below the HRR average based on whether their fixed 
effects coefficients are greater than zero or less than zero.   
These measures, based on 2008 data, are predictive of ACO characteristics in the 
2009-2011 pre-contract period.  In the 2009-2011 ACO group, the adjusted utilization 
of low-value services relative to the local mean was 5.5 services per 100 beneficiaries 
higher for ACOs with levels greater than the local mean in 2008 that that of ACOs with 
levels lower than the local mean in 2008 (P<0.001).  Also, in 2009-2011, the adjusted 
count of low-value services in ACO service areas was 12.2 services per 100 beneficiaries 
higher for ACOs classified as high use services areas in 2008 than for those classified as 
low use service areas (P<0.001). 
In order to minimize the possibility of bias from regression to the mean, these 
baseline characteristics were measured in 2008, before the start of the study period.  
Bias from regression to the mean may occur whenever analyzing whether high or low 
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baseline levels of an outcome predict future changes in that outcome.  This possibility is 
unlikely in our study, however, since there was no evidence of regression to the mean 
during the pre-contract period.  Indeed, ACOs with high baseline utilization levels 
relative to their service area saw adjusted low-value service utilization grow somewhat 
faster by 0.5 services per year during 2009-2011 (P=.06), a temporal trend in the 
opposite direction as would be predicted by regression to the mean.  
 
Analyses Adjusting for Pre-Contract Trends 
We repeated our main analyses with models that test and adjust for the 
presence of non-parallel trends in outcomes between the ACO and non-ACO groups 
during the pre-contract period. These models were of the following form: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖,𝑡,𝑘,ℎ) =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐴𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑘 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑅𝑅_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠ℎ × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡  +   𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝑂_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑘
× 2012𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝑂_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑘 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑡  +  𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  
 
where “Year_Continuous” is the year of study observation, specified continuously 
(2009-2012). This model differs from those described in the body of the manuscript 
because of the inclusion of the “ACO_Group×Year_Continuous” term, whose β4 
coefficient represents the difference in linear annual trend between the ACO and non-
ACO group in the pre-contract period. The magnitude and statistical significance of this 
coefficient serve as our test for non-parallel trends in the pre-contract period. There 
was no statistically significant evidence of non-parallel trends for any of the outcomes 
reported in Table 3.  For example, during the pre-contract period, the adjusted annual 
count of low-value services in the ACO group changed at a rate of 0.1 services per 100 
beneficiaries per year faster than the non-ACO group (P=0.74), and adjusted spending 
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on low-value services in the ACO group changed at a rate of $20 per 100 beneficiaries 
per year slower (P=0.88).   
β3 remains the coefficient representing the estimated effect of Pioneer contracts 
in 2012. However, this estimate now reflects the assumption that, in the absence of the 
Pioneer contract, outcomes in the ACO group would have continued according to the 
estimated prior linear trend, which may not have been parallel to that of non-ACO 
beneficiaries in the region. This may not be a reasonable assumption, especially if a pre-
contract divergence in trends is due to randomness. Such divergence in pre-contract 
trend would tend to be followed by convergence in the post-contract period rather than 
continued divergence, due to regression to the mean. Importantly, introducing the trend 
term into this model increases the confidence intervals on the β3 coefficient because the 
estimates now incorporate the additional uncertainty with which these extrapolated 
trends were estimated. Still, we believe that these models may serve a useful purpose as 
a robustness test even though no statistically significant divergent trends were found in 
the pre-contract period. Trend-adjusted differential changes in low-value service 
frequency are presented in Table A2.2.  The magnitudes of these estimates are largely 
similar to those presented in Table 2.2.3. Following trend-adjustment, the magnitude of 
the differential reduction in the count of low-value services was largely unchanged, 
moving from 1.9% to 2.1%, as was the magnitude of the differential decrease in 
spending on low-value services, moving from 4.5% to 4.1%. 
In order to adjust our analyses of organizational subgroups for pre-contract 
trends, we introduced interactions between the organizational characteristics of 
interest and the β3 and β4 terms. Results from these analyses are presented in Figure 
A2.1.  Following trend adjustment, the estimated effects of Pioneer contracts were still 
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greater for ACOs with higher baseline levels of low-value services than their service 
area (-1.8 services per 100 beneficiaries) than for ACOs with lower baseline rates (-0.1 
services per 100 beneficiaries, P=0.002 for difference), and there were still no 
statistically significant associations between ACO performance and other characteristics 
of the organizations.   
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Table A2.2 Trend-Adjusted Differential Changes in Low-Value Service Frequency, by Service 
Annual Count or Spending per 100 Beneficiaries 
Trend-
Adjusted 
Differential 
Change  95% CI 
Trend-Adjusted 
Differential 
Change as 
percent of ACO 
Meana  95% CI P-Value 
Total low-value services, no. -0.9 (-1.5, -0.2) -2.1 (-3.7, -0.5) 0.01 
Total low-value service spending, $ -420 (-937, 98) -4.1 (-9.1, 1) 0.11 
  
 
 
 
 Low-value services by clinical category, no.b 
 
 
 
 
    Cancer screening -0.2 (-0.5, 0.2) -1.5 (-4.6, 1.6) 0.33 
   Testing -0.3 (-0.6, 0.1) -3.0 (-7, 1.1) 0.15 
   Preoperative Services -0.1 (-0.2, 0.1) -2.4 (-8.7, 3.9) 0.46 
   Imaging -0.2 (-0.6, 0.2) -1.4 (-4, 1.1) 0.26 
   Cardiovascular Tests and Procedures -0.1 (-0.1, 0) -7.5 (-14.8, -0.2) 0.04 
   Other Invasive Procedures -0.1 (-0.4, 0.2) -2.7 (-9.1, 3.7) 0.41 
  
 
 
 
 Low-value services by price, no.b  
 
 
 
 
    High price -0.2 (-0.7, 0.2) -1.4 (-4.2, 1.4) 0.31 
   Low price -0.6 (-1.2, -0.1) -2.5 (-4.6, -0.4) 0.02 
  
 
 
 
 Low-value services by sensitivity to patient 
preferences, nob 
 
 
 
 
    More sensitive -0.7 (-1.4, -0.1) -2.7 (-5, -0.3) 0.03 
   Less sensitive -0.1 (-0.5, 0.2) -0.9 (-3.6, 1.8) 0.51 
ACO  = Accountable Care Organization 
 
a Calculated as the differential change divided by the adjusted 2012 mean for ACO group.  
 
b Note that the sum of differential changes within each set of service categories equals the total differential change. 
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   FIGURE. A2.1  Trend-Adjusted Differential Changes in Use of Low-Value Services in ACO vs. Control Group, by Baseline Use 
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